Narrative:

We operate a cpr bombardier global express. We were planning an XA00 departure out of iad. As we prepared the aircraft; it did not occur to us that there would be any problem exiting the ramp. And during the external walkaround; the only reason that I could think of why I did not notice this potential problem to exit from cargo was probably because it was blocked by 2 relatively large aircraft. And from a distance this would make the distance between them difficult to judge. There was a DC8 loading cargo on the left; and a boeing bizjet on the right completely shut down and closed up. It was not till the line crew came up to the cockpit just prior to engine start and pointed out that they were trying to move the boeing; but were not able. They indicated that they thought that we might be able to squeeze out. Of which we agreed to pull out and take a look; but told them that we needed a lot of assistance as far as men on each wing; and knew that this could amount to nothing more than a look see. Which would also secondly make a point to the people at XXX that they indeed have boxed us in; and this is not good. We pulled out and made the right turn; toward the 2 aircraft; but as we progressed it was convincingly apparent that there would be no way. We positioned in the best possible way so as not to get anyone stuck; but as we progressed the line crew continued to motion us forward; and thinking that there was some reason to take us further forward; we continued; but it became very obvious that they were intending to take us into a very unsafe position; motioning us to go under the wing of the other aircraft. This; of course; was not an option and we stopped well short of that prospect. But close enough to concern the DC8 crew; though they did not jump out and ask us to stop. We shut down the left engine and the captain got out to explore if there was any quick resolve; such as the moving of the DC8; but they were not going to budge till they were through loading their cargo. And the boeing crew was nowhere to be found; so we were left to shutting down and waiting the 30 mins till the DC8 got pushed back. It was not till later when talking to the crew of the DC8 that I was informed that they were loading ammunition. As the lineman was leading us; the thought certainly crossed my mind; was it ok to take 1 wing under the other; if he was able to lead me safely in that situation? This is not a good thought. In reflection of that thought; there were some human factors involved which not till now did I realize have influence but as yet have not caused me to do anything unsafe. But in this case it led me into a situation that could unknowingly influence judgement or at the least continue to bring stress into the cockpit. The captain on this flight asked our lead passenger if it would be ok to stay another night in washington rather than move the aircraft empty the night before; and the boss agreed. We had given ourselves at least 1 hour 15 mins extra; but I think getting to our destination and in position for the pickup was an extra added pressure because of the fact that the PIC had created the timetable. Secondly this PIC has been with this department for 15+ yrs and during that tenure he has had an earlier incident with the boss on board. And I notice that when flying with him although he seems cool as a cucumber; I am on alert that he will occasionally try to push that limit; to be put in the right light with the boss. In this situation; I think I did feel a bit of pressure coming from him in regards to taxiing up and taking a look. But that was leading me into a situation that could take us into trying something that we would rather not try. I need to be aware of my own limits in any situation when flying with him or anyone else. This awareness may very well assist in many other situations that will allow me to look at the circumstances and not any pressure coming from other seat to the side of me or any seat in the cabin. And this situation has also given me new resolve to take the mindset I have had for years. The lineman is merely advisory and they would go home and think nothing if two wings met on a ramp; wile at a minimum I would carry that for the rest of my career. I am rethinking how very serious the operations on the ramp are; and just how much insidious danger awaits there. The bottom line is that two wings are never to cross on the ground or in the air. I think the contributory elements to this situation are: 1) everyone is trying to meet deadlines that really are not that important. 2) the FBO felt that they would show they were trying; by doing the impossible; because they were responsible for making sure that we would get out and that they did not set us up to be impeded. For their lack of anticipation an apology is probably better suited. 3) the perception in and around larger aircraft that distances are more difficult to judge. 4) we were on an angle to the two aircraft before we began to taxi out; and from there it did seem there was an adequate distance between the aircraft. 5) not having a tremendous amount of time in this aircraft it is difficult to conceptualize the wingspan in comparison to situations like this. Helpful to remember: 1) the linemen are advisory only; though extremely helpful they have no tests or medicals to pass. And their motivations may not be your own. 2) scout it out and plan ahead. 3) and have a good sense of where your wingtips are and when in the slightest doubt wait it out. 4) make sure wherever you are on the airport that there is plenty of room for ground operations. 5) and finally the fact that you never know what the aircraft you are taxiing by might be carrying. I learned a lot.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A GLOBAL EXPRESS 700 FO RPTS REFUSING TO TAXI OUT OF AN IAD CARGO RAMP WITH INSUFFICIENT WING CLRNC FROM A DC8 AND A BOEING BIZJET.

