Narrative:

Aircraft came to us with 2 inbound write-ups for right wing ai valve inoperative and right engine high pressure bleed valve erratic. Wing ai valve was wired open and deferred MEL 3011F and high pressure valve was wired closed and deferred MEL 3611S. We were about 1.5 hours late and hurrying to catch up after missing our second wheels up time. Taxiing out we had a hydraulic ptu ECAM with no associated faults. Captain called maintenance on his cell phone and while he was talking; I was finishing up ground operations. I noticed that MEL 3011F requires affected side engine bleed (2) to be 'off' per the completed ECAM that comes up after engine #2 start. However; the MEL 3611F (high pressure valve deferral) requires engine #2 bleed 'on' for takeoff. He started talking to maintenance about this; and there was also some confusion about the proper position of the air xbleed valve. Captain got the impression from maintenance that we should go with the engine bleed on. I wasn't quite sure that was entirely correct; but he was talking to maintenance and I figured that the two of them must have worked out the issue. It became rapidly more confusing; especially because we were next for takeoff and didn't want to miss a third wheels up time. As we were taking the runway; I understood that we were departing with ai air going to the right wing; which didn't seem technically correct; but we would only be on the ground for a short time (takeoff roll) and that there really wasn't much bleed air going to the wing with the hp valve wired closed and the xbleed valve closed. After airborne; and several ACARS and an eventual phone call to maintenance; it became clear to me that they didn't understand the issue very well either as we got 3 different answers (turn the bleed on; turn it off; bleed position is our option). There are 2 big issues here. First; there is conflicting guidance on the deferral operations placards on what to do with the engine bleed switch. System wise; it makes sense now to turn the bleed off; but that violates one of the MEL procedures; and how am I qualified to decide which MEL takes priority? Second; the fastest way to contact maintenance is with a cell phone; but that cut me out of half of the conversation and kept me from doing my job of backing up the captain. Perhaps we should do the 'old fashioned' way of using the radio for important issues or at least have the captain use the speaker phone function if he has it. I trusted that he and maintenance had worked out the issue; but it doesn't seem that way after all; and I would like to think that I would have been in a better position to question what was happening if I had been in on both sides of the conversation. The captain and I talked all this out over the next day and we think these are the right conclusions.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 WAS DISPATCHED WITH 2 DEFERRED ITEMS. WING ANTI-ICE VALVE LOCKED OPEN; AND #2 HIGH PRESSURE VALVE LOCKED CLOSED. CREW NOTES CONFLICT ON #2 BLEED VALVE BE OPEN FOR TKOF.

Narrative: ACFT CAME TO US WITH 2 INBOUND WRITE-UPS FOR R WING AI VALVE INOP AND R ENG HIGH PRESSURE BLEED VALVE ERRATIC. WING AI VALVE WAS WIRED OPEN AND DEFERRED MEL 3011F AND HIGH PRESSURE VALVE WAS WIRED CLOSED AND DEFERRED MEL 3611S. WE WERE ABOUT 1.5 HRS LATE AND HURRYING TO CATCH UP AFTER MISSING OUR SECOND WHEELS UP TIME. TAXIING OUT WE HAD A HYD PTU ECAM WITH NO ASSOCIATED FAULTS. CAPT CALLED MAINT ON HIS CELL PHONE AND WHILE HE WAS TALKING; I WAS FINISHING UP GND OPS. I NOTICED THAT MEL 3011F REQUIRES AFFECTED SIDE ENG BLEED (2) TO BE 'OFF' PER THE COMPLETED ECAM THAT COMES UP AFTER ENG #2 START. HOWEVER; THE MEL 3611F (HIGH PRESSURE VALVE DEFERRAL) REQUIRES ENG #2 BLEED 'ON' FOR TKOF. HE STARTED TALKING TO MAINT ABOUT THIS; AND THERE WAS ALSO SOME CONFUSION ABOUT THE PROPER POS OF THE AIR XBLEED VALVE. CAPT GOT THE IMPRESSION FROM MAINT THAT WE SHOULD GO WITH THE ENG BLEED ON. I WASN'T QUITE SURE THAT WAS ENTIRELY CORRECT; BUT HE WAS TALKING TO MAINT AND I FIGURED THAT THE TWO OF THEM MUST HAVE WORKED OUT THE ISSUE. IT BECAME RAPIDLY MORE CONFUSING; ESPECIALLY BECAUSE WE WERE NEXT FOR TKOF AND DIDN'T WANT TO MISS A THIRD WHEELS UP TIME. AS WE WERE TAKING THE RWY; I UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WERE DEPARTING WITH AI AIR GOING TO THE R WING; WHICH DIDN'T SEEM TECHNICALLY CORRECT; BUT WE WOULD ONLY BE ON THE GND FOR A SHORT TIME (TKOF ROLL) AND THAT THERE REALLY WASN'T MUCH BLEED AIR GOING TO THE WING WITH THE HP VALVE WIRED CLOSED AND THE XBLEED VALVE CLOSED. AFTER AIRBORNE; AND SEVERAL ACARS AND AN EVENTUAL PHONE CALL TO MAINT; IT BECAME CLR TO ME THAT THEY DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THE ISSUE VERY WELL EITHER AS WE GOT 3 DIFFERENT ANSWERS (TURN THE BLEED ON; TURN IT OFF; BLEED POS IS OUR OPTION). THERE ARE 2 BIG ISSUES HERE. FIRST; THERE IS CONFLICTING GUIDANCE ON THE DEFERRAL OPS PLACARDS ON WHAT TO DO WITH THE ENG BLEED SWITCH. SYS WISE; IT MAKES SENSE NOW TO TURN THE BLEED OFF; BUT THAT VIOLATES ONE OF THE MEL PROCS; AND HOW AM I QUALIFIED TO DECIDE WHICH MEL TAKES PRIORITY? SECOND; THE FASTEST WAY TO CONTACT MAINT IS WITH A CELL PHONE; BUT THAT CUT ME OUT OF HALF OF THE CONVERSATION AND KEPT ME FROM DOING MY JOB OF BACKING UP THE CAPT. PERHAPS WE SHOULD DO THE 'OLD FASHIONED' WAY OF USING THE RADIO FOR IMPORTANT ISSUES OR AT LEAST HAVE THE CAPT USE THE SPEAKER PHONE FUNCTION IF HE HAS IT. I TRUSTED THAT HE AND MAINT HAD WORKED OUT THE ISSUE; BUT IT DOESN'T SEEM THAT WAY AFTER ALL; AND I WOULD LIKE TO THINK THAT I WOULD HAVE BEEN IN A BETTER POS TO QUESTION WHAT WAS HAPPENING IF I HAD BEEN IN ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CONVERSATION. THE CAPT AND I TALKED ALL THIS OUT OVER THE NEXT DAY AND WE THINK THESE ARE THE RIGHT CONCLUSIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.