Narrative:

We departed bozeman; mt; at XA32; with the first officer as PF. After rotation; and during gear retraction; he verbalized that he was having trouble maintaining directional control (yaw) and that he thought we had an engine failure. He asked for left rudder trim and we leveled the aircraft at 6500 ft MSL. We had difficulty getting the aircraft in trim because I noticed the rudder trim indicator was not moving. At the same time we were receiving a gear unsafe warning on the main doors stating they were not closed. We could also hear that the doors had not closed. The tower then initiated a handoff and squawk code change; at which time we stated that we may have to return to the field. The tower controller then cleared us for a l-hand downwind and asked us if we needed any assistance. We stated that we would let him know shortly. We continued straight out; in visual conditions; while we finished getting the aircraft in trim; which required that I take the controls to help diagnose the problem; and the gear door warning extinguished. At this point we decided to continue; climb; assess the situation and determine our options. We informed the tower controller that we had fixed our problem; and wanted to continue the climb. At this point we climbed and had not yet initiated the turn for the departure procedure and were climbing out of approximately 8000 ft MSL at +4000 FPM to our cleared altitude of 12000 ft. We were unable to turn left during the first part of the obstacle departure due to rudder deflection being right and the turn requiring a left turn. At this point we verified that we were above the MSA for the quadrant we were in and climbing. To maintain terrain clearance we decided to continue the climb to 12000 ft; check in with ZLC; and receive an on-course heading for our initial route of bzn direct to the bil VOR. When I checked in with slc; I asked if we could make a right turn to join our filed route; and the controller stated that if we could maintain obstacle clearance that we were cleared to do so. We were in VMC during this whole event except when we were climbing out over the manni NDB between 7800-8100 ft MSL; when we transited a thin overcast layer. We stated that we could do so; and initiated a right turn to a heading of 120 degrees to intercept the route. We did not initially want to return to bozeman if we had such an uncontrollable rudder problem as the runway was contaminated with the center 80 ft braking action reported as fair and the area outside of that being reported poor. The runway was covered with thin; patchy ice. We decided in the climb that we wanted to stay visual until we fixed the trim issue; and then worry about the gear door issue later. We believe the gear door indication was caused by the adverse yaw and resultant air flow causing the doors not to latch. After considering all options; and having diagnosed the problems; continuing the flight as planned was the best course of action as determined by the crew. There were no QRH procedures for the 2 system issues that were experienced that directed us to return to the departure airport; divert; or to continue. Postflt inspection of the trim indication system showed that the needle would move in the direction of trim applied; but the indication and movement; rate; location were incorrect. The safety of flight was never in doubt; terrain clearance (as published MSA and MEA) was exceeded at all times; and no altdevs were incurred. No passenger were on board.