Narrative:

This flight was to be my bi-annual line check. A check airman was occupying the center jumpseat and listening on the headset to air-ground interphone communications. He witnessed the following event. Scheduled push time had passed. All briefing and checklist items had been accomplished. When the ground crew man checked on with me; he stated that the walkaround was complete and to release the brakes. I told him to stand by; as I would get a push clearance. The first officer received a push clearance from ramp control. I called via interphone to the ground crew and said; 'the brakes are released; you're cleared to push.' he acknowledged. After approximately 60 seconds we had still not moved. The flight parked next to us called ramp for a push clearance and was told to hold their push as they had company (us) pushing off. The crew of the other aircraft responded that we weren't pushing as we didn't have a tow bar attached. Upon hearing this; I immediately queried the ground crew man via interphone as to whether or not we had a tow bar attached. He said something to the effect of; 'not yet; but almost;' and something about late bags. I immediately reset the parking brake and informed him the brakes were set and to cancel the push. I directed him to get a supervisor. The aircraft had been left for some time with no chocks in place; no parking brake set; and no tow bar/tug attached. When the supervisor arrived on headset; he said he was the ramp manager. I related to him what had taken place and asked if he could explain to me what the problem was. He became indignant that I would ask what appeared to him to be a rhetorical question in disgust. I explained to this individual the seriousness of the event; the fact that the safety of the aircraft; passenger; and crew had been compromised; and that as the captain; his ground crew had jeopardized my job and certificate with their actions. This manager was having a hard time grasping the seriousness and possible implications this event posed for me. He said several times that there was no need for me to be so upset with him; to which I pointed out that as the captain; I was the one who was going to have to answer for any incident or accident; and that it was I who was charged with the safety and well being of the aircraft; passenger and crew. This kind of stuff with our sub-contracted ramp personnel must end before some otherwise innocent; well meaning air crew finds themselves in a regrettable situation brought about by the continued incompetence of the ground crew. The ramp needs to be staffed with competent; experienced personnel that are adequately rewarded so they stay for more than a few weeks.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 CAPT AT THE GATE WAS ADVISED BY PUSHBACK CREW THEY WERE READY TO PUSH AND TO RELEASE BRAKES; EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD NOT CONNECTED THE TOW BAR YET.

Narrative: THIS FLT WAS TO BE MY BI-ANNUAL LINE CHK. A CHK AIRMAN WAS OCCUPYING THE CTR JUMPSEAT AND LISTENING ON THE HEADSET TO AIR-GND INTERPHONE COMS. HE WITNESSED THE FOLLOWING EVENT. SCHEDULED PUSH TIME HAD PASSED. ALL BRIEFING AND CHKLIST ITEMS HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. WHEN THE GND CREW MAN CHKED ON WITH ME; HE STATED THAT THE WALKAROUND WAS COMPLETE AND TO RELEASE THE BRAKES. I TOLD HIM TO STAND BY; AS I WOULD GET A PUSH CLRNC. THE FO RECEIVED A PUSH CLRNC FROM RAMP CTL. I CALLED VIA INTERPHONE TO THE GND CREW AND SAID; 'THE BRAKES ARE RELEASED; YOU'RE CLRED TO PUSH.' HE ACKNOWLEDGED. AFTER APPROX 60 SECONDS WE HAD STILL NOT MOVED. THE FLT PARKED NEXT TO US CALLED RAMP FOR A PUSH CLRNC AND WAS TOLD TO HOLD THEIR PUSH AS THEY HAD COMPANY (US) PUSHING OFF. THE CREW OF THE OTHER ACFT RESPONDED THAT WE WEREN'T PUSHING AS WE DIDN'T HAVE A TOW BAR ATTACHED. UPON HEARING THIS; I IMMEDIATELY QUERIED THE GND CREW MAN VIA INTERPHONE AS TO WHETHER OR NOT WE HAD A TOW BAR ATTACHED. HE SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF; 'NOT YET; BUT ALMOST;' AND SOMETHING ABOUT LATE BAGS. I IMMEDIATELY RESET THE PARKING BRAKE AND INFORMED HIM THE BRAKES WERE SET AND TO CANCEL THE PUSH. I DIRECTED HIM TO GET A SUPVR. THE ACFT HAD BEEN LEFT FOR SOME TIME WITH NO CHOCKS IN PLACE; NO PARKING BRAKE SET; AND NO TOW BAR/TUG ATTACHED. WHEN THE SUPVR ARRIVED ON HEADSET; HE SAID HE WAS THE RAMP MGR. I RELATED TO HIM WHAT HAD TAKEN PLACE AND ASKED IF HE COULD EXPLAIN TO ME WHAT THE PROB WAS. HE BECAME INDIGNANT THAT I WOULD ASK WHAT APPEARED TO HIM TO BE A RHETORICAL QUESTION IN DISGUST. I EXPLAINED TO THIS INDIVIDUAL THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE EVENT; THE FACT THAT THE SAFETY OF THE ACFT; PAX; AND CREW HAD BEEN COMPROMISED; AND THAT AS THE CAPT; HIS GND CREW HAD JEOPARDIZED MY JOB AND CERTIFICATE WITH THEIR ACTIONS. THIS MGR WAS HAVING A HARD TIME GRASPING THE SERIOUSNESS AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS THIS EVENT POSED FOR ME. HE SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR ME TO BE SO UPSET WITH HIM; TO WHICH I POINTED OUT THAT AS THE CAPT; I WAS THE ONE WHO WAS GOING TO HAVE TO ANSWER FOR ANY INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT; AND THAT IT WAS I WHO WAS CHARGED WITH THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF THE ACFT; PAX AND CREW. THIS KIND OF STUFF WITH OUR SUB-CONTRACTED RAMP PERSONNEL MUST END BEFORE SOME OTHERWISE INNOCENT; WELL MEANING AIR CREW FINDS THEMSELVES IN A REGRETTABLE SITUATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE CONTINUED INCOMPETENCE OF THE GND CREW. THE RAMP NEEDS TO BE STAFFED WITH COMPETENT; EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL THAT ARE ADEQUATELY REWARDED SO THEY STAY FOR MORE THAN A FEW WKS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.