Narrative:

I was the PNF on an empty repositioning leg. We were holding short of runway 21 for departure on an IFR plan. A small aircraft on final was instructed to go around so that we could meet our departure slot given by lax controllers. We were given an immediate clearance for takeoff; which we complied with (all pre-takeoff checklists completed while holding short in anticipation of immediate takeoff clearance). The takeoff roll was uneventful; although I did notice a large aircraft had just departed lax westbound. Just after rotation; I noticed an aircraft at our 11:00 O'clock above us displayed on the TCAS (I did not have visual contact). I watched this aircraft's trend on our TCAS and noticed that there may be a potential conflict; which I mentioned to the PF. Smo requires a noise-abatement takeoff procedure; which the PF was complying with. At approximately 600 ft MSL; our TCAS announced a TA -- neither of us had time to mentally process this TA when an RA was soon after announced to 'descend.' at this point; the PF had decreased the power significantly to comply with the noise abatement procedures. However; the PF was not correcting per the RA aggressively enough. The red TCAS airplane display changed from 300 ft above to 200 ft above -- at which point I took control of the aircraft and aggressively pushed the nose down to comply with the RA as displayed on our vsi. The vsi was green at approximately 500 FPM down. At this point; we were climbing at 1500 plus FPM and passing 1300 ft MSL. We descended to approximately 900 ft MSL from our apex of approximately 1400 ft MSL. The GPWS announced a 'don't sink' warning -- both PF and myself acknowledged our altitude with regard to the GPWS warning. Smo tower advised us to contact lax departure; which we complied with. Upon contacting lax I immediately announced our RA and intentions. Lax replied that they would report this to their supervisor. By now we were crossing the shoreline and resuming our climb per normal climb procedures. I believe this problem was caused by 3 items: 1) smo tower's rush to get us off the ground to comply with lax's departure slot. In addition; the noise abatement requirements at smo require an aggressive climb after rotation; resulting in climb rates of 2500 plus FPM which can trigger a TCAS RA much quicker/sooner than during a normal takeoff rate of climb. 2) the WX was VFR and many VFR aircraft were flying in proximity to smo. 3) the PF's slow response to the RA. On climb; the PF and I discussed the event. He admitted that he wasn't looking at the vsi after our RA was announced. In the lear 40; the vsi turns red and green displaying what rates of climb are or are not required to comply with the RA. This would explain why he was not correcting aggressively enough when the RA was announced. We also discussed the aircraft I noticed departing lax on our departure roll from smo. Neither of us were sure if that was the aircraft that caused our RA. Neither of us saw the conflicting aircraft. I made sure the PF understood the importance of complying with all RA's at all times. The departure procedure from runway 21 at smo is questionable with regard to separation with lax departures and VFR aircraft flying the shoreline. The procedure is typically to fly runway heading until passing the lax 310 radial at which point an immediate right turn to heading 265 is executed. Without understanding the complexity of traffic control procedures at lax; I cannot understand why a right turn just after takeoff is not allowed as this would keep us away from lax departures. In addition; the noise abatement takeoff procedures required at smo demand a great amount of attention. This fact; combined with the complex departure procedure; and VFR aircraft 'running' the shoreline results in very congested airspace and an extremely 'busy' cockpit at low altitude. I'm not sure of VFR altitudes required at the shoreline; but perhaps a mandatory maximum altitude of less than 500 ft for VFR aircraft flying the shoreline would help to prevent a smo departure conflicting with low-flying shoreline VFR flying aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CREW OF LEAR 40 DEPARTING SMO RWY 21 HAS TCAS RA WITH UNKNOWN ACFT NEAR SHORELINE.

