Narrative:

I was assigned aircraft X. The flight release indicated both autoplts were placarded as inoperative. A review of the logbook showed the following write-up: 'altitude arming function would not work with selection only.' had to pull altitude select knob to arm altitude. 'Also lost altitude arming function 3 times prior to altitude capture.' in response to this write-up; contract maintenance had placarded both autoplts. To me this write-up indicated 2 working autoplts and a problem with the altimeter arming system. A cell phone call to the maintenance desk revealed that it should only take about 30 mins to change the altimeter selection box in the dfg if the parts were on hand. At this point I informed maintenance I was refusing the aircraft until it was fixed. Dispatcher was notified and the passenger agents were asked to hold boarding. It is my understanding that the aircraft had been at the gate for about 2 hours. A mechanic and a maintenance supervisor arrived at the gate. I was informed that this was a legal aircraft and if I would not fly it; I could have another airplane but this aircraft would be good to go for another crew. Changing the conversation to the problem write-up revealed that the contract placard was not completely correct. The mechanic checked the altimeter arming system and found that it appeared to be working normally. He was able to perform a full rts system test on both dfg's and remove the placard. By his keeping me updated on the progress of the check; coordination with the gate agent enabled a timely boarding and departure was only 27 mins late with a full mission capable aircraft and not one with a downgraded lower minimum performance status. This event brings up several questions. For yrs; I have been privileged to fly the best maintained aircraft in the world. There is no doubt in my mind that our aircraft were maintained in the best possible condition. In the past 1 1/2 yrs; however; I have noticed a very disturbing trend. It now appears that the new airline standard is that -- if it's legal; it flies! As a military trained safety officer; I am concerned that safety is being compromised. Other recent examples are having to refuse an aircraft with a landing light out in order to get the bulb changed prior to flying into ZZZZ1. Many airports lack the excellent lighting we have here in the states and all lights possible help greatly on a dark night. Also; some airports south of the border do not have txwys and it's nice to have plenty of lights on when back-taxiing on an active runway. My logbook shows that I flew aircraft XXXX to ZZZ3 and back to ZZZ with the autoplt placarded inoperative through coordination with dispatch and maintenance; the aircraft was taken OTS upon arrival back in ZZZ. It was scheduled for several more legs before dispatch was informed I would not accept it for a third flight. My questions are: 1) why is maintenance not repairing aircraft with known problems when the aircraft has ground time available at a major maintenance hub? 2) why would we not take an aircraft of service and repair an item which increases both safety and lowers cost? An aircraft without autoplt must fly below rvsm airspace and thus burn considerably more fuel.) 3) why does our company say safety is our first priority and yet we now appear to routinely dispatch aircraft with multiple MEL items open? It is legal but certainly not most safe way to operate. Many of us in aviation are familiar with the swiss cheese theory of accident prevention. Each and every layer of cheese prevents the holes from lining up. Whenever all the layers line up and the hole goes all the way through; there is an accident -- increasing here at the company; it seems the only layer still protecting us is that of the flight crew. Why? My experience as both a squadron and group safety officer tells me that our current operation is pushing the limits. I would like to suggest that at major hubs; a 2 man maintenance team consisting of 1 engine mechanic and avionics mechanic be established to repair open MEL items on all aircraft at the gate for 1 hour or longer. Reducing the number of MEL items would greatly increase safety; increase passenger comfort (ie; single pack and inoperative APU's) and reduce cost as many MEL's itemsprevents use of rvsm airspace.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 CAPT RPTS ON NUMEROUS DEFERRED MAINT ITEMS THAT ARE EASILY REPAIRED NOW GET FIXED ONLY WITH CREW REFUSAL.

