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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 731830 |
Time | |
Date | 200703 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : jfk.airport |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Weather Elements | Rain Ice |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : jfk.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
ASRS Report | 731830 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
ASRS Report | 731831 |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Weather Flight Crew Human Performance Company |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
Our flight was deiced/anti-iced off the gate; precipitation at the time was very light drizzle with no evidence of freezing. On taxi out; we received the new ATIS which stated 'fzrapl.' the first officer and I discussed how we believed that this would require us to return to the gate. We got out the operations manual and the current deice guide and verified this in fact was the case but whatever precipitation was falling was extremely light -- in fact so light you could barely see it out the window. So we opened the windows and stuck our hand and arms out to discern just what type of precipitation we had. It was very light ice pellets extremely; small about the size of a pinhead along with no other precipitation. The extremely light nature of the precipitation can be verified as ATIS information gave the visibility as 7 mi. We decided to continue taxiing and as we approached the takeoff runway we would make another check of WX conditions to see if there were any changes to the type of precipitation. But as conditions stood we were legal for takeoff according to the operations manual and the issued deice guide. When #2 for takeoff; we again opened the windows checked the precipitation and it was only 'I/P;' very light in intensity. We made sure we were under our 'hot' and proceeded to take off. I was using our standard procedures to determine the possibility of wing contamination taking into account all the variables. The ATIS is just one more tool you have to make your decision but to quote our manual; 'ATIS may lag behind actual observed WX conditions; pilots may determine the current conditions by flight deck observation as the basis for 'hot' determination.' I am now aware that a message had been sent that completely removes this procedure and we are to use the ATIS as our go/no-go decision and disregard actual WX conditions outside our windows. Unfortunately; neither the first officer nor I were aware of the message. This is a fundamental change to our operational procedure and should have been communicated via a bulletin or message in the flight plan not as an e-mail wedged between messages about lost sunglasses and early retirements. There is nothing in our operations manual or deice guide that mentions reported WX as being a factor; but these are the documents we use to make our decision. What can I; air carrier; and the FAA learn from this situation? 1) from now on I'll make sure to keep and try to file any e-mails that are of an operational nature so as to have them available if needed. 2) the company should make sure all messages that change operational procedures. Such as this one; is disseminated via official means. 3) as for the FAA; ice pellets did not just appear this yr due to global warming. We have been dealing with it since we started flying in snow/sleet storms. Wing contamination is one of the most difficult and serious decisions a captain has to make in his career. In recent yrs we have been given many excellent tools to help us make this decision. Apparently there is new information on how ice pellets react with a/I fluid please give us that information and any special considerations we should know and let the captain make the call. He's the guy who can see the wing; not the guy behind the tinted glass in the tower; or the dispatcher 1500 mi away in the nice; warm room.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A300 CREW DEPARTS IN WEATHER CONDITIONS DESCRIBED AS -FZRAPL IN VIOLATION OF FARS.
