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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 698527 |
Time | |
Date | 200605 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : teb.airport |
State Reference | NJ |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Weather Elements | Windshear |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | BAe 125 Series 800 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : teb.tower |
Make Model Name | Dassault-Breguet Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | ground : position and hold |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : atp pilot : cfi pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 9000 flight time type : 2400 |
ASRS Report | 698527 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : flight engineer pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 160 flight time total : 14700 flight time type : 6500 |
ASRS Report | 698359 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground less severe incursion : runway non adherence : far non adherence : required legal separation |
Independent Detector | other controllerb |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance controller : issued alert |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Airport ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Deviation |
Narrative:
On short final; the winds shifted to the northwest and became very gusty. Airspeed began to fluctuate +/-10-15 KTS. All landing checks were complete and communications were terse focusing on vref calls and aircraft position reference the ILS. Due to the excessive winds; a difficult but otherwise uneventful landing was made. During the rollout; and in the middle of a high workload time; controling the aircraft and completing rollout calls -- tower called to request 'aircraft X; where are you parking on the field?' I answered 'FBO and we experienced a 20 KT shear on short final.' I understood tower to say 'roger; continue to the end; oh -- turn left there at taxiway B; stay with me.' I replied 'left here at taxiway B; stay with you.' while the aircraft began to exit the runway; I started the after landing checklist and the PF asked to confirm we were cleared to the ramp and began slowing the aircraft to a stop. It is important to note that taxiway B is very short; is between intersecting runways 1 and 6 and has nonstandard markings consisting of back-to-back hold short lines as to provide no 'safe' location between the runways. Looking up; I replied 'I believe so; I will check.' captain brought the aircraft to a complete stop with the aircraft straddling the hold short line; looking over his shoulder to verify runway 1 was clear before proceeding and noted the aircraft on runway 1 with his landing lights on; appearing to be on the takeoff roll. At the same time I called tower to 'confirm we are cleared to cross' of which tower responded 'negative; I told you to hold short.' I responded 'sir; I understood we were cleared to the ramp; which I read back.' the controller then responded 'negative; I told you to hold short' and canceled the other aircraft's takeoff clearance from runway 1 and cleared us to 'cross runway 1 to the ramp; contact ground on the other side.' the other aircraft exited the runway prior to taxiway B returning to the departure end of runway 1 and we taxied to the ramp. Several factors contributing to the situation were: 1) high workload traffic location. 2) gusty crosswind and windshear factors. 3) tower's attempt to communicate during a high workload time. 4) pilot's decision to respond to tower during high workload time. 5) tower not confirming readback of hold short clearance. 6) confign of taxiway B and nonstandard markings. 7) use of intersecting runways for takeoff and departure. It is important to note that it is impossible to position aircraft on taxiway B as to be clear of both runways you are either still on runway 6 after landing or on runway 1 clearing runway 6. Knowing there was an aircraft on final behind us and never hearing the takeoff clearance issued to the aircraft on runway 1; it is normal. Behavior to cross the first hold short line after exiting the runway as to be clear of active runway; not realizing that it is the same line for runway 1. There is a 'hot spot' listed on the airport diagram at taxiway B but no description of the nonstandard hold short lines used. Although the factors listed above led to the described situation; it is noted that safety initiatives on both the PF (by stopping the aircraft before it entered runway 1; visually inspecting before entering a runway; and confirming the clearance) and the controller (by noting the aircraft's position and canceling the departing aircraft's takeoff clearance) kept the situation from resulting in a incident or accident and provided no loss of safety on either aircraft. Supplemental information from acn 698359: the PNF reported a windshear of 20 KTS to tower. Tower instructed us to (as we heard it) 'taxiway B remain with me.' the PNF read back 'bravo; stay with you.' I inquired; 'are we clear to cross?' this caused a hesitation which both of us know could mean 'miscom.' I stopped the aircraft and looked left down runway 1. I could clearly see a falcon on the runway in position. The PNF and I were discussing the instructions when I noticed the lights come on on the falcon. I exclaimed 'he's taking off.' again we were still stationary. However; my nosewheel was past the hold line. This I attribute to very poor markings as 2 hold lines are back-to-back; generating what looks like 1 hold line on taxiway B (it is a hot spot).
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: HAWKER 800XP FLT CREW HAS A RWY INCURSION AT TEB.