Narrative: I WAS ASSIGNED ACFT X. THE FLT RELEASE INDICATED BOTH AUTOPLTS WERE PLACARDED AS INOP. A REVIEW OF THE LOGBOOK SHOWED THE FOLLOWING WRITE-UP: 'ALT ARMING FUNCTION WOULD NOT WORK WITH SELECTION ONLY.' HAD TO PULL ALT SELECT KNOB TO ARM ALT. 'ALSO LOST ALT ARMING FUNCTION 3 TIMES PRIOR TO ALT CAPTURE.' IN RESPONSE TO THIS WRITE-UP; CONTRACT MAINT HAD PLACARDED BOTH AUTOPLTS. TO ME THIS WRITE-UP INDICATED 2 WORKING AUTOPLTS AND A PROB WITH THE ALTIMETER ARMING SYS. A CELL PHONE CALL TO THE MAINT DESK REVEALED THAT IT SHOULD ONLY TAKE ABOUT 30 MINS TO CHANGE THE ALTIMETER SELECTION BOX IN THE DFG IF THE PARTS WERE ON HAND. AT THIS POINT I INFORMED MAINT I WAS REFUSING THE ACFT UNTIL IT WAS FIXED. DISPATCHER WAS NOTIFIED AND THE PAX AGENTS WERE ASKED TO HOLD BOARDING. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ACFT HAD BEEN AT THE GATE FOR ABOUT 2 HRS. A MECH AND A MAINT SUPVR ARRIVED AT THE GATE. I WAS INFORMED THAT THIS WAS A LEGAL ACFT AND IF I WOULD NOT FLY IT; I COULD HAVE ANOTHER AIRPLANE BUT THIS ACFT WOULD BE GOOD TO GO FOR ANOTHER CREW. CHANGING THE CONVERSATION TO THE PROB WRITE-UP REVEALED THAT THE CONTRACT PLACARD WAS NOT COMPLETELY CORRECT. THE MECH CHKED THE ALTIMETER ARMING SYS AND FOUND THAT IT APPEARED TO BE WORKING NORMALLY. HE WAS ABLE TO PERFORM A FULL RTS SYS TEST ON BOTH DFG'S AND REMOVE THE PLACARD. BY HIS KEEPING ME UPDATED ON THE PROGRESS OF THE CHK; COORD WITH THE GATE AGENT ENABLED A TIMELY BOARDING AND DEP WAS ONLY 27 MINS LATE WITH A FULL MISSION CAPABLE ACFT AND NOT ONE WITH A DOWNGRADED LOWER MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STATUS. THIS EVENT BRINGS UP SEVERAL QUESTIONS. FOR YRS; I HAVE BEEN PRIVILEGED TO FLY THE BEST MAINTAINED ACFT IN THE WORLD. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT OUR ACFT WERE MAINTAINED IN THE BEST POSSIBLE CONDITION. IN THE PAST 1 1/2 YRS; HOWEVER; I HAVE NOTICED A VERY DISTURBING TREND. IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE NEW AIRLINE STANDARD IS THAT -- IF IT'S LEGAL; IT FLIES! AS A MIL TRAINED SAFETY OFFICER; I AM CONCERNED THAT SAFETY IS BEING COMPROMISED. OTHER RECENT EXAMPLES ARE HAVING TO REFUSE AN ACFT WITH A LNDG LIGHT OUT IN ORDER TO GET THE BULB CHANGED PRIOR TO FLYING INTO ZZZZ1. MANY ARPTS LACK THE EXCELLENT LIGHTING WE HAVE HERE IN THE STATES AND ALL LIGHTS POSSIBLE HELP GREATLY ON A DARK NIGHT. ALSO; SOME ARPTS S OF THE BORDER DO NOT HAVE TXWYS AND IT'S NICE TO HAVE PLENTY OF LIGHTS ON WHEN BACK-TAXIING ON AN ACTIVE RWY. MY LOGBOOK SHOWS THAT I FLEW ACFT XXXX TO ZZZ3 AND BACK TO ZZZ WITH THE AUTOPLT PLACARDED INOP THROUGH COORD WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT; THE ACFT WAS TAKEN OTS UPON ARR BACK IN ZZZ. IT WAS SCHEDULED FOR SEVERAL MORE LEGS BEFORE DISPATCH WAS INFORMED I WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT FOR A THIRD FLT. MY QUESTIONS ARE: 1) WHY IS MAINT NOT REPAIRING ACFT WITH KNOWN PROBS WHEN THE ACFT HAS GND TIME AVAILABLE AT A MAJOR MAINT HUB? 2) WHY WOULD WE NOT TAKE AN ACFT OF SVC AND REPAIR AN ITEM WHICH INCREASES BOTH SAFETY AND LOWERS COST? AN ACFT WITHOUT AUTOPLT MUST FLY BELOW RVSM AIRSPACE AND THUS BURN CONSIDERABLY MORE FUEL.) 3) WHY DOES OUR COMPANY SAY SAFETY IS OUR FIRST PRIORITY AND YET WE NOW APPEAR TO ROUTINELY DISPATCH ACFT WITH MULTIPLE MEL ITEMS OPEN? IT IS LEGAL BUT CERTAINLY NOT MOST SAFE WAY TO OPERATE. MANY OF US IN AVIATION ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE SWISS CHEESE THEORY OF ACCIDENT PREVENTION. EACH AND EVERY LAYER OF CHEESE PREVENTS THE HOLES FROM LINING UP. WHENEVER ALL THE LAYERS LINE UP AND THE HOLE GOES ALL THE WAY THROUGH; THERE IS AN ACCIDENT -- INCREASING HERE AT THE COMPANY; IT SEEMS THE ONLY LAYER STILL PROTECTING US IS THAT OF THE FLT CREW. WHY? MY EXPERIENCE AS BOTH A SQUADRON AND GROUP SAFETY OFFICER TELLS ME THAT OUR CURRENT OP IS PUSHING THE LIMITS. I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT AT MAJOR HUBS; A 2 MAN MAINT TEAM CONSISTING OF 1 ENG MECH AND AVIONICS MECH BE ESTABLISHED TO REPAIR OPEN MEL ITEMS ON ALL ACFT AT THE GATE FOR 1 HR OR LONGER. REDUCING THE NUMBER OF MEL ITEMS WOULD GREATLY INCREASE SAFETY; INCREASE PAX COMFORT (IE; SINGLE PACK AND INOP APU'S) AND REDUCE COST AS MANY MEL'S ITEMSPREVENTS USE OF RVSM AIRSPACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.