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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 710546 |
Time | |
Date | 200609 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | navaid : leb.vor |
State Reference | MA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 4000 msl bound upper : 5600 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | landing : missed approach |
Route In Use | arrival : holding pattern |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zbw.artcc |
Make Model Name | Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172 |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | observation : observer |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : cfi pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 8 flight time total : 4050 flight time type : 180 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 65 flight time total : 475 flight time type : 475 |
ASRS Report | 710536 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical altitude deviation : overshoot conflict : airborne critical non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued alert controller : issued new clearance |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 22800 vertical : 700 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
I was acting as a safety pilot/check pilot during a training flight. The PIC is a current instrument rated pilot. We were training in a C182 equipped with a G1000 glass cockpit. The PIC is checked out to fly VFR in this aircraft; I am also current in this aircraft as well. We were flying the leb GPS runway 7 missed approach procedure; climb to 4000 ft direct to the VOR and hold. We started the climb from the MDA of 1500 ft to 4000 ft. The PIC set the appropriate altitude in the autoplt. Climbing through approximately 2500 ft; approach advised us to climb to 5000 ft and asked our intentions. The PIC answered that we would continue to hold until cleared onto our next fix. At this point; the PIC reset the garmin altitude setting to 5000 ft; and the autoplt to 6000 ft. I noticed this mis-setting; but did not remark on it at the time. We were climbing through 4000 ft; I wanted to see if the PIC would catch his inadvertent mistake. We were climbing in the hold and given new instructions: 'continue the hold; fly outbound on the 190 degree radial.' the PIC asked me if we were meant to fly back to the VOR first or turn directly to intercept the radial. I replied that we must go to the VOR first. My attention was diverted by helping the PIC set up the pfd and keep an eye outside for traffic. We flew through the assigned altitude to 5600 ft. The controller told us: 'what is your altitude? What is your altimeter setting? Descend immediately; turn left to a heading 190 degrees; there is conflicting traffic; and you can be expecting a call from us!' we complied immediately with a left turn and a descent. The controller's tone was anxious. There was no chance of any response aside from 'roger.' ATC took us sbound for a while before turning us east toward 'neets' intersection and rkd; our destination. Factors: 1) having a non-integrated autoplt adds an extra burden to the pilot during a coupled instrument approachs. 2) clearer distinction within the crew on safety pilot/check pilot/instructor pilot role. I showed up for this flight expecting to be a safety pilot; the PIC wishes to do a check ride. I should have advised the PIC of the autoplt setting when noticed. I should have been keeping track of the safety of the flight instead of trying to provide instruction. 3) my lack of recent time on the G1000 in an IFR environment. 4) lack of missed approach planning. I had not studied the approach prior to flying it; and we did not thoroughly brief the missed approach (safety pilot/check pilot issue). 5) ATC could have alerted us earlier of the deviation. They could have got us clear of the area/conflict before the reprimand.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: INST RATED PLT AND SAFETY PLT EXPERIENCE ALTDEV ON MISSED APCH.
Narrative: I WAS ACTING AS A SAFETY PLT/CHK PLT DURING A TRAINING FLT. THE PIC IS A CURRENT INST RATED PLT. WE WERE TRAINING IN A C182 EQUIPPED WITH A G1000 GLASS COCKPIT. THE PIC IS CHKED OUT TO FLY VFR IN THIS ACFT; I AM ALSO CURRENT IN THIS ACFT AS WELL. WE WERE FLYING THE LEB GPS RWY 7 MISSED APCH PROC; CLB TO 4000 FT DIRECT TO THE VOR AND HOLD. WE STARTED THE CLB FROM THE MDA OF 1500 FT TO 4000 FT. THE PIC SET THE APPROPRIATE ALT IN THE AUTOPLT. CLBING THROUGH APPROX 2500 FT; APCH ADVISED US TO CLB TO 5000 FT AND ASKED OUR INTENTIONS. THE PIC ANSWERED THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD UNTIL CLRED ONTO OUR NEXT FIX. AT THIS POINT; THE PIC RESET THE GARMIN ALT SETTING TO 5000 FT; AND THE AUTOPLT TO 6000 FT. I NOTICED THIS MIS-SETTING; BUT DID NOT REMARK ON IT AT THE TIME. WE WERE CLBING THROUGH 4000 FT; I WANTED TO SEE IF THE PIC WOULD CATCH HIS INADVERTENT MISTAKE. WE WERE CLBING IN THE HOLD AND GIVEN NEW INSTRUCTIONS: 'CONTINUE THE HOLD; FLY OUTBOUND ON THE 190 DEG RADIAL.' THE PIC ASKED ME IF WE WERE MEANT TO FLY BACK TO THE VOR FIRST OR TURN DIRECTLY TO INTERCEPT THE RADIAL. I REPLIED THAT WE MUST GO TO THE VOR FIRST. MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED BY HELPING THE PIC SET UP THE PFD AND KEEP AN EYE OUTSIDE FOR TFC. WE FLEW THROUGH THE ASSIGNED ALT TO 5600 FT. THE CTLR TOLD US: 'WHAT IS YOUR ALT? WHAT IS YOUR ALTIMETER SETTING? DSND IMMEDIATELY; TURN L TO A HDG 190 DEGS; THERE IS CONFLICTING TFC; AND YOU CAN BE EXPECTING A CALL FROM US!' WE COMPLIED IMMEDIATELY WITH A L TURN AND A DSCNT. THE CTLR'S TONE WAS ANXIOUS. THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF ANY RESPONSE ASIDE FROM 'ROGER.' ATC TOOK US SBOUND FOR A WHILE BEFORE TURNING US E TOWARD 'NEETS' INTXN AND RKD; OUR DEST. FACTORS: 1) HAVING A NON-INTEGRATED AUTOPLT ADDS AN EXTRA BURDEN TO THE PLT DURING A COUPLED INST APCHS. 2) CLEARER DISTINCTION WITHIN THE CREW ON SAFETY PLT/CHK PLT/INSTRUCTOR PLT ROLE. I SHOWED UP FOR THIS FLT EXPECTING TO BE A SAFETY PLT; THE PIC WISHES TO DO A CHK RIDE. I SHOULD HAVE ADVISED THE PIC OF THE AUTOPLT SETTING WHEN NOTICED. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN KEEPING TRACK OF THE SAFETY OF THE FLT INSTEAD OF TRYING TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTION. 3) MY LACK OF RECENT TIME ON THE G1000 IN AN IFR ENVIRONMENT. 4) LACK OF MISSED APCH PLANNING. I HAD NOT STUDIED THE APCH PRIOR TO FLYING IT; AND WE DID NOT THOROUGHLY BRIEF THE MISSED APCH (SAFETY PLT/CHK PLT ISSUE). 5) ATC COULD HAVE ALERTED US EARLIER OF THE DEV. THEY COULD HAVE GOT US CLR OF THE AREA/CONFLICT BEFORE THE REPRIMAND.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.