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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 736070 |
Time | |
Date | 200704 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : spa.airport |
State Reference | SC |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : ztl.artcc |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | PA-23-250 Aztec |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | ground : takeoff roll |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Gates Learjet Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | ground : takeoff roll |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : commercial pilot : flight engineer pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 300 flight time total : 1025 flight time type : 10 |
ASRS Report | 736070 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical excursion : runway non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took evasive action flight crew : rejected takeoff |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 20 vertical : 30 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Airport Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
My copilot and I self-announced on CTAF that we were taxiing to runway 23 (winds were 220 degrees at 8 KTS). We then taxied to the end of runway 23 for run-up checks. We saw a lear jet taxiing to runway 5; but heard no radio xmissions from him. We discussed that he was probably talking to greer approach for an IFR clearance; but would surely self-announce before taking the runway. We self-announced that we were taking runway 23 for immediate departure; then taxied into position. We set and checked power then released brakes. Approximately 5 seconds later we heard 'lear????? Departing runway 5.' we immediately closed the throttles and took evasive maneuvers to the right side of the runway and applied brakes heavily. My copilot transmitted 'aztec aborting on runway 23 spartanburg because we don't know what the lear is doing.' there is a crest in the runway; so we could not see the aircraft until we had traveled about 1000 ft down the runway. We then saw him rotate and bank hard right where he avoided us by about 30 ft. We taxied clear and taxied back to runway 23 for another takeoff. The lear never made another transmission. After talking to the FBO 1 hour later; we learned that the lear pilot seemed 'in a huge hurry.' the problem was caused by a 'professional pilot' not following basic non-twred airport procedures specified in the far aim and constantly emphasized by many safety organizations. He failed to use the proper runway for current wind conditions and failed to make any of the recommended announcements on CTAF. Either of these would have 'broken the chain' of events leading up to a possible tragedy.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PA 23 ABORTS TKOF FROM RWY 23 AT SPA WHEN A LEARJET ROLLS OPPOSITE DIRECTION OF RWY 5.
Narrative: MY COPLT AND I SELF-ANNOUNCED ON CTAF THAT WE WERE TAXIING TO RWY 23 (WINDS WERE 220 DEGS AT 8 KTS). WE THEN TAXIED TO THE END OF RWY 23 FOR RUN-UP CHKS. WE SAW A LEAR JET TAXIING TO RWY 5; BUT HEARD NO RADIO XMISSIONS FROM HIM. WE DISCUSSED THAT HE WAS PROBABLY TALKING TO GREER APCH FOR AN IFR CLRNC; BUT WOULD SURELY SELF-ANNOUNCE BEFORE TAKING THE RWY. WE SELF-ANNOUNCED THAT WE WERE TAKING RWY 23 FOR IMMEDIATE DEP; THEN TAXIED INTO POS. WE SET AND CHKED PWR THEN RELEASED BRAKES. APPROX 5 SECONDS LATER WE HEARD 'LEAR????? DEPARTING RWY 5.' WE IMMEDIATELY CLOSED THE THROTTLES AND TOOK EVASIVE MANEUVERS TO THE R SIDE OF THE RWY AND APPLIED BRAKES HEAVILY. MY COPLT XMITTED 'AZTEC ABORTING ON RWY 23 SPARTANBURG BECAUSE WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THE LEAR IS DOING.' THERE IS A CREST IN THE RWY; SO WE COULD NOT SEE THE ACFT UNTIL WE HAD TRAVELED ABOUT 1000 FT DOWN THE RWY. WE THEN SAW HIM ROTATE AND BANK HARD R WHERE HE AVOIDED US BY ABOUT 30 FT. WE TAXIED CLR AND TAXIED BACK TO RWY 23 FOR ANOTHER TKOF. THE LEAR NEVER MADE ANOTHER XMISSION. AFTER TALKING TO THE FBO 1 HR LATER; WE LEARNED THAT THE LEAR PLT SEEMED 'IN A HUGE HURRY.' THE PROB WAS CAUSED BY A 'PROFESSIONAL PLT' NOT FOLLOWING BASIC NON-TWRED ARPT PROCS SPECIFIED IN THE FAR AIM AND CONSTANTLY EMPHASIZED BY MANY SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS. HE FAILED TO USE THE PROPER RWY FOR CURRENT WIND CONDITIONS AND FAILED TO MAKE ANY OF THE RECOMMENDED ANNOUNCEMENTS ON CTAF. EITHER OF THESE WOULD HAVE 'BROKEN THE CHAIN' OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO A POSSIBLE TRAGEDY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.