Narrative:

During the departure pre brief; the first officer briefed the nobly 2 departure SID RNAV runway 17R. The FMS was verified by the captain and first officer and both agreed on the routing. The first officer opted to hand fly with the flight director in the speed and heading and 1/2 bank modes selected. The nobly 2 departure for runway 17R called for a course of 153 degrees to navye fix. The first officer was the flying pilot and called for the above autoplt modes. The captain contacted departure control as instructed. Shortly after contact; the controller asked if we were on a heading for the nobly 2. I advised the controller that we were on a heading of 153 degrees to navye fix. The first officer verbalized to me that we were in fact heading 153 degrees to the same fix. I then quickly reviewed the SID and reverified the FMS and discovered we were drifting left of course. The controller returned a call to us indicating that we weren't doing the nobly 2. The first officer was verbalizing to me that we were in fact doing the nobly 2 and that the fix was within 2 miles of our location point. The controller then advised us again that we were not doing the nobly 2 and to turn left to a heading of 090 degrees. During cruise we determined that the navigation mode would have corrected for the wind drift and the SID called for a course not a heading of 153 degrees. During the event I told the first officer to turn toward the navye fix at which time the fix was now flashing and moved to jgirl fix. The first officer believed that it was the normal FMS map position for the aircraft to be and followed the course toward jgirl until ATC directed us to a heading of 090 degrees. Human performance factors for me personally were both the controller and first officer talking simultaneously. I was hearing two different instructions; reading the SID and seeing something different on the FMS map. I was in an information overload situation. I should have been more assertive with the first officer to turn quicker to the right to get back on course. We should have departed with the understanding that the autopilot and navigation mode would be used for total automation to execute the nobly 2 SID. My sleep pattern the previous night was not restful and I was not operating at my peak performance. I could have advised the controller that we had FMS discrepancies and requested a corrective heading toward the nobly 2 route. Shortly after; we were given the TRACON phone number to call upon arrival. Upon arrival; I contacted the ATC office and they informed us that we drifted too far and may have gotten into another controller's airspace. They advised me that recently the FAA was very strict with dfw ATC and the facility had reported 89 course deviations for that SID in the last 30 days.supplemental information from acn 712081: during the pre departure briefing; the FMS was loaded and verified and the route verified by both captain and first officer. The takeoff brief was given by myself; the first officer; as it was to be my leg. The takeoff for runway 17R was briefed; including the nobly 1 RNAV departure. We were to fly a heading of 174 degrees until at or above 1080 ft MSL; then via a 153 degree course to navye and so on. I briefed I would start with automation of speed mode and heading mode because of the initial heading. After our positive rate of climb; I asked for speed mode; heading and 1/2 bank. Upon reaching 1080 ft; instead of asking for navigation mode; I flew the 153 degree heading to navye. Shortly after the turn to 153 degrees; ATC questioned our heading. I confirmed to the captain that we were on the 153 degree heading to navye. At this point; I was still hand flying and now in doubt as to our departure procedure. I failed to notice that I was a little left of course because I was flying a 153 degree heading instead of a 153 degree course. The next thought that came to mind is that I used 1/2 bank instead of full bank. And now this is what I think the problem was. The departure controller asked a second time what our heading was. Again; I verified we were on the 153 degree heading to navye. The controller then said we were doing the departure incorrectly. It is about this time that we realized we are a little left of course and made a slight turn toward the right. But now which seems to be simultaneously; the FMS fix is flashing; indicating to me that we are about to overfly the waypoint. I now did not want to make a further right turn just to go back to the left again after passing navye. The controller calls again and tells us we are flying the departure wrong and gives us a turn to 090 degrees. For myself; the night before had been rather short. I missed the last flight of the day; so I got up extra early to make the xa:30 drive to the airport. I was very tired when I got up; but I opted not to call in sick as I had done so for a day within two weeks prior. On the drive to work; again I was sleepy; but came to work anyway. I should have called in sick or fatigued or whatever; but not to work. As I briefed the departure and the 174 degree heading initially; I think right then I had it in my mind to fly headings first; instead of navigation mode on the fcp. Contributing to all of this is the controller talking to us about doing something wrong with no indication of what it is that we are not doing; right in the middle of a busy phase of flight. It seemed very distracting and confusing. The captain is trying to do flows and checks and at the same time figure what we are doing wrong. Aside from coming to work in the first place; I should have turned the autoplt on sooner and reviewed the SID again. I don't know if I could have figured it out at that point as busy as we were at the time; but it would have eased the workload for both of us.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ700 CREW DRIFTS LEFT ON NOBLY2 DEP FROM DFW.

