Ground personnel and additional baggage to an EMB145 after pushback; with both engines running.

Attributes
ACN	692957
Time
Date	200604
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : lga.airport
State Reference	NY
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	ground : pushback
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time type : 1500
ASRS Report	692957
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Events
Anomaly	non adherence : company policies
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Company
Primary Problem	Company

Narrative:

We were pushing back and in contact with ramp control. I was told I was cleared to start and started engine #2 in the pushback. After the push; they disconnected and I started engine #1. After it was started; I observed a ramp person waving 1 finger at me and pointing to engine #1. I thought he was indicating that I was ok to start engine #1. It was already started. He then pointed again to engine #1. Unable to communicate; the headset was already disconnected; I contacted ramp asking if they saw a problem or if they knew what was going on. About that time the baggage door opened and he came back and said that they had a last min bag and were putting it on. It is obvious that they should not have opened the baggage door with the engine running; it was too late to stop them; plus the paperwork was already finalized. I reminded them to make the appropriate change on the paperwork; but I have no idea if this occurred. My main concern is that the safety of the ramp persons and aircraft were jeopardized for 1 bag. Additionally; I was not alerted verbally about what was happening. In conclusion: the bag should have not been loaded and I should have been made more aware of the situation. Staying connected with the headsets would have alleviated the confusion; but the willingness to deviation from and the disregard for basic safety was the main issue.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GND PERSONNEL AND ADDITIONAL BAGGAGE TO AN EMB145 AFTER PUSHBACK; WITH BOTH ENGS RUNNING.

Narrative: WE WERE PUSHING BACK AND IN CONTACT WITH RAMP CTL. I WAS TOLD I WAS CLRED TO START AND STARTED ENG #2 IN THE PUSHBACK. AFTER THE PUSH; THEY DISCONNECTED AND I STARTED ENG #1. AFTER IT WAS STARTED; I OBSERVED A RAMP PERSON WAVING 1 FINGER AT ME AND POINTING TO ENG #1. I THOUGHT HE WAS INDICATING THAT I WAS OK TO START ENG #1. IT WAS ALREADY STARTED. HE THEN POINTED AGAIN TO ENG #1. UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE; THE HEADSET WAS ALREADY DISCONNECTED; I CONTACTED RAMP ASKING IF THEY SAW A PROB OR IF THEY KNEW WHAT WAS GOING ON. ABOUT THAT TIME THE BAGGAGE DOOR OPENED AND HE CAME BACK AND SAID THAT THEY HAD A LAST MIN BAG AND WERE PUTTING IT ON. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE OPENED THE BAGGAGE DOOR WITH THE ENG RUNNING; IT WAS TOO LATE TO STOP THEM; PLUS THE PAPERWORK WAS ALREADY FINALIZED. I REMINDED THEM TO MAKE THE APPROPRIATE CHANGE ON THE PAPERWORK; BUT I HAVE NO IDEA IF THIS OCCURRED. MY MAIN CONCERN IS THAT THE SAFETY OF THE RAMP PERSONS AND ACFT WERE JEOPARDIZED FOR 1 BAG. ADDITIONALLY; I WAS NOT ALERTED VERBALLY ABOUT WHAT WAS HAPPENING. IN CONCLUSION: THE BAG SHOULD HAVE NOT BEEN LOADED AND I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE MORE AWARE OF THE SITUATION. STAYING CONNECTED WITH THE HEADSETS WOULD HAVE ALLEVIATED THE CONFUSION; BUT THE WILLINGNESS TO DEV FROM AND THE DISREGARD FOR BASIC SAFETY WAS THE MAIN ISSUE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.