Narrative:

All pretkof engine start; pretaxi; taxi; and before takeoff checklists were performed in accordance with SOP. We were cleared into position and hold by iad tower. After about 1 min; we were cleared for takeoff. I released the brakes and applied toga power as per our performance requirements for runway 30 winds; weights; and temperature. As we approached about 40 KTS; we heard a loud explosion and the aircraft veered to the left. I retarded the throttles to idle; applied maximum braking and called 'abort.' before the aircraft stopped; I told the passenger to remain seated using the aircraft PA system. At that time; we received an 'engine failure' ECAM. We ran the ECAM checklist for engine failure. We had no indication of fire in the aircraft. As the first officer was running the ECAM checklist; he called the tower to report the abort and called for fire trucks to roll. I called the purser and asked him to look out the left emergency escape window to see if we were on fire. He reported back in about 30 seconds that there was no fire. Shortly after; I heard the fire truck call tower and say the engine was on fire. I believe his words were; 'fully involved.' I keyed the microphone; called the fire truck and confirm the fire. He confirmed the fire and I commenced to start an evacuate/evacuation. I told the flight attendants to use the right side exits only to keep the passenger out of the fire on the left and to keep them out of the way of the fire trucks. We still had no fire warning in the cockpit. I told the first officer to run the evacuate/evacuation checklist and he complied. The aircraft was totally empty and power was off the aircraft in approximately 58 seconds using the 3 exits on the right side of the aircraft. I cut 2 fingers on my left hand trying to get the cover for my escape rope off. It was very hard to get off. To my knowledge there were no other injuries. I was the last to evacuate/evacuation the aircraft after running the full length of the aircraft and checking all lavatories for people. Supplemental information from acn 692924: I was executing the #1 engine failure ECAM as directed by the captain. We followed the ECAM steps and did not put a second fire bottle into the engine because the fire light was not illuminated. The fire trucks showed up soon afterwards and reported that there was in fact a fire in the #1 engine. The captain immediately called for the evacuate/evacuation qrc. It was also announced to the flight attendants that we would be evacuating out the right side of the airplane. We also opened the cockpit windows and threw out the escape lines in case they would be needed. All passenger were immediately removed away from the airplane with help from the fire department and were gathered together.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 FLT CREW HAS #1 ENG FAILURE DURING TKOF; ABORTS THE TKOF; AND EVACS THE ACFT WITH NO INJURIES TO PAX.

Narrative: ALL PRETKOF ENG START; PRETAXI; TAXI; AND BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS WERE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOP. WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD BY IAD TWR. AFTER ABOUT 1 MIN; WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. I RELEASED THE BRAKES AND APPLIED TOGA PWR AS PER OUR PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR RWY 30 WINDS; WTS; AND TEMP. AS WE APCHED ABOUT 40 KTS; WE HEARD A LOUD EXPLOSION AND THE ACFT VEERED TO THE L. I RETARDED THE THROTTLES TO IDLE; APPLIED MAX BRAKING AND CALLED 'ABORT.' BEFORE THE ACFT STOPPED; I TOLD THE PAX TO REMAIN SEATED USING THE ACFT PA SYS. AT THAT TIME; WE RECEIVED AN 'ENG FAILURE' ECAM. WE RAN THE ECAM CHKLIST FOR ENG FAILURE. WE HAD NO INDICATION OF FIRE IN THE ACFT. AS THE FO WAS RUNNING THE ECAM CHKLIST; HE CALLED THE TWR TO RPT THE ABORT AND CALLED FOR FIRE TRUCKS TO ROLL. I CALLED THE PURSER AND ASKED HIM TO LOOK OUT THE L EMER ESCAPE WINDOW TO SEE IF WE WERE ON FIRE. HE RPTED BACK IN ABOUT 30 SECONDS THAT THERE WAS NO FIRE. SHORTLY AFTER; I HEARD THE FIRE TRUCK CALL TWR AND SAY THE ENG WAS ON FIRE. I BELIEVE HIS WORDS WERE; 'FULLY INVOLVED.' I KEYED THE MIKE; CALLED THE FIRE TRUCK AND CONFIRM THE FIRE. HE CONFIRMED THE FIRE AND I COMMENCED TO START AN EVAC. I TOLD THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO USE THE R SIDE EXITS ONLY TO KEEP THE PAX OUT OF THE FIRE ON THE L AND TO KEEP THEM OUT OF THE WAY OF THE FIRE TRUCKS. WE STILL HAD NO FIRE WARNING IN THE COCKPIT. I TOLD THE FO TO RUN THE EVAC CHKLIST AND HE COMPLIED. THE ACFT WAS TOTALLY EMPTY AND PWR WAS OFF THE ACFT IN APPROX 58 SECONDS USING THE 3 EXITS ON THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT. I CUT 2 FINGERS ON MY L HAND TRYING TO GET THE COVER FOR MY ESCAPE ROPE OFF. IT WAS VERY HARD TO GET OFF. TO MY KNOWLEDGE THERE WERE NO OTHER INJURIES. I WAS THE LAST TO EVAC THE ACFT AFTER RUNNING THE FULL LENGTH OF THE ACFT AND CHKING ALL LAVATORIES FOR PEOPLE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 692924: I WAS EXECUTING THE #1 ENG FAILURE ECAM AS DIRECTED BY THE CAPT. WE FOLLOWED THE ECAM STEPS AND DID NOT PUT A SECOND FIRE BOTTLE INTO THE ENG BECAUSE THE FIRE LIGHT WAS NOT ILLUMINATED. THE FIRE TRUCKS SHOWED UP SOON AFTERWARDS AND RPTED THAT THERE WAS IN FACT A FIRE IN THE #1 ENG. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY CALLED FOR THE EVAC QRC. IT WAS ALSO ANNOUNCED TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS THAT WE WOULD BE EVACUATING OUT THE R SIDE OF THE AIRPLANE. WE ALSO OPENED THE COCKPIT WINDOWS AND THREW OUT THE ESCAPE LINES IN CASE THEY WOULD BE NEEDED. ALL PAX WERE IMMEDIATELY REMOVED AWAY FROM THE AIRPLANE WITH HELP FROM THE FIRE DEPT AND WERE GATHERED TOGETHER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.