Narrative: DURING THE DEP PRE BRIEF; THE FO BRIEFED THE NOBLY 2 DEP SID RNAV RWY 17R. THE FMS WAS VERIFIED BY THE CAPT AND FO AND BOTH AGREED ON THE ROUTING. THE FO OPTED TO HAND FLY WITH THE FLT DIRECTOR IN THE SPD AND HDG AND 1/2 BANK MODES SELECTED. THE NOBLY 2 DEP FOR RWY 17R CALLED FOR A COURSE OF 153 DEGS TO NAVYE FIX. THE FO WAS THE FLYING PLT AND CALLED FOR THE ABOVE AUTOPLT MODES. THE CAPT CONTACTED DEP CTL AS INSTRUCTED. SHORTLY AFTER CONTACT; THE CTLR ASKED IF WE WERE ON A HDG FOR THE NOBLY 2. I ADVISED THE CTLR THAT WE WERE ON A HDG OF 153 DEGS TO NAVYE FIX. THE FO VERBALIZED TO ME THAT WE WERE IN FACT HDG 153 DEGS TO THE SAME FIX. I THEN QUICKLY REVIEWED THE SID AND REVERIFIED THE FMS AND DISCOVERED WE WERE DRIFTING LEFT OF COURSE. THE CTLR RETURNED A CALL TO US INDICATING THAT WE WEREN'T DOING THE NOBLY 2. THE FO WAS VERBALIZING TO ME THAT WE WERE IN FACT DOING THE NOBLY 2 AND THAT THE FIX WAS WITHIN 2 MILES OF OUR LOCATION POINT. THE CTLR THEN ADVISED US AGAIN THAT WE WERE NOT DOING THE NOBLY 2 AND TO TURN LEFT TO A HDG OF 090 DEGS. DURING CRUISE WE DETERMINED THAT THE NAV MODE WOULD HAVE CORRECTED FOR THE WIND DRIFT AND THE SID CALLED FOR A COURSE NOT A HDG OF 153 DEGS. DURING THE EVENT I TOLD THE FO TO TURN TOWARD THE NAVYE FIX AT WHICH TIME THE FIX WAS NOW FLASHING AND MOVED TO JGIRL FIX. THE FO BELIEVED THAT IT WAS THE NORMAL FMS MAP POSITION FOR THE ACFT TO BE AND FOLLOWED THE COURSE TOWARD JGIRL UNTIL ATC DIRECTED US TO A HDG OF 090 DEGS. HUMAN PERFORMANCE FACTORS FOR ME PERSONALLY WERE BOTH THE CTLR AND FO TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY. I WAS HEARING TWO DIFFERENT INSTRUCTIONS; READING THE SID AND SEEING SOMETHING DIFFERENT ON THE FMS MAP. I WAS IN AN INFO OVERLOAD SITUATION. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE WITH THE FO TO TURN QUICKER TO THE RIGHT TO GET BACK ON COURSE. WE SHOULD HAVE DEPARTED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE AUTOPILOT AND NAV MODE WOULD BE USED FOR TOTAL AUTOMATION TO EXECUTE THE NOBLY 2 SID. MY SLEEP PATTERN THE PREVIOUS NIGHT WAS NOT RESTFUL AND I WAS NOT OPERATING AT MY PEAK PERFORMANCE. I COULD HAVE ADVISED THE CTLR THAT WE HAD FMS DISCREPANCIES AND REQUESTED A CORRECTIVE HDG TOWARD THE NOBLY 2 ROUTE. SHORTLY AFTER; WE WERE GIVEN THE TRACON PHONE NUMBER TO CALL UPON ARR. UPON ARR; I CONTACTED THE ATC OFFICE AND THEY INFORMED US THAT WE DRIFTED TOO FAR AND MAY HAVE GOTTEN INTO ANOTHER CTLR'S AIRSPACE. THEY ADVISED ME THAT RECENTLY THE FAA WAS VERY STRICT WITH DFW ATC AND THE FACILITY HAD REPORTED 89 COURSE DEVIATIONS FOR THAT SID IN THE LAST 30 DAYS.SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 712081: DURING THE PRE DEP BRIEFING; THE FMS WAS LOADED AND VERIFIED AND THE ROUTE VERIFIED BY BOTH