Narrative:

The situation arose because of an apparent problem with fuel not being drawn from both main fuel tanks. This resulted in a precautionary landing while flying under an IFR flight plan. I did not declare an emergency; nor did I declare an urgent situation. I attempted to contact new york approach control several times; but the frequency was experiencing one of those busy times where it was mostly the controling issuing instructions and pilots' terse acknowledgements. For some reason; perhaps because of how busy the frequency was; I did not declare an emergency. Additionally; I was not completely convinced it was an emergency because I happened to be directly over an airport. Nevertheless; I did deviate from my IFR flight plan without a clearance. In retrospect; I should have declared an emergency; or; at the very least; broadcast a 'pan; pan; pan' urgent request to inform new york approach of my intentions rather than just deviate from my flight plan. Having said that; the mantra of 'aviate; navigation; communication' seemed appropriate and I was busy trying to land as soon as possible; so after several attempts at communicating with ATC; I focused my attention on a rapid descent down to the airport (blm). Although I did not actually experience an engine out (I am; however; convinced that it skipped a couple of times because of a brief interruption in fuel flow); the situation should never have reached that stage. I had noticed earlier that the fuel gauges were showing the left tank nearly empty and the right tank over 1/2 full. Of course; GA fuel gauges are notoriously inaccurate; and ours is no exception. However; having owned the plane for 4 yrs; I know this to be out of the ordinary. Part of my poor decision making was my disbelief that there really was a fuel problem. I was over republic airport (frg) when I really became aware of the problem and should have made a precautionary landing at that point for 2 reasons: first; I was about to fly over busy jfk airspace and declaring an emergency there would be; at the very least; quite an inconvenience at a major airport. Second; my route after jfk was south over water. It is not very far over water; but still; given my concerns; this should have given much more weight to my decisions. Incredibly; all these thoughts did occur to me at the time; but my unwillingness to believe the situation was becoming critical won out. I keep pushing the 'nearest' button on the GPS to make sure I knew what my options were. This behavior alone should have compelled me to make a precautionary landing. Lesson learned I hope. Another contributing factor was that this flight was charity mission was what is known as a 'link' mission; meaning that I was flying to meet another pilot who would fly passenger to their final destination. I think urge to complete the mission coupled with my unwillingness to believe there was a problem (it was my own plane after all; and it had just come out of annual and is a plane I was very comfortable and confident about) were the major contributing factors. Having said that; I have flown dozens of charity missions like this in the past; and have not allowed the urge to 'complete the mission' to cloud my judgement; especially with regard to hazardous WX. I think my unwillingness to accept that there was a mechanical problem was by far the larger of the 2 contributing factors. On the plus side; was that I did make a safe precautionary landing. After refueling; it turned out that I had burned 25 gallons on the left side (30 total; 28 usable) and only 8 gallons from the right so there was something going on; although I am unsure whether or not that fuel would have eventually started flowing from the right tank again. It is possible that the 'skips' I heard was the engine being momentarily starved for fuel and then fuel from the right tank began to flow. No real way of knowing at this point until a mechanic takes a look at the fuel system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN IFR PA28 PLT DIVERTED TO BLM WITH A SUSPECTED FUEL PROB. HE WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT NEW YORK APCH PRIOR TO DIVERTING.

