Narrative:

This was the 3RD winter storm of the season at mci. As was the case in our first winter storm we had no supervisor in the tower cabin attendant for several hours in the afternoon; even though there were two in the building. (During the first winter storm when we had no supervisor in the tower cabin attendant we had an operational error; on final.) the second supervisor on this occasion was working on administrative duties (watch schedule development) for several hours even though there was a winter storm in progress. The tower was extra busy with winter time operations: multiple runway closingsecond officerpenings; extra vehicle traffic with all of the snow plows; sweepers; etc; associated with snow removal; rapidly changing WX conditions; deicing; etc. But still no supervisor in the tower. We were understaffed in controllers for this shift especially considering the winter storm and also increased traffic the mkc airport due to several dozen additional flts coming in. But as has been typical with management decisions at mci; no overtime was used to make up for the sick leave hits; and short staffing. As a result of not being able to split out needed position; at least 3 aircraft has to be broken off their approachs (in winter storm conditions; and reported icing conditions) to refly the extra mi of a second approach. In the tower cabin attendant a controller already tired from working winter storm conditions was made to work 2 hours and 35 mins straight on position; with no break; at the end of his shift; getting off position only 5 mins before he went home. The decisions of management not to call in overtime at mci has resulted in a shortage of controllers; resulting in position not being able to be opened when needed; compromising safety. Twice last week supervisors stated they would have needed to have opened position earlier but they had no one available to do it. The supervisors are also routinely working the ad (data) position combined to their supervisor position resulting in the fact that they are not able to oversee the operations. This was definitely a factor in our last operational error. The supervisor was working the data position combined.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MCI TWR CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING FAC STAFFING PROCS THAT MAKE SUPVR'S RELUCTANT TO USE CALL OUT OVERTIME.

Narrative: THIS WAS THE 3RD WINTER STORM OF THE SEASON AT MCI. AS WAS THE CASE IN OUR FIRST WINTER STORM WE HAD NO SUPVR IN THE TWR CAB FOR SEVERAL HRS IN THE AFTERNOON; EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE TWO IN THE BUILDING. (DURING THE FIRST WINTER STORM WHEN WE HAD NO SUPVR IN THE TWR CAB WE HAD AN OPERROR; ON FINAL.) THE SECOND SUPVR ON THIS OCCASION WAS WORKING ON ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES (WATCH SCHEDULE DEVELOPMENT) FOR SEVERAL HRS EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS A WINTER STORM IN PROGRESS. THE TWR WAS EXTRA BUSY WITH WINTER TIME OPS: MULTIPLE RWY CLOSINGS/OPENINGS; EXTRA VEHICLE TFC WITH ALL OF THE SNOW PLOWS; SWEEPERS; ETC; ASSOCIATED WITH SNOW REMOVAL; RAPIDLY CHANGING WX CONDITIONS; DEICING; ETC. BUT STILL NO SUPVR IN THE TWR. WE WERE UNDERSTAFFED IN CTLRS FOR THIS SHIFT ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE WINTER STORM AND ALSO INCREASED TFC THE MKC ARPT DUE TO SEVERAL DOZEN ADDITIONAL FLTS COMING IN. BUT AS HAS BEEN TYPICAL WITH MGMNT DECISIONS AT MCI; NO OVERTIME WAS USED TO MAKE UP FOR THE SICK LEAVE HITS; AND SHORT STAFFING. AS A RESULT OF NOT BEING ABLE TO SPLIT OUT NEEDED POS; AT LEAST 3 ACFT HAS TO BE BROKEN OFF THEIR APCHS (IN WINTER STORM CONDITIONS; AND RPTED ICING CONDITIONS) TO REFLY THE EXTRA MI OF A SECOND APCH. IN THE TWR CAB A CTLR ALREADY TIRED FROM WORKING WINTER STORM CONDITIONS WAS MADE TO WORK 2 HRS AND 35 MINS STRAIGHT ON POS; WITH NO BREAK; AT THE END OF HIS SHIFT; GETTING OFF POS ONLY 5 MINS BEFORE HE WENT HOME. THE DECISIONS OF MGMNT NOT TO CALL IN OVERTIME AT MCI HAS RESULTED IN A SHORTAGE OF CTLRS; RESULTING IN POS NOT BEING ABLE TO BE OPENED WHEN NEEDED; COMPROMISING SAFETY. TWICE LAST WEEK SUPVRS STATED THEY WOULD HAVE NEEDED TO HAVE OPENED POS EARLIER BUT THEY HAD NO ONE AVAILABLE TO DO IT. THE SUPVRS ARE ALSO ROUTINELY WORKING THE AD (DATA) POS COMBINED TO THEIR SUPVR POS RESULTING IN THE FACT THAT THEY ARE NOT ABLE TO OVERSEE THE OPS. THIS WAS DEFINITELY A FACTOR IN OUR LAST OPERROR. THE SUPVR WAS WORKING THE DATA POS COMBINED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.