Narrative:

After ATC gave the clearance to take off; we proceeded to depart runway 6. Shortly after takeoff and prior to our right turn to sgd we received an RA to climb. The aircraft was accelerating through 180 KTS. I pitched the aircraft to the command bars of the flight director. With the aircraft still at takeoff power and the aircraft close to 18 degree pitch attitude; the aircraft developed a very high rate of climb. Initially; the conflicting traffic was not in sight however; an aircraft was later spotted at our 12 O'clock position; moving to our 7 O'clock position. We suspect that this was the aircraft that caused the RA but cannot be sure. Once that conflict was resolved; it was immediately followed by a descending RA. With the aircraft still in an abnormally high pitch attitude it was difficult to arrest the rate of climb demanded by the command bars of the flight director. The conflicting traffic for the second RA was never seen or confirmed. After the second RA was resolved; we expedited a climb up to 6000 ft. As a result of being off course and not knowing the location of the second conflicting traffic; we remained on the present heading and attempted to contact ATC for amended instructions. There seemed to be a long delay for the handoff to departure control. However; prior to reaching 6000 ft we were handed off to departure control. Once we checked on; ATC seemed confused and asked if we were turning to sgd. We advised that we were still on runway heading. It was obvious to us that the departure instructions given to us were conflicting with other traffic in the area. We were then given a second frequency change. On the check in with the next controller; we were given a heading for ave and a telephone number to call on the ground. Once on the ground we contacted mr X; a supervisor for the oakland approach control. He mentioned that this has happened in the past and wanted to know why we had not made the turn to sgd. We informed him that once receiving the RA; we were required to maintain wings level during the climb and descent as the performance of the RA was predicted on that attitude. He understood the performance requirements. He then questioned why we had not turned to sgd after the second RA. I informed him that almost from the time the aircraft had the gear in the wells we were taking evasive action. This led us to question whether we had the correct clearance from the start. We did know that maintaining the present heading caused no further RA's. Further; not knowing the location of the second conflicting traffic; turning to sgd may have induced a third RA. Therefore; in the interest of the safety of flight; I chose to remain on runway heading; maintain the assigned altitude and contact ATC immediately for an amended clearance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CITATION CE750 HAS A TCAS RA DURING DEP FROM APC.

Narrative: AFTER ATC GAVE THE CLRNC TO TAKE OFF; WE PROCEEDED TO DEPART RWY 6. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF AND PRIOR TO OUR R TURN TO SGD WE RECEIVED AN RA TO CLB. THE ACFT WAS ACCELERATING THROUGH 180 KTS. I PITCHED THE ACFT TO THE COMMAND BARS OF THE FLT DIRECTOR. WITH THE ACFT STILL AT TKOF PWR AND THE ACFT CLOSE TO 18 DEG PITCH ATTITUDE; THE ACFT DEVELOPED A VERY HIGH RATE OF CLB. INITIALLY; THE CONFLICTING TFC WAS NOT IN SIGHT HOWEVER; AN ACFT WAS LATER SPOTTED AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS; MOVING TO OUR 7 O'CLOCK POS. WE SUSPECT THAT THIS WAS THE ACFT THAT CAUSED THE RA BUT CANNOT BE SURE. ONCE THAT CONFLICT WAS RESOLVED; IT WAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A DSNDING RA. WITH THE ACFT STILL IN AN ABNORMALLY HIGH PITCH ATTITUDE IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ARREST THE RATE OF CLB DEMANDED BY THE COMMAND BARS OF THE FLT DIRECTOR. THE CONFLICTING TFC FOR THE SECOND RA WAS NEVER SEEN OR CONFIRMED. AFTER THE SECOND RA WAS RESOLVED; WE EXPEDITED A CLB UP TO 6000 FT. AS A RESULT OF BEING OFF COURSE AND NOT KNOWING THE LOCATION OF THE SECOND CONFLICTING TFC; WE REMAINED ON THE PRESENT HDG AND ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT ATC FOR AMENDED INSTRUCTIONS. THERE SEEMED TO BE A LONG DELAY FOR THE HDOF TO DEP CTL. HOWEVER; PRIOR TO REACHING 6000 FT WE WERE HANDED OFF TO DEP CTL. ONCE WE CHKED ON; ATC SEEMED CONFUSED AND ASKED IF WE WERE TURNING TO SGD. WE ADVISED THAT WE WERE STILL ON RWY HDG. IT WAS OBVIOUS TO US THAT THE DEP INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO US WERE CONFLICTING WITH OTHER TFC IN THE AREA. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A SECOND FREQ CHANGE. ON THE CHK IN WITH THE NEXT CTLR; WE WERE GIVEN A HDG FOR AVE AND A TELEPHONE NUMBER TO CALL ON THE GND. ONCE ON THE GND WE CONTACTED MR X; A SUPVR FOR THE OAKLAND APCH CTL. HE MENTIONED THAT THIS HAS HAPPENED IN THE PAST AND WANTED TO KNOW WHY WE HAD NOT MADE THE TURN TO SGD. WE INFORMED HIM THAT ONCE RECEIVING THE RA; WE WERE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN WINGS LEVEL DURING THE CLB AND DSCNT AS THE PERFORMANCE OF THE RA WAS PREDICTED ON THAT ATTITUDE. HE UNDERSTOOD THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS. HE THEN QUESTIONED WHY WE HAD NOT TURNED TO SGD AFTER THE SECOND RA. I INFORMED HIM THAT ALMOST FROM THE TIME THE ACFT HAD THE GEAR IN THE WELLS WE WERE TAKING EVASIVE ACTION. THIS LED US TO QUESTION WHETHER WE HAD THE CORRECT CLRNC FROM THE START. WE DID KNOW THAT MAINTAINING THE PRESENT HDG CAUSED NO FURTHER RA'S. FURTHER; NOT KNOWING THE LOCATION OF THE SECOND CONFLICTING TFC; TURNING TO SGD MAY HAVE INDUCED A THIRD RA. THEREFORE; IN THE INTEREST OF THE SAFETY OF FLT; I CHOSE TO REMAIN ON RWY HDG; MAINTAIN THE ASSIGNED ALT AND CONTACT ATC IMMEDIATELY FOR AN AMENDED CLRNC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.