Narrative: THE SITUATION AROSE BECAUSE OF AN APPARENT PROB WITH FUEL NOT BEING DRAWN FROM BOTH MAIN FUEL TANKS. THIS RESULTED IN A PRECAUTIONARY LNDG WHILE FLYING UNDER AN IFR FLT PLAN. I DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER; NOR DID I DECLARE AN URGENT SITUATION. I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT NEW YORK APCH CTL SEVERAL TIMES; BUT THE FREQ WAS EXPERIENCING ONE OF THOSE BUSY TIMES WHERE IT WAS MOSTLY THE CTLING ISSUING INSTRUCTIONS AND PLTS' TERSE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. FOR SOME REASON; PERHAPS BECAUSE OF HOW BUSY THE FREQ WAS; I DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER. ADDITIONALLY; I WAS NOT COMPLETELY CONVINCED IT WAS AN EMER BECAUSE I HAPPENED TO BE DIRECTLY OVER AN ARPT. NEVERTHELESS; I DID DEVIATE FROM MY IFR FLT PLAN WITHOUT A CLRNC. IN RETROSPECT; I SHOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER; OR; AT THE VERY LEAST; BROADCAST A 'PAN; PAN; PAN' URGENT REQUEST TO INFORM NEW YORK APCH OF MY INTENTIONS RATHER THAN JUST DEVIATE FROM MY FLT PLAN. HAVING SAID THAT; THE MANTRA OF 'AVIATE; NAV; COM' SEEMED APPROPRIATE AND I WAS BUSY TRYING TO LAND ASAP; SO AFTER SEVERAL ATTEMPTS AT COMMUNICATING WITH ATC; I FOCUSED MY ATTN ON A RAPID DSCNT DOWN TO THE ARPT (BLM). ALTHOUGH I DID NOT ACTUALLY EXPERIENCE AN ENG OUT (I AM; HOWEVER; CONVINCED THAT IT SKIPPED A COUPLE OF TIMES BECAUSE OF A BRIEF INTERRUPTION IN FUEL FLOW); THE SITUATION SHOULD NEVER HAVE REACHED THAT STAGE. I HAD NOTICED EARLIER THAT THE FUEL GAUGES WERE SHOWING THE L TANK NEARLY EMPTY AND THE R TANK OVER 1/2 FULL. OF COURSE; GA FUEL GAUGES ARE NOTORIOUSLY INACCURATE; AND OURS IS NO EXCEPTION. HOWEVER; HAVING OWNED THE PLANE FOR 4 YRS; I KNOW THIS TO BE OUT OF THE ORDINARY. PART OF MY POOR DECISION MAKING WAS MY DISBELIEF THAT THERE REALLY WAS A FUEL PROB. I WAS OVER REPUBLIC ARPT (FRG) WHEN I REALLY BECAME AWARE OF THE PROB AND SHOULD HAVE MADE A PRECAUTIONARY LNDG AT THAT POINT FOR 2 REASONS: FIRST; I WAS ABOUT TO FLY OVER BUSY JFK AIRSPACE AND DECLARING AN EMER THERE WOULD BE; AT THE VERY LEAST; QUITE AN INCONVENIENCE AT A MAJOR ARPT. SECOND; MY RTE AFTER JFK WAS S OVER WATER. IT IS NOT VERY FAR OVER WATER; BUT STILL; GIVEN MY CONCERNS; THIS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN MUCH MORE WT TO MY DECISIONS. INCREDIBLY; ALL THESE THOUGHTS DID OCCUR TO ME AT THE TIME; BUT MY UNWILLINGNESS TO BELIEVE THE SITUATION WAS BECOMING CRITICAL WON OUT. I KEEP PUSHING THE 'NEAREST' BUTTON ON THE GPS TO MAKE SURE I KNEW WHAT MY OPTIONS WERE. THIS BEHAVIOR ALONE SHOULD HAVE COMPELLED ME TO MAKE A PRECAUTIONARY LNDG. LESSON LEARNED I HOPE. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THAT THIS FLT WAS CHARITY MISSION WAS WHAT IS KNOWN AS A 'LINK' MISSION; MEANING THAT I WAS FLYING TO MEET ANOTHER PLT WHO WOULD FLY PAX TO THEIR FINAL DEST. I THINK URGE TO COMPLETE THE MISSION COUPLED WITH MY UNWILLINGNESS TO BELIEVE THERE WAS A PROB (IT WAS MY OWN PLANE AFTER ALL; AND IT HAD JUST COME OUT OF ANNUAL AND IS A PLANE I WAS VERY COMFORTABLE AND CONFIDENT ABOUT) WERE THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. HAVING SAID THAT; I HAVE FLOWN DOZENS OF CHARITY MISSIONS LIKE THIS IN THE PAST; AND HAVE NOT ALLOWED THE URGE TO 'COMPLETE THE MISSION' TO CLOUD MY JUDGEMENT; ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO HAZARDOUS WX. I THINK MY UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THAT THERE WAS A MECHANICAL PROB WAS BY FAR THE LARGER OF THE 2 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. ON THE PLUS SIDE; WAS THAT I DID MAKE A SAFE PRECAUTIONARY LNDG. AFTER REFUELING; IT TURNED OUT THAT I HAD BURNED 25 GALLONS ON THE L SIDE (30 TOTAL; 28 USABLE) AND ONLY 8 GALLONS FROM THE R SO THERE WAS SOMETHING GOING ON; ALTHOUGH I AM UNSURE WHETHER OR NOT THAT FUEL WOULD HAVE EVENTUALLY STARTED FLOWING FROM THE R TANK AGAIN. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE 'SKIPS' I HEARD WAS THE ENG BEING MOMENTARILY STARVED FOR FUEL AND THEN FUEL FROM THE R TANK BEGAN TO FLOW. NO REAL WAY OF KNOWING AT THIS POINT UNTIL A MECH TAKES A LOOK AT THE FUEL SYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.