Narrative:

Controller (cpc) had been assigned training from XA00-XI00. Previous shift ended at XO00 (10 hours prior) and he normally works a XF00 shift. After 6 hours; the supervisor notified cpc he would need to work traffic and be held over on overtime due to staffing. Cpc took a break; reported to control room at XG30; and was assigned R19 (D combined with right). After an hour of relatively continuous average to moderate traffic; cpc descended a B737 through an E135 on the same route; approximately 3.8 mi behind. He had intended to descend the E135 first; but had to wait until it entered his airspace. After doing other functions he returned to the B737; thinking he had completed the E135 descent earlier; and descended the B737. He was relieved about 10 mins later; once the sector was not too busy to turn over to the next controller. During the hour prior; the cpc performed both right and D functions. This involved receiving pointouts and other coordination. He felt he was getting more than usual cutting across the southwest corner for aircraft on the ewr and teb arrs. These can delay climbs on aircraft northbound on J42. He had also received several handoffs on the lga arrival with late dscnts and late handoff initiations. This can cause extra conflicts with aircraft climbing on J42. His annoyance with other controllers was probably a distraction. Knowing that he was being used for staffing; the cpc probably held off asking for a d-side controller for assistance. This d-side could have eliminated or at least reduced some of the distrs caused by land line coordination; and gotten control of the E135 to descend earlier. Having originally been on an unusual schedule (time) and being in a classroom setting for 6 hours; the cpc was probably not in the right mindset for such a busy sector. This cpc has been working a majority of the late night shifts on his crew's rotation; after only working them infrequently the previous 3 yrs; and he tended to be more tired during his work week. He also usually works 3 night shifts; a quick rest break; a morning shift followed by the late night shift. This amounts to 24 hours work in a 40 hour period. This also contributes to fatigue. Corrective actions: controllers still need to ask for help in a timely manner. Surrounding controllers need to understand the extra workload can be caused by late handoffs; missed restrs; and extra pointouts. Schedulers need to schedule enough personnel to ensure adequate staffing to handle traffic without causing excess fatigue; both during the shift and throughout the work week. The FAA needs to accelerate the rate of hiring; or start to allow xfer of personnel who can handle the work without forcing them to take a pay cut to move to busier facilities.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZDC CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL230 WHEN DESCENDING TFC THROUGH OCCUPIED ALT; CITING FATIGUE AND OTHER DISTRS AS CONTRIBUTORY.

Narrative: CTLR (CPC) HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TRAINING FROM XA00-XI00. PREVIOUS SHIFT ENDED AT XO00 (10 HRS PRIOR) AND HE NORMALLY WORKS A XF00 SHIFT. AFTER 6 HRS; THE SUPVR NOTIFIED CPC HE WOULD NEED TO WORK TFC AND BE HELD OVER ON OVERTIME DUE TO STAFFING. CPC TOOK A BREAK; RPTED TO CTL ROOM AT XG30; AND WAS ASSIGNED R19 (D COMBINED WITH R). AFTER AN HR OF RELATIVELY CONTINUOUS AVERAGE TO MODERATE TFC; CPC DSNDED A B737 THROUGH AN E135 ON THE SAME RTE; APPROX 3.8 MI BEHIND. HE HAD INTENDED TO DSND THE E135 FIRST; BUT HAD TO WAIT UNTIL IT ENTERED HIS AIRSPACE. AFTER DOING OTHER FUNCTIONS HE RETURNED TO THE B737; THINKING HE HAD COMPLETED THE E135 DSCNT EARLIER; AND DSNDED THE B737. HE WAS RELIEVED ABOUT 10 MINS LATER; ONCE THE SECTOR WAS NOT TOO BUSY TO TURN OVER TO THE NEXT CTLR. DURING THE HR PRIOR; THE CPC PERFORMED BOTH R AND D FUNCTIONS. THIS INVOLVED RECEIVING POINTOUTS AND OTHER COORD. HE FELT HE WAS GETTING MORE THAN USUAL CUTTING ACROSS THE SW CORNER FOR ACFT ON THE EWR AND TEB ARRS. THESE CAN DELAY CLBS ON ACFT NBOUND ON J42. HE HAD ALSO RECEIVED SEVERAL HDOFS ON THE LGA ARR WITH LATE DSCNTS AND LATE HDOF INITIATIONS. THIS CAN CAUSE EXTRA CONFLICTS WITH ACFT CLBING ON J42. HIS ANNOYANCE WITH OTHER CTLRS WAS PROBABLY A DISTR. KNOWING THAT HE WAS BEING USED FOR STAFFING; THE CPC PROBABLY HELD OFF ASKING FOR A D-SIDE CTLR FOR ASSISTANCE. THIS D-SIDE COULD HAVE ELIMINATED OR AT LEAST REDUCED SOME OF THE DISTRS CAUSED BY LAND LINE COORD; AND GOTTEN CTL OF THE E135 TO DSND EARLIER. HAVING ORIGINALLY BEEN ON AN UNUSUAL SCHEDULE (TIME) AND BEING IN A CLASSROOM SETTING FOR 6 HRS; THE CPC WAS PROBABLY NOT IN THE RIGHT MINDSET FOR SUCH A BUSY SECTOR. THIS CPC HAS BEEN WORKING A MAJORITY OF THE LATE NIGHT SHIFTS ON HIS CREW'S ROTATION; AFTER ONLY WORKING THEM INFREQUENTLY THE PREVIOUS 3 YRS; AND HE TENDED TO BE MORE TIRED DURING HIS WORK WEEK. HE ALSO USUALLY WORKS 3 NIGHT SHIFTS; A QUICK REST BREAK; A MORNING SHIFT FOLLOWED BY THE LATE NIGHT SHIFT. THIS AMOUNTS TO 24 HRS WORK IN A 40 HR PERIOD. THIS ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO FATIGUE. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: CTLRS STILL NEED TO ASK FOR HELP IN A TIMELY MANNER. SURROUNDING CTLRS NEED TO UNDERSTAND THE EXTRA WORKLOAD CAN BE CAUSED BY LATE HDOFS; MISSED RESTRS; AND EXTRA POINTOUTS. SCHEDULERS NEED TO SCHEDULE ENOUGH PERSONNEL TO ENSURE ADEQUATE STAFFING TO HANDLE TFC WITHOUT CAUSING EXCESS FATIGUE; BOTH DURING THE SHIFT AND THROUGHOUT THE WORK WEEK. THE FAA NEEDS TO ACCELERATE THE RATE OF HIRING; OR START TO ALLOW XFER OF PERSONNEL WHO CAN HANDLE THE WORK WITHOUT FORCING THEM TO TAKE A PAY CUT TO MOVE TO BUSIER FACILITIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.