Narrative: WE OPERATE A CPR BOMBARDIER GLOBAL EXPRESS. WE WERE PLANNING AN XA00 DEP OUT OF IAD. AS WE PREPARED THE ACFT; IT DID NOT OCCUR TO US THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY PROB EXITING THE RAMP. AND DURING THE EXTERNAL WALKAROUND; THE ONLY REASON THAT I COULD THINK OF WHY I DID NOT NOTICE THIS POTENTIAL PROB TO EXIT FROM CARGO WAS PROBABLY BECAUSE IT WAS BLOCKED BY 2 RELATIVELY LARGE ACFT. AND FROM A DISTANCE THIS WOULD MAKE THE DISTANCE BTWN THEM DIFFICULT TO JUDGE. THERE WAS A DC8 LOADING CARGO ON THE L; AND A BOEING BIZJET ON THE R COMPLETELY SHUT DOWN AND CLOSED UP. IT WAS NOT TILL THE LINE CREW CAME UP TO THE COCKPIT JUST PRIOR TO ENG START AND POINTED OUT THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO MOVE THE BOEING; BUT WERE NOT ABLE. THEY INDICATED THAT THEY THOUGHT THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO SQUEEZE OUT. OF WHICH WE AGREED TO PULL OUT AND TAKE A LOOK; BUT TOLD THEM THAT WE NEEDED A LOT OF ASSISTANCE AS FAR AS MEN ON EACH WING; AND KNEW THAT THIS COULD AMOUNT TO NOTHING MORE THAN A LOOK SEE. WHICH WOULD ALSO SECONDLY MAKE A POINT TO THE PEOPLE AT XXX THAT THEY INDEED HAVE BOXED US IN; AND THIS IS NOT GOOD. WE PULLED OUT AND MADE THE R TURN; TOWARD THE 2 ACFT; BUT AS WE PROGRESSED IT WAS CONVINCINGLY APPARENT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO WAY. WE POSITIONED IN THE BEST POSSIBLE WAY SO AS NOT TO GET ANYONE STUCK; BUT AS WE PROGRESSED THE LINE CREW CONTINUED TO MOTION US FORWARD; AND THINKING THAT THERE WAS SOME REASON TO TAKE US FURTHER FORWARD; WE CONTINUED; BUT IT BECAME VERY OBVIOUS THAT THEY WERE INTENDING TO TAKE US INTO A VERY UNSAFE POS; MOTIONING US TO GO UNDER THE WING OF THE OTHER ACFT. THIS; OF COURSE; WAS NOT AN OPTION AND WE STOPPED WELL SHORT OF THAT PROSPECT. BUT CLOSE ENOUGH TO CONCERN THE DC8 CREW; THOUGH THEY DID NOT JUMP OUT AND ASK US TO STOP. WE SHUT DOWN THE L ENG AND THE CAPT GOT OUT TO EXPLORE IF THERE WAS ANY QUICK RESOLVE; SUCH AS THE MOVING OF THE DC8; BUT THEY WERE NOT GOING TO BUDGE TILL THEY WERE THROUGH LOADING THEIR CARGO. AND THE BOEING CREW WAS NOWHERE TO BE FOUND; SO WE WERE LEFT TO SHUTTING DOWN AND WAITING THE 30 MINS TILL THE DC8 GOT PUSHED BACK. IT WAS NOT TILL LATER WHEN TALKING TO THE CREW OF THE DC8 THAT I WAS INFORMED THAT THEY WERE LOADING AMMUNITION. AS THE LINEMAN WAS LEADING US; THE THOUGHT CERTAINLY CROSSED MY MIND; WAS IT OK TO TAKE 1 WING UNDER THE OTHER; IF HE WAS ABLE TO LEAD ME SAFELY IN THAT SITUATION? THIS IS NOT A GOOD THOUGHT. IN REFLECTION OF THAT THOUGHT; THERE WERE SOME HUMAN FACTORS INVOLVED WHICH NOT TILL NOW DID I REALIZE HAVE INFLUENCE BUT AS YET HAVE NOT CAUSED ME TO DO ANYTHING UNSAFE. BUT IN THIS CASE IT LED ME INTO A SITUATION THAT COULD UNKNOWINGLY INFLUENCE JUDGEMENT OR AT THE LEAST CONTINUE TO BRING STRESS INTO THE COCKPIT. THE CAPT ON THIS FLT ASKED OUR LEAD PAX IF IT WOULD BE OK TO STAY ANOTHER NIGHT IN WASHINGTON RATHER THAN MOVE THE ACFT EMPTY THE NIGHT BEFORE; AND THE BOSS AGREED. WE HAD GIVEN OURSELVES AT LEAST 1 HR 15 