CAPT AND FO. THE TKOF BRIEF WAS GIVEN BY MYSELF; THE FO; AS IT WAS TO BE MY LEG. THE TKOF FOR RWY 17R WAS BRIEFED; INCLUDING THE NOBLY 1 RNAV DEP. WE WERE TO FLY A HDG OF 174 DEGS UNTIL AT OR ABOVE 1080 FT MSL; THEN VIA A 153 DEG COURSE TO NAVYE AND SO ON. I BRIEFED I WOULD START WITH AUTOMATION OF SPD MODE AND HDG MODE BECAUSE OF THE INITIAL HDG. AFTER OUR POSITIVE RATE OF CLB; I ASKED FOR SPD MODE; HDG AND 1/2 BANK. UPON REACHING 1080 FT; INSTEAD OF ASKING FOR NAV MODE; I FLEW THE 153 DEG HDG TO NAVYE. SHORTLY AFTER THE TURN TO 153 DEGS; ATC QUESTIONED OUR HDG. I CONFIRMED TO THE CAPT THAT WE WERE ON THE 153 DEG HDG TO NAVYE. AT THIS POINT; I WAS STILL HAND FLYING AND NOW IN DOUBT AS TO OUR DEP PROC. I FAILED TO NOTICE THAT I WAS A LITTLE LEFT OF COURSE BECAUSE I WAS FLYING A 153 DEG HDG INSTEAD OF A 153 DEG COURSE. THE NEXT THOUGHT THAT CAME TO MIND IS THAT I USED 1/2 BANK INSTEAD OF FULL BANK. AND NOW THIS IS WHAT I THINK THE PROBLEM WAS. THE DEP CTLR ASKED A SECOND TIME WHAT OUR HDG WAS. AGAIN; I VERIFIED WE WERE ON THE 153 DEG HDG TO NAVYE. THE CTLR THEN SAID WE WERE DOING THE DEP INCORRECTLY. IT IS ABOUT THIS TIME THAT WE REALIZED WE ARE A LITTLE LEFT OF COURSE AND MADE A SLIGHT TURN TOWARD THE RIGHT. BUT NOW WHICH SEEMS TO BE SIMULTANEOUSLY; THE FMS FIX IS FLASHING; INDICATING TO ME THAT WE ARE ABOUT TO OVERFLY THE WAYPOINT. I NOW DID NOT WANT TO MAKE A FURTHER RIGHT TURN JUST TO GO BACK TO THE LEFT AGAIN AFTER PASSING NAVYE. THE CTLR CALLS AGAIN AND TELLS US WE ARE FLYING THE DEP WRONG AND GIVES US A TURN TO 090 DEGS. FOR MYSELF; THE NIGHT BEFORE HAD BEEN RATHER SHORT. I MISSED THE LAST FLT OF THE DAY; SO I GOT UP EXTRA EARLY TO MAKE THE XA:30 DRIVE TO THE ARPT. I WAS VERY TIRED WHEN I GOT UP; BUT I OPTED NOT TO CALL IN SICK AS I HAD DONE SO FOR A DAY WITHIN TWO WEEKS PRIOR. ON THE DRIVE TO WORK; AGAIN I WAS SLEEPY; BUT CAME TO WORK ANYWAY. I SHOULD HAVE CALLED IN SICK OR FATIGUED OR WHATEVER; BUT NOT TO WORK. AS I BRIEFED THE DEP AND THE 174 DEG HDG INITIALLY; I THINK RIGHT THEN I HAD IT IN MY MIND TO FLY HDGS FIRST; INSTEAD OF NAV MODE ON THE FCP. CONTRIBUTING TO ALL OF THIS IS THE CTLR TALKING TO US ABOUT DOING SOMETHING WRONG WITH NO INDICATION OF WHAT IT IS THAT WE ARE NOT DOING; RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF A BUSY PHASE OF FLT. IT SEEMED VERY DISTRACTING AND CONFUSING. THE CAPT IS TRYING TO DO FLOWS AND CHKS AND AT THE SAME TIME FIGURE WHAT WE ARE DOING WRONG. ASIDE FROM COMING TO WORK IN THE FIRST PLACE; I SHOULD HAVE TURNED THE AUTOPLT ON SOONER AND REVIEWED THE SID AGAIN. I DON'T KNOW IF I COULD HAVE FIGURED IT OUT AT THAT POINT AS BUSY AS WE WERE AT THE TIME; BUT IT WOULD HAVE EASED THE WORKLOAD FOR BOTH OF US.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.