Narrative: ON SHORT FINAL; THE WINDS SHIFTED TO THE NW AND BECAME VERY GUSTY. AIRSPD BEGAN TO FLUCTUATE +/-10-15 KTS. ALL LNDG CHKS WERE COMPLETE AND COMS WERE TERSE FOCUSING ON VREF CALLS AND ACFT POS REF THE ILS. DUE TO THE EXCESSIVE WINDS; A DIFFICULT BUT OTHERWISE UNEVENTFUL LNDG WAS MADE. DURING THE ROLLOUT; AND IN THE MIDDLE OF A HIGH WORKLOAD TIME; CTLING THE ACFT AND COMPLETING ROLLOUT CALLS -- TWR CALLED TO REQUEST 'ACFT X; WHERE ARE YOU PARKING ON THE FIELD?' I ANSWERED 'FBO AND WE EXPERIENCED A 20 KT SHEAR ON SHORT FINAL.' I UNDERSTOOD TWR TO SAY 'ROGER; CONTINUE TO THE END; OH -- TURN L THERE AT TXWY B; STAY WITH ME.' I REPLIED 'L HERE AT TXWY B; STAY WITH YOU.' WHILE THE ACFT BEGAN TO EXIT THE RWY; I STARTED THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST AND THE PF ASKED TO CONFIRM WE WERE CLRED TO THE RAMP AND BEGAN SLOWING THE ACFT TO A STOP. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT TXWY B IS VERY SHORT; IS BTWN INTERSECTING RWYS 1 AND 6 AND HAS NONSTANDARD MARKINGS CONSISTING OF BACK-TO-BACK HOLD SHORT LINES AS TO PROVIDE NO 'SAFE' LOCATION BTWN THE RWYS. LOOKING UP; I REPLIED 'I BELIEVE SO; I WILL CHK.' CAPT BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A COMPLETE STOP WITH THE ACFT STRADDLING THE HOLD SHORT LINE; LOOKING OVER HIS SHOULDER TO VERIFY RWY 1 WAS CLR BEFORE PROCEEDING AND NOTED THE ACFT ON RWY 1 WITH HIS LNDG LIGHTS ON; APPEARING TO BE ON THE TKOF ROLL. AT THE SAME TIME I CALLED TWR TO 'CONFIRM WE ARE CLRED TO CROSS' OF WHICH TWR RESPONDED 'NEGATIVE; I TOLD YOU TO HOLD SHORT.' I RESPONDED 'SIR; I UNDERSTOOD WE WERE CLRED TO THE RAMP; WHICH I READ BACK.' THE CTLR THEN RESPONDED 'NEGATIVE; I TOLD YOU TO HOLD SHORT' AND CANCELED THE OTHER ACFT'S TKOF CLRNC FROM RWY 1 AND CLRED US TO 'CROSS RWY 1 TO THE RAMP; CONTACT GND ON THE OTHER SIDE.' THE OTHER ACFT EXITED THE RWY PRIOR TO TXWY B RETURNING TO THE DEP END OF RWY 1 AND WE TAXIED TO THE RAMP. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SIT WERE: 1) HIGH WORKLOAD TFC LOCATION. 2) GUSTY XWIND AND WINDSHEAR FACTORS. 3) TWR'S ATTEMPT TO COMMUNICATE DURING A HIGH WORKLOAD TIME. 4) PLT'S DECISION TO RESPOND TO TWR DURING HIGH WORKLOAD TIME. 5) TWR NOT CONFIRMING READBACK OF HOLD SHORT CLRNC. 6) CONFIGN OF TXWY B AND NONSTANDARD MARKINGS. 7) USE OF INTERSECTING RWYS FOR TKOF AND DEP. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO POS ACFT ON TXWY B AS TO BE CLR OF BOTH RWYS YOU ARE EITHER STILL ON RWY 6 AFTER LNDG OR ON RWY 1 CLRING RWY 6. KNOWING THERE WAS AN ACFT ON FINAL BEHIND US AND NEVER HEARING THE TKOF CLRNC ISSUED TO THE ACFT ON RWY 1; IT IS NORMAL. BEHAVIOR TO CROSS THE FIRST HOLD SHORT LINE AFTER EXITING THE RWY AS TO BE CLR OF ACTIVE RWY; NOT REALIZING THAT IT IS THE SAME LINE FOR RWY 1. THERE IS A 'HOT SPOT' LISTED ON THE ARPT DIAGRAM AT TXWY B BUT NO DESCRIPTION OF THE NONSTANDARD HOLD SHORT LINES USED. ALTHOUGH THE FACTORS LISTED ABOVE LED TO THE DESCRIBED SIT; IT IS NOTED THAT SAFETY INITIATIVES ON BOTH THE PF (BY STOPPING THE ACFT BEFORE IT ENTERED RWY 1; VISUALLY INSPECTING BEFORE ENTERING A RWY; AND CONFIRMING THE CLRNC) AND THE CTLR (BY NOTING THE ACFT'S POS AND CANCELING THE DEPARTING ACFT'S TKOF CLRNC) KEPT THE SIT FROM RESULTING IN A INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT AND PROVIDED NO LOSS OF SAFETY ON EITHER ACFT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 698359: THE PNF RPTED A WINDSHEAR OF 20 KTS TO TWR. TWR INSTRUCTED US TO (AS WE HEARD IT) 'TXWY B REMAIN WITH ME.' THE PNF READ BACK 'BRAVO; STAY WITH YOU.' I INQUIRED; 'ARE WE CLR TO CROSS?' THIS CAUSED A HESITATION WHICH BOTH OF US KNOW COULD MEAN 'MISCOM.' I STOPPED THE ACFT AND LOOKED L DOWN RWY 1. I COULD CLRLY SEE A FALCON ON THE RWY IN POS. THE PNF AND I WERE DISCUSSING THE INSTRUCTIONS WHEN I NOTICED THE LIGHTS COME ON ON THE FALCON. I EXCLAIMED 'HE'S TAKING OFF.' AGAIN WE WERE STILL STATIONARY. HOWEVER; MY NOSEWHEEL WAS PAST THE HOLD LINE. THIS I ATTRIBUTE TO VERY POOR MARKINGS AS 2 HOLD LINES ARE BACK-TO-BACK; GENERATING WHAT LOOKS LIKE 1 HOLD LINE ON TXWY B (IT IS A HOT SPOT).
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.