MINS EXTRA; BUT I THINK GETTING TO OUR DEST AND IN POS FOR THE PICKUP WAS AN EXTRA ADDED PRESSURE BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THE PIC HAD CREATED THE TIMETABLE. SECONDLY THIS PIC HAS BEEN WITH THIS DEPT FOR 15+ YRS AND DURING THAT TENURE HE HAS HAD AN EARLIER INCIDENT WITH THE BOSS ON BOARD. AND I NOTICE THAT WHEN FLYING WITH HIM ALTHOUGH HE SEEMS COOL AS A CUCUMBER; I AM ON ALERT THAT HE WILL OCCASIONALLY TRY TO PUSH THAT LIMIT; TO BE PUT IN THE RIGHT LIGHT WITH THE BOSS. IN THIS SITUATION; I THINK I DID FEEL A BIT OF PRESSURE COMING FROM HIM IN REGARDS TO TAXIING UP AND TAKING A LOOK. BUT THAT WAS LEADING ME INTO A SITUATION THAT COULD TAKE US INTO TRYING SOMETHING THAT WE WOULD RATHER NOT TRY. I NEED TO BE AWARE OF MY OWN LIMITS IN ANY SITUATION WHEN FLYING WITH HIM OR ANYONE ELSE. THIS AWARENESS MAY VERY WELL ASSIST IN MANY OTHER SITUATIONS THAT WILL ALLOW ME TO LOOK AT THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND NOT ANY PRESSURE COMING FROM OTHER SEAT TO THE SIDE OF ME OR ANY SEAT IN THE CABIN. AND THIS SITUATION HAS ALSO GIVEN ME NEW RESOLVE TO TAKE THE MINDSET I HAVE HAD FOR YEARS. THE LINEMAN IS MERELY ADVISORY AND THEY WOULD GO HOME AND THINK NOTHING IF TWO WINGS MET ON A RAMP; WILE AT A MINIMUM I WOULD CARRY THAT FOR THE REST OF MY CAREER. I AM RETHINKING HOW VERY SERIOUS THE OPS ON THE RAMP ARE; AND JUST HOW MUCH INSIDIOUS DANGER AWAITS THERE. THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT TWO WINGS ARE NEVER TO CROSS ON THE GROUND OR IN THE AIR. I THINK THE CONTRIBUTORY ELEMENTS TO THIS SITUATION ARE: 1) EVERYONE IS TRYING TO MEET DEADLINES THAT REALLY ARE NOT THAT IMPORTANT. 2) THE FBO FELT THAT THEY WOULD SHOW THEY WERE TRYING; BY DOING THE IMPOSSIBLE; BECAUSE THEY WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING SURE THAT WE WOULD GET OUT AND THAT THEY DID NOT SET US UP TO BE IMPEDED. FOR THEIR LACK OF ANTICIPATION AN APOLOGY IS PROBABLY BETTER SUITED. 3) THE PERCEPTION IN AND AROUND LARGER ACFT THAT DISTANCES ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO JUDGE. 4) WE WERE ON AN ANGLE TO THE TWO ACFT BEFORE WE BEGAN TO TAXI OUT; AND FROM THERE IT DID SEEM THERE WAS AN ADEQUATE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE ACFT. 5) NOT HAVING A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF TIME IN THIS ACFT IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONCEPTUALIZE THE WINGSPAN IN COMPARISON TO SITUATIONS LIKE THIS. HELPFUL TO REMEMBER: 1) THE LINEMEN ARE ADVISORY ONLY; THOUGH EXTREMELY HELPFUL THEY HAVE NO TESTS OR MEDICALS TO PASS. AND THEIR MOTIVATIONS MAY NOT BE YOUR OWN. 2) SCOUT IT OUT AND PLAN AHEAD. 3) AND HAVE A GOOD SENSE OF WHERE YOUR WINGTIPS ARE AND WHEN IN THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT WAIT IT OUT. 4) MAKE SURE WHEREVER YOU ARE ON THE AIRPORT THAT THERE IS PLENTY OF ROOM FOR GROUND OPS. 5) AND FINALLY THE FACT THAT YOU NEVER KNOW WHAT THE ACFT YOU ARE TAXIING BY MIGHT BE CARRYING. I LEARNED A LOT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.