Narrative:

I was vectored to the ILS runway 6 at teb (teterboro; nj). I had been requested to maintain 160 KTS to the OM; and out of consideration for many faster aircraft in the pattern; continued to maintain relatively high power settings to short final. Upon retarding the throttle to the idle position over the threshold at approximately 40 ft AGL; I discovered I no longer had throttle control (at least had no ability to retard below about 20 inches manifold pressure). Cycling the throttle did not change the problem. So; at low altitude; over a long runway; with no ability to reduce power in order to land; I pulled the mixture. The engine quit as intended and I made a successful dead-stick landing. On rollout; with the propeller still wind-milling; I enriched the mixture allowing a restart (at high power). With some difficulty; I used mixture to toggle between a dead engine and a high-revving engine so that I may at least clear the runway at this busy airport before coming to a dead halt. I did not declare an emergency. I had not yet even advised the tower of my predicament. I was busy 'flying the airplane.' I received and read back an instruction to 'exit left on taxiway B; hold short of runway 1.' I exited left; saw the hold short line ahead; and gave it one last burst of rich mixture in order to clear runway 6 before calling a tug. It was then I saw the first set of lines were actually the hold short lines for runway 1 and the lines to clear runway 6 were a few feet ahead of them. I applied the brakes; but it was too late. I stopped with about 4 ft of my aircraft across the line (encroaching runway 1). I was also nowhere close to clearing runway 6. I apprised ground control of the entire situation; and with their permission; got out and pushed the plane back clear of the line to at least reopen runway 1. A tug arrived shortly and towed me to the FBO. I believe the major factor contributing to this incident was the mechanical failure of the throttle linkage; which rendered the aircraft less than normally controllable. Other factors include the pilot's lack of familiarity with the airport; distraction of the pilot produced by the failure; low-light condition; and confusing taxiway markings. Any time a taxiway crosses 2 runways and the markings are such that an aircraft by definition enters a second runway before technically leaving the first; you are going to have a 'runway incursion hotspot' as this area is designated on the commercial chart.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BONANZA PLT EXPERIENCED LOSS OF THROTTLE CTL ON SHORT FINAL AT TEB. WHEN HE TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY HE FAILED TO HOLD SHORT OF ANOTHER RWY HOLD LINE BECAUSE OF CONFUSING MARKINGS AND DISTR DUE TO THE THROTTLE PROB.

Narrative: I WAS VECTORED TO THE ILS RWY 6 AT TEB (TETERBORO; NJ). I HAD BEEN REQUESTED TO MAINTAIN 160 KTS TO THE OM; AND OUT OF CONSIDERATION FOR MANY FASTER ACFT IN THE PATTERN; CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN RELATIVELY HIGH PWR SETTINGS TO SHORT FINAL. UPON RETARDING THE THROTTLE TO THE IDLE POS OVER THE THRESHOLD AT APPROX 40 FT AGL; I DISCOVERED I NO LONGER HAD THROTTLE CTL (AT LEAST HAD NO ABILITY TO RETARD BELOW ABOUT 20 INCHES MANIFOLD PRESSURE). CYCLING THE THROTTLE DID NOT CHANGE THE PROB. SO; AT LOW ALT; OVER A LONG RWY; WITH NO ABILITY TO REDUCE PWR IN ORDER TO LAND; I PULLED THE MIXTURE. THE ENG QUIT AS INTENDED AND I MADE A SUCCESSFUL DEAD-STICK LNDG. ON ROLLOUT; WITH THE PROP STILL WIND-MILLING; I ENRICHED THE MIXTURE ALLOWING A RESTART (AT HIGH PWR). WITH SOME DIFFICULTY; I USED MIXTURE TO TOGGLE BTWN A DEAD ENG AND A HIGH-REVVING ENG SO THAT I MAY AT LEAST CLR THE RWY AT THIS BUSY ARPT BEFORE COMING TO A DEAD HALT. I DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER. I HAD NOT YET EVEN ADVISED THE TWR OF MY PREDICAMENT. I WAS BUSY 'FLYING THE AIRPLANE.' I RECEIVED AND READ BACK AN INSTRUCTION TO 'EXIT L ON TXWY B; HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1.' I EXITED L; SAW THE HOLD SHORT LINE AHEAD; AND GAVE IT ONE LAST BURST OF RICH MIXTURE IN ORDER TO CLR RWY 6 BEFORE CALLING A TUG. IT WAS THEN I SAW THE FIRST SET OF LINES WERE ACTUALLY THE HOLD SHORT LINES FOR RWY 1 AND THE LINES TO CLR RWY 6 WERE A FEW FEET AHEAD OF THEM. I APPLIED THE BRAKES; BUT IT WAS TOO LATE. I STOPPED WITH ABOUT 4 FT OF MY ACFT ACROSS THE LINE (ENCROACHING RWY 1). I WAS ALSO NOWHERE CLOSE TO CLRING RWY 6. I APPRISED GND CTL OF THE ENTIRE SITUATION; AND WITH THEIR PERMISSION; GOT OUT AND PUSHED THE PLANE BACK CLR OF THE LINE TO AT LEAST REOPEN RWY 1. A TUG ARRIVED SHORTLY AND TOWED ME TO THE FBO. I BELIEVE THE MAJOR FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT WAS THE MECHANICAL FAILURE OF THE THROTTLE LINKAGE; WHICH RENDERED THE ACFT LESS THAN NORMALLY CONTROLLABLE. OTHER FACTORS INCLUDE THE PLT'S LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT; DISTR OF THE PLT PRODUCED BY THE FAILURE; LOW-LIGHT CONDITION; AND CONFUSING TXWY MARKINGS. ANY TIME A TXWY CROSSES 2 RWYS AND THE MARKINGS ARE SUCH THAT AN ACFT BY DEFINITION ENTERS A SECOND RWY BEFORE TECHNICALLY LEAVING THE FIRST; YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE A 'RWY INCURSION HOTSPOT' AS THIS AREA IS DESIGNATED ON THE COMMERCIAL CHART.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.