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LJ35 FAILS TO FOLLOW OBSTACLE DEP PROC FROM BZN WHEN THE FLT CREW EXPERIENCES MALFUNCTIONING RUDDER TRIM AND GEAR UNSAFE INDICATION AFTER TKOF.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED BOZEMAN; MT; AT XA32; WITH THE FO AS PF. AFTER ROTATION; AND DURING GEAR RETRACTION; HE VERBALIZED THAT HE WAS HAVING TROUBLE MAINTAINING DIRECTIONAL CTL (YAW) AND THAT HE THOUGHT WE HAD AN ENG FAILURE. HE ASKED FOR L RUDDER TRIM AND WE LEVELED THE ACFT AT 6500 FT MSL. WE HAD DIFFICULTY GETTING THE ACFT IN TRIM BECAUSE I NOTICED THE RUDDER TRIM INDICATOR WAS NOT MOVING. AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE RECEIVING A GEAR UNSAFE WARNING ON THE MAIN DOORS STATING THEY WERE NOT CLOSED. WE COULD ALSO HEAR THAT THE DOORS HAD NOT CLOSED. THE TWR THEN INITIATED A HDOF AND SQUAWK CODE CHANGE; AT WHICH TIME WE STATED THAT WE MAY HAVE TO RETURN TO THE FIELD. THE TWR CTLR THEN CLRED US FOR A L-HAND DOWNWIND AND ASKED US IF WE NEEDED ANY ASSISTANCE. WE STATED THAT WE WOULD LET HIM KNOW SHORTLY. WE CONTINUED STRAIGHT OUT; IN VISUAL CONDITIONS; WHILE WE FINISHED GETTING THE ACFT IN TRIM; WHICH REQUIRED THAT I TAKE THE CTLS TO HELP DIAGNOSE THE PROB; AND THE GEAR DOOR WARNING EXTINGUISHED. AT THIS POINT WE DECIDED TO CONTINUE; CLB; ASSESS THE SITUATION AND DETERMINE OUR OPTIONS. WE INFORMED THE TWR CTLR THAT WE HAD FIXED OUR PROB; AND WANTED TO CONTINUE THE CLB. AT THIS POINT WE CLBED AND HAD NOT YET INITIATED THE TURN FOR THE DEP PROC AND WERE CLBING OUT OF APPROX 8000 FT MSL AT +4000 FPM TO OUR CLRED ALT OF 12000 FT. WE WERE UNABLE TO TURN L DURING THE FIRST PART OF THE OBSTACLE DEP DUE TO RUDDER DEFLECTION BEING R AND THE TURN REQUIRING A L TURN. AT THIS POINT WE VERIFIED THAT WE WERE ABOVE THE MSA FOR THE QUADRANT WE WERE IN AND CLBING. TO MAINTAIN TERRAIN CLRNC WE DECIDED TO CONTINUE THE CLB TO 12000 FT; CHK IN WITH ZLC; AND RECEIVE AN ON-COURSE HDG FOR OUR INITIAL RTE OF BZN DIRECT TO THE BIL VOR. WHEN I CHKED IN WITH SLC; I ASKED IF WE COULD MAKE A R TURN TO JOIN OUR FILED RTE; AND THE CTLR STATED THAT IF WE COULD MAINTAIN OBSTACLE CLRNC THAT WE WERE CLRED TO DO SO. WE WERE IN VMC DURING THIS WHOLE EVENT EXCEPT WHEN WE WERE CLBING OUT OVER THE MANNI NDB BTWN 7800-8100 FT MSL; WHEN WE TRANSITED A THIN OVCST LAYER. WE STATED THAT WE COULD DO SO; AND INITIATED A R TURN TO A HDG OF 120 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE RTE. WE DID NOT INITIALLY WANT TO RETURN TO BOZEMAN IF WE HAD SUCH AN UNCTLABLE RUDDER PROB AS THE RWY WAS CONTAMINATED WITH THE CTR 80 FT BRAKING ACTION RPTED AS FAIR AND THE AREA OUTSIDE OF THAT BEING RPTED POOR. THE RWY WAS COVERED WITH THIN; PATCHY ICE. WE DECIDED IN THE CLB THAT WE WANTED TO STAY VISUAL UNTIL WE FIXED THE TRIM ISSUE; AND THEN WORRY ABOUT THE GEAR DOOR ISSUE LATER. WE BELIEVE THE GEAR DOOR INDICATION WAS CAUSED BY THE ADVERSE YAW AND RESULTANT AIR FLOW CAUSING THE DOORS NOT TO LATCH. AFTER CONSIDERING ALL OPTIONS; AND HAVING DIAGNOSED THE PROBS; CONTINUING THE FLT AS PLANNED WAS THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION AS DETERMINED BY THE CREW. THERE WERE NO QRH PROCS FOR THE 2 SYS ISSUES THAT WERE EXPERIENCED THAT DIRECTED US TO RETURN TO THE DEP ARPT; DIVERT; OR TO CONTINUE. POSTFLT INSPECTION OF THE TRIM INDICATION SYS SHOWED THAT THE NEEDLE WOULD MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF TRIM APPLIED; BUT THE INDICATION AND MOVEMENT; RATE; LOCATION WERE INCORRECT. THE SAFETY OF FLT WAS NEVER IN DOUBT; TERRAIN CLRNC (AS PUBLISHED MSA AND MEA) WAS EXCEEDED AT ALL TIMES; AND NO ALTDEVS WERE INCURRED. NO PAX WERE ON BOARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.