Narrative:

After an uneventful first leg from tulsa arriving slightly late in st louis; I assisted with some um's to keep the process flowing; quickly reviewed and signed the paperwork and proceeded to greet the passenger as they came aboard. I failed to take note of the first 4 lines at the top of the WX package about the use of runway 29; but concentrated on the WX in baltimore. We loaded everyone on board and pushed 10 mins late. Normal startup and operation by the book to this point. When we called for taxi we were sent to spot to await ground control. Ground control cleared us to runway 29 via taxiway C. We had run numbers for runway 30L so I slowed the aircraft while my partner pulled out the opc. There was no data for runway 29 and that should have been my biggest clue that something was wrong. I had recalled seeing it in the FMC so we talked about what we should do and determined that we could build a runway with data from runway 30L shortened to less than 9000 ft and use maximum power for takeoff. We did; got a stopping margin of 3500 ft; and proceeded to accept and depart from runway 29. Once airborne we got a message from dispatch asking if we had used runway 30L to which I became suspicious and after looking over the paperwork discovered the 4 line message at the top of the first page of the WX packet about not using runway 29. There was no mention of anything in the release or in any other body of the NOTAMS. I informed dispatch of what we had done and proceeded uneventfully to bwi. Contributing factors are minimal. I did want to make up some time because there was a line for runway 30L so runway 29 sounded too good to be true. We were not rushing; though. We did; however; forget to ask each other why the runway wasn't in the opc. I should have called dispatch at that very moment of realization that we had no data and that is the most important lapse in this entire episode. Call it ego; maybe a little arrogance; the desire to complete the mission; who knows. It was not willful. We thought out the problem; we just didn't see the flags in our face. Corrective action: read the paperwork; the information was there.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B737-300 TAKE OFF FROM RWY FOR WHICH THEIR ONBOARD PERFORMANCE COMPUTER HAD NO DATA. HAD FAILED TO NOTE RESTR AGAINST USING THE RWY IN THE FLT PAPERS.

Narrative: AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL FIRST LEG FROM TULSA ARRIVING SLIGHTLY LATE IN ST LOUIS; I ASSISTED WITH SOME UM'S TO KEEP THE PROCESS FLOWING; QUICKLY REVIEWED AND SIGNED THE PAPERWORK AND PROCEEDED TO GREET THE PAX AS THEY CAME ABOARD. I FAILED TO TAKE NOTE OF THE FIRST 4 LINES AT THE TOP OF THE WX PACKAGE ABOUT THE USE OF RWY 29; BUT CONCENTRATED ON THE WX IN BALTIMORE. WE LOADED EVERYONE ON BOARD AND PUSHED 10 MINS LATE. NORMAL STARTUP AND OP BY THE BOOK TO THIS POINT. WHEN WE CALLED FOR TAXI WE WERE SENT TO SPOT TO AWAIT GND CTL. GND CTL CLRED US TO RWY 29 VIA TXWY C. WE HAD RUN NUMBERS FOR RWY 30L SO I SLOWED THE ACFT WHILE MY PARTNER PULLED OUT THE OPC. THERE WAS NO DATA FOR RWY 29 AND THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN MY BIGGEST CLUE THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG. I HAD RECALLED SEEING IT IN THE FMC SO WE TALKED ABOUT WHAT WE SHOULD DO AND DETERMINED THAT WE COULD BUILD A RWY WITH DATA FROM RWY 30L SHORTENED TO LESS THAN 9000 FT AND USE MAX PWR FOR TKOF. WE DID; GOT A STOPPING MARGIN OF 3500 FT; AND PROCEEDED TO ACCEPT AND DEPART FROM RWY 29. ONCE AIRBORNE WE GOT A MESSAGE FROM DISPATCH ASKING IF WE HAD USED RWY 30L TO WHICH I BECAME SUSPICIOUS AND AFTER LOOKING OVER THE PAPERWORK DISCOVERED THE 4 LINE MESSAGE AT THE TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE OF THE WX PACKET ABOUT NOT USING RWY 29. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF ANYTHING IN THE RELEASE OR IN ANY OTHER BODY OF THE NOTAMS. I INFORMED DISPATCH OF WHAT WE HAD DONE AND PROCEEDED UNEVENTFULLY TO BWI. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ARE MINIMAL. I DID WANT TO MAKE UP SOME TIME BECAUSE THERE WAS A LINE FOR RWY 30L SO RWY 29 SOUNDED TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE. WE WERE NOT RUSHING; THOUGH. WE DID; HOWEVER; FORGET TO ASK EACH OTHER WHY THE RWY WASN'T IN THE OPC. I SHOULD HAVE CALLED DISPATCH AT THAT VERY MOMENT OF REALIZATION THAT WE HAD NO DATA AND THAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT LAPSE IN THIS ENTIRE EPISODE. CALL IT EGO; MAYBE A LITTLE ARROGANCE; THE DESIRE TO COMPLETE THE MISSION; WHO KNOWS. IT WAS NOT WILLFUL. WE THOUGHT OUT THE PROB; WE JUST DIDN'T SEE THE FLAGS IN OUR FACE. CORRECTIVE ACTION: READ THE PAPERWORK; THE INFO WAS THERE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.