Narrative:

I was the flight engineer during a part 121 airline certification proving flight on apr/xa/06 with a total crew of 3; 1 extra flight engineer; 1 vp of operations and 4 FAA inspectors on board. The flight was scheduled from ksi-anc with 225669 pounds of cargo aboard. A major gross weight error of approximately 114000 pounds was detected by the crew on taxi out and the aircraft returned to the parking stand for a clarification of cargo load. The FAA inspectors superimposed simulated scenarios that the crews were expected to react to in conjunction with real aircraft issues during the normal performance of their respective preflight duties. During all these distrs the ground agent load specialist entered the cargo load in the electronic weight and balance system in kilos rather than in pounds. The copy the pilots receive clearly states the numbers are in pounds. The e-load was in error. As stated; the flight plan reflected the correct cargo weight in pounds. The FAA inspector's simulated scenarios imposed on a working crew during critical crew duties are not only unsafe; but lead to distrs; confusion and interfere with actual flight duties. In my opinion; flying under these conditions as mentioned; with a few young inexperienced FAA inspectors exposed the crew to a greater risk of failure and certificate action. I personally feel that there was a predisposition on the part of the FAA inspectors to fail the certification rather than help build a successful operation. In my opinion I feel the FAA senior management needs to conduct a reality check on the initial airline FAA certification inspectors' processes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 FLT CREW HAS A WT AND BAL PROB DURING TAXI FOR TKOF.

Narrative: I WAS THE FE DURING A PART 121 AIRLINE CERTIFICATION PROVING FLT ON APR/XA/06 WITH A TOTAL CREW OF 3; 1 EXTRA FE; 1 VP OF OPS AND 4 FAA INSPECTORS ON BOARD. THE FLT WAS SCHEDULED FROM KSI-ANC WITH 225669 LBS OF CARGO ABOARD. A MAJOR GROSS WT ERROR OF APPROX 114000 LBS WAS DETECTED BY THE CREW ON TAXI OUT AND THE ACFT RETURNED TO THE PARKING STAND FOR A CLARIFICATION OF CARGO LOAD. THE FAA INSPECTORS SUPERIMPOSED SIMULATED SCENARIOS THAT THE CREWS WERE EXPECTED TO REACT TO IN CONJUNCTION WITH REAL ACFT ISSUES DURING THE NORMAL PERFORMANCE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE PREFLT DUTIES. DURING ALL THESE DISTRS THE GND AGENT LOAD SPECIALIST ENTERED THE CARGO LOAD IN THE ELECTRONIC WT AND BAL SYS IN KILOS RATHER THAN IN LBS. THE COPY THE PLTS RECEIVE CLRLY STATES THE NUMBERS ARE IN LBS. THE E-LOAD WAS IN ERROR. AS STATED; THE FLT PLAN REFLECTED THE CORRECT CARGO WT IN LBS. THE FAA INSPECTOR'S SIMULATED SCENARIOS IMPOSED ON A WORKING CREW DURING CRITICAL CREW DUTIES ARE NOT ONLY UNSAFE; BUT LEAD TO DISTRS; CONFUSION AND INTERFERE WITH ACTUAL FLT DUTIES. IN MY OPINION; FLYING UNDER THESE CONDITIONS AS MENTIONED; WITH A FEW YOUNG INEXPERIENCED FAA INSPECTORS EXPOSED THE CREW TO A GREATER RISK OF FAILURE AND CERTIFICATE ACTION. I PERSONALLY FEEL THAT THERE WAS A PREDISPOSITION ON THE PART OF THE FAA INSPECTORS TO FAIL THE CERTIFICATION RATHER THAN HELP BUILD A SUCCESSFUL OP. IN MY OPINION I FEEL THE FAA SENIOR MGMNT NEEDS TO CONDUCT A REALITY CHK ON THE INITIAL AIRLINE FAA CERTIFICATION INSPECTORS' PROCESSES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.