Narrative: I WAS THE PNF ON AN EMPTY REPOSITIONING LEG. WE WERE HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 21 FOR DEP ON AN IFR PLAN. A SMALL ACFT ON FINAL WAS INSTRUCTED TO GO AROUND SO THAT WE COULD MEET OUR DEP SLOT GIVEN BY LAX CTLRS. WE WERE GIVEN AN IMMEDIATE CLRNC FOR TKOF; WHICH WE COMPLIED WITH (ALL PRE-TKOF CHKLISTS COMPLETED WHILE HOLDING SHORT IN ANTICIPATION OF IMMEDIATE TKOF CLRNC). THE TKOF ROLL WAS UNEVENTFUL; ALTHOUGH I DID NOTICE A LARGE ACFT HAD JUST DEPARTED LAX WESTBOUND. JUST AFTER ROTATION; I NOTICED AN ACFT AT OUR 11:00 O'CLOCK ABOVE US DISPLAYED ON THE TCAS (I DID NOT HAVE VISUAL CONTACT). I WATCHED THIS ACFT'S TREND ON OUR TCAS AND NOTICED THAT THERE MAY BE A POTENTIAL CONFLICT; WHICH I MENTIONED TO THE PF. SMO REQUIRES A NOISE-ABATEMENT TKOF PROC; WHICH THE PF WAS COMPLYING WITH. AT APPROX 600 FT MSL; OUR TCAS ANNOUNCED A TA -- NEITHER OF US HAD TIME TO MENTALLY PROCESS THIS TA WHEN AN RA WAS SOON AFTER ANNOUNCED TO 'DSND.' AT THIS POINT; THE PF HAD DECREASED THE POWER SIGNIFICANTLY TO COMPLY WITH THE NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS. HOWEVER; THE PF WAS NOT CORRECTING PER THE RA AGGRESSIVELY ENOUGH. THE RED TCAS AIRPLANE DISPLAY CHANGED FROM 300 FT ABOVE TO 200 FT ABOVE -- AT WHICH POINT I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND AGGRESSIVELY PUSHED THE NOSE DOWN TO COMPLY WITH THE RA AS DISPLAYED ON OUR VSI. THE VSI WAS GREEN AT APPROX 500 FPM DOWN. AT THIS POINT; WE WERE CLBING AT 1500 PLUS FPM AND PASSING 1300 FT MSL. WE DSNDED TO APPROX 900 FT MSL FROM OUR APEX OF APPROX 1400 FT MSL. THE GPWS ANNOUNCED A 'DON'T SINK' WARNING -- BOTH PF AND MYSELF ACKNOWLEDGED OUR ALT WITH REGARD TO THE GPWS WARNING. SMO TWR ADVISED US TO CONTACT LAX DEP; WHICH WE COMPLIED WITH. UPON CONTACTING LAX I IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED OUR RA AND INTENTIONS. LAX REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD REPORT THIS TO THEIR SUPVR. BY NOW WE WERE CROSSING THE SHORELINE AND RESUMING OUR CLB PER NORMAL CLB PROCS. I BELIEVE THIS PROB WAS CAUSED BY 3 ITEMS: 1) SMO TWR'S RUSH TO GET US OFF THE GND TO COMPLY WITH LAX'S DEP SLOT. IN ADDITION; THE NOISE ABATEMENT REQUIREMENTS AT SMO REQUIRE AN AGGRESSIVE CLB AFTER ROTATION; RESULTING IN CLB RATES OF 2500 PLUS FPM WHICH CAN TRIGGER A TCAS RA MUCH QUICKER/SOONER THAN DURING A NORMAL TKOF RATE OF CLB. 2) THE WX WAS VFR AND MANY VFR ACFT WERE FLYING IN PROXIMITY TO SMO. 3) THE PF'S SLOW RESPONSE TO THE RA. ON CLB; THE PF AND I DISCUSSED THE EVENT. HE ADMITTED THAT HE WASN'T LOOKING AT THE VSI AFTER OUR RA WAS ANNOUNCED. IN THE LEAR 40; THE VSI TURNS RED AND GREEN DISPLAYING WHAT RATES OF CLB ARE OR ARE NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH THE RA. THIS WOULD EXPLAIN WHY HE WAS NOT CORRECTING AGGRESSIVELY ENOUGH WHEN THE RA WAS ANNOUNCED. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE ACFT I NOTICED DEPARTING LAX ON OUR DEP ROLL FROM SMO. NEITHER OF US WERE SURE IF THAT WAS THE ACFT THAT CAUSED OUR RA. NEITHER OF US SAW THE CONFLICTING ACFT. I MADE SURE THE PF UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLYING WITH ALL RA'S AT ALL TIMES. THE DEP PROC FROM RWY 21 AT SMO IS QUESTIONABLE WITH REGARD TO SEPARATION WITH LAX DEPS AND VFR ACFT FLYING THE SHORELINE. THE PROC IS TYPICALLY TO FLY RWY HDG UNTIL PASSING THE LAX 310 RADIAL AT WHICH POINT AN IMMEDIATE RIGHT TURN TO HDG 265 IS EXECUTED. WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE COMPLEXITY OF TFC CTL PROCS AT LAX; I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY A RIGHT TURN JUST AFTER TKOF IS NOT ALLOWED AS THIS WOULD KEEP US AWAY FROM LAX DEPS. IN ADDITION; THE NOISE ABATEMENT TKOF PROCS REQUIRED AT SMO DEMAND A GREAT AMOUNT OF ATTENTION. THIS FACT; COMBINED WITH THE COMPLEX DEP PROC; AND VFR ACFT 'RUNNING' THE SHORELINE RESULTS IN VERY CONGESTED AIRSPACE AND AN EXTREMELY 'BUSY' COCKPIT AT LOW ALT. I'M NOT SURE OF VFR ALTS REQUIRED AT THE SHORELINE; BUT PERHAPS A MANDATORY MAX ALT OF LESS THAN 500 FT FOR VFR ACFT FLYING THE SHORELINE WOULD HELP TO PREVENT A SMO DEP CONFLICTING WITH LOW-FLYING SHORELINE VFR FLYING ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.