Narrative: OUR FLT WAS DEICED/ANTI-ICED OFF THE GATE; PRECIP AT THE TIME WAS VERY LIGHT DRIZZLE WITH NO EVIDENCE OF FREEZING. ON TAXI OUT; WE RECEIVED THE NEW ATIS WHICH STATED 'FZRAPL.' THE FO AND I DISCUSSED HOW WE BELIEVED THAT THIS WOULD REQUIRE US TO RETURN TO THE GATE. WE GOT OUT THE OPS MANUAL AND THE CURRENT DEICE GUIDE AND VERIFIED THIS IN FACT WAS THE CASE BUT WHATEVER PRECIP WAS FALLING WAS EXTREMELY LIGHT -- IN FACT SO LIGHT YOU COULD BARELY SEE IT OUT THE WINDOW. SO WE OPENED THE WINDOWS AND STUCK OUR HAND AND ARMS OUT TO DISCERN JUST WHAT TYPE OF PRECIP WE HAD. IT WAS VERY LIGHT ICE PELLETS EXTREMELY; SMALL ABOUT THE SIZE OF A PINHEAD ALONG WITH NO OTHER PRECIP. THE EXTREMELY LIGHT NATURE OF THE PRECIP CAN BE VERIFIED AS ATIS INFO GAVE THE VISIBILITY AS 7 MI. WE DECIDED TO CONTINUE TAXIING AND AS WE APCHED THE TKOF RWY WE WOULD MAKE ANOTHER CHK OF WX CONDITIONS TO SEE IF THERE WERE ANY CHANGES TO THE TYPE OF PRECIP. BUT AS CONDITIONS STOOD WE WERE LEGAL FOR TKOF ACCORDING TO THE OPS MANUAL AND THE ISSUED DEICE GUIDE. WHEN #2 FOR TKOF; WE AGAIN OPENED THE WINDOWS CHKED THE PRECIP AND IT WAS ONLY 'I/P;' VERY LIGHT IN INTENSITY. WE MADE SURE WE WERE UNDER OUR 'HOT' AND PROCEEDED TO TAKE OFF. I WAS USING OUR STANDARD PROCS TO DETERMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF WING CONTAMINATION TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE VARIABLES. THE ATIS IS JUST ONE MORE TOOL YOU HAVE TO MAKE YOUR DECISION BUT TO QUOTE OUR MANUAL; 'ATIS MAY LAG BEHIND ACTUAL OBSERVED WX CONDITIONS; PLTS MAY DETERMINE THE CURRENT CONDITIONS BY FLT DECK OBSERVATION AS THE BASIS FOR 'HOT' DETERMINATION.' I AM NOW AWARE THAT A MESSAGE HAD BEEN SENT THAT COMPLETELY REMOVES THIS PROC AND WE ARE TO USE THE ATIS AS OUR GO/NO-GO DECISION AND DISREGARD ACTUAL WX CONDITIONS OUTSIDE OUR WINDOWS. UNFORTUNATELY; NEITHER THE FO NOR I WERE AWARE OF THE MESSAGE. THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE TO OUR OPERATIONAL PROC AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMMUNICATED VIA A BULLETIN OR MESSAGE IN THE FLT PLAN NOT AS AN E-MAIL WEDGED BTWN MESSAGES ABOUT LOST SUNGLASSES AND EARLY RETIREMENTS. THERE IS NOTHING IN OUR OPS MANUAL OR DEICE GUIDE THAT MENTIONS RPTED WX AS BEING A FACTOR; BUT THESE ARE THE DOCUMENTS WE USE TO MAKE OUR DECISION. WHAT CAN I; ACR; AND THE FAA LEARN FROM THIS SIT? 1) FROM NOW ON I'LL MAKE SURE TO KEEP AND TRY TO FILE ANY E-MAILS THAT ARE OF AN OPERATIONAL NATURE SO AS TO HAVE THEM AVAILABLE IF NEEDED. 2) THE COMPANY SHOULD MAKE SURE ALL MESSAGES THAT CHANGE OPERATIONAL PROCS. SUCH AS THIS ONE; IS DISSEMINATED VIA OFFICIAL MEANS. 3) AS FOR THE FAA; ICE PELLETS DID NOT JUST APPEAR THIS YR DUE TO GLOBAL WARMING. WE HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH IT SINCE WE STARTED FLYING IN SNOW/SLEET STORMS. WING CONTAMINATION IS ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT AND SERIOUS DECISIONS A CAPT HAS TO MAKE IN HIS CAREER. IN RECENT YRS WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN MANY EXCELLENT TOOLS TO HELP US MAKE THIS DECISION. APPARENTLY THERE IS NEW INFO ON HOW ICE PELLETS REACT WITH A/I FLUID PLEASE GIVE US THAT INFO AND ANY SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS WE SHOULD KNOW AND LET THE CAPT MAKE THE CALL. HE'S THE GUY WHO CAN SEE THE WING; NOT THE GUY BEHIND THE TINTED GLASS IN THE TWR; OR THE DISPATCHER 1500 MI AWAY IN THE NICE; WARM ROOM.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.