37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 712357 |
Time | |
Date | 200609 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 140 ER&LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : maintenance |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | Other |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Operating Under FAR Part | other : uknk |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | maintenance : lead technician |
ASRS Report | 712357 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | maintenance : technician |
ASRS Report | 712359 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance maintenance problem : improper documentation non adherence : company policies non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | other other : 4 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : schedule pressure contributing factor : work cards contributing factor : engineering procedure performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : testing |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Environmental Factor Chart Or Publication Aircraft Maintenance Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
Situations | |
Publication | MAINT MANUAL CHAPTER 27 |
Narrative:
During a phase 4A inspection at the hangar in the evening; while mechanic/crew chief was performing work card 27-700-05 (functional check of aileron actuator damping components and monitoring); the r-hand aileron positive control area (power control actuator) failed the continuity check. The positive control area was replaced by a serviceable unit and the remainder of the checks for the positive control area on work card xx and work card xy (functional check aileron damper for aileron damping force) were north/a'ed. The assumption by maintenance was that these checks would have been done by the vendor to certify the replacement positive control area as a serviceable unit; and the amm did not require these checks as part of the removal and replacement the unit. Subsequently; the phase 4A was turned in; reviewed by maintenance supervisor; reviewed by me; and released for revenue. Maintenance failed to notice the notation on work card xx that states if problems occur during this step; the positive control area is defective; so replace it with a new one and do the procedure again.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN EMB140 WAS RELEASED FOR SVC WITH A CHK OF THE AILERON DAMPING COMPONENTS AND MONITORING NOT ACCOMPLISHED.
Narrative: DURING A PHASE 4A INSPECTION AT THE HANGAR IN THE EVENING; WHILE MECH/CREW CHIEF WAS PERFORMING WORK CARD 27-700-05 (FUNCTIONAL CHK OF AILERON ACTUATOR DAMPING COMPONENTS AND MONITORING); THE R-HAND AILERON PCA (PWR CTL ACTUATOR) FAILED THE CONTINUITY CHK. THE PCA WAS REPLACED BY A SERVICEABLE UNIT AND THE REMAINDER OF THE CHKS FOR THE PCA ON WORK CARD XX AND WORK CARD XY (FUNCTIONAL CHK AILERON DAMPER FOR AILERON DAMPING FORCE) WERE N/A'ED. THE ASSUMPTION BY MAINT WAS THAT THESE CHKS WOULD HAVE BEEN DONE BY THE VENDOR TO CERTIFY THE REPLACEMENT PCA AS A SERVICEABLE UNIT; AND THE AMM DID NOT REQUIRE THESE CHKS AS PART OF THE REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT THE UNIT. SUBSEQUENTLY; THE PHASE 4A WAS TURNED IN; REVIEWED BY MAINT SUPVR; REVIEWED BY ME; AND RELEASED FOR REVENUE. MAINT FAILED TO NOTICE THE NOTATION ON WORK CARD XX THAT STATES IF PROBS OCCUR DURING THIS STEP; THE PCA IS DEFECTIVE; SO REPLACE IT WITH A NEW ONE AND DO THE PROC AGAIN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.