Narrative:

At crw ATCT; almost all shifts are scheduled with less than the minimum amount of controllers needed to perform the necessary duties for the shifts. One day; I was scheduled to work the evening shift with three (3) other controllers. The shifts require at least five (5) ATC controllers to provide a safe and expeditious flow of traffic; as FAA orders require. On this particular day; we had one of the controllers call in sick prior to the beginning of his shift. Overtime was authorized; however; only 1 person was eligible; due to overtime requirements for other shifts. This person could not be reached. I notified the acting air traffic manager of the situation and recommended that we go VFR tower from XA00 hours until XC00 hours. He replied that he was working on it and he had to call the air traffic manager. The air traffic manager called back and instructed us to close the tower and make it uncontrolled. I informed him that we have no procedures for this and recommended us to go to a VFR tower as we have procedures for this and have been trained. He then ordered me to close the tower and run the TRACON with the 2 controllers we had. Myself and the other controller proceeded to follow the manager's direction as ordered. For the next two (2) hours; the crw ATCT facility was in complete turmoil. We really had no idea on how to proceed with this. We were short staffed; significantly busy (the need for the VFR tower); and now forced to come up with a game plan to do something we are not trained to do; nor have procedures to follow. The aircraft were put into many unsafe situations to include: construction on and around the airport; safety equipment not monitored; a change with routine operations; local WX not disseminated via ATIS; an inability to adjust airfield lighting panel; unfamiliar aircraft on the ground; and the list goes on. One instance a helicopter; on an active rescue flight; was delayed because of the operation. Also another aircraft called on approach frequency because he was lost on the airport and could not find the FBO. I informed him of the location. When the pilot crossed the runway; he then broadcasted on the approach frequency that he was crossing the runway instead of the frequency we had designated as the unicom. Lucky for him that there were no other aircraft on final or departing at that time. Another aircraft was required to go around due to an unsafe GS indication. We had no knowledge whether the GS indicator indicated green or not. Crw is not designed or intended to close at any time! It is a 24 hour facility. This manager's direction; contrary to both controller's judgement on duty; compromised the safety of the flying public and put the careers of both controllers in jeopardy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRW CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING MGMNT'S TWR CLOSURE DECISION FOR SEVERAL HOURS DUE TO STAFFING SHORTAGES; CITING SAFETY CONCERNS.

Narrative: AT CRW ATCT; ALMOST ALL SHIFTS ARE SCHEDULED WITH LESS THAN THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF CTLRS NEEDED TO PERFORM THE NECESSARY DUTIES FOR THE SHIFTS. ONE DAY; I WAS SCHEDULED TO WORK THE EVENING SHIFT WITH THREE (3) OTHER CTLRS. THE SHIFTS REQUIRE AT LEAST FIVE (5) ATC CTLRS TO PROVIDE A SAFE AND EXPEDITIOUS FLOW OF TFC; AS FAA ORDERS REQUIRE. ON THIS PARTICULAR DAY; WE HAD ONE OF THE CTLRS CALL IN SICK PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF HIS SHIFT. OVERTIME WAS AUTHORIZED; HOWEVER; ONLY 1 PERSON WAS ELIGIBLE; DUE TO OVERTIME REQUIREMENTS FOR OTHER SHIFTS. THIS PERSON COULD NOT BE REACHED. I NOTIFIED THE ACTING AIR TFC MGR OF THE SITUATION AND RECOMMENDED THAT WE GO VFR TWR FROM XA00 HRS UNTIL XC00 HRS. HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS WORKING ON IT AND HE HAD TO CALL THE AIR TFC MGR. THE AIR TFC MGR CALLED BACK AND INSTRUCTED US TO CLOSE THE TWR AND MAKE IT UNCTLED. I INFORMED HIM THAT WE HAVE NO PROCS FOR THIS AND RECOMMENDED US TO GO TO A VFR TWR AS WE HAVE PROCS FOR THIS AND HAVE BEEN TRAINED. HE THEN ORDERED ME TO CLOSE THE TWR AND RUN THE TRACON WITH THE 2 CTLRS WE HAD. MYSELF AND THE OTHER CTLR PROCEEDED TO FOLLOW THE MGR'S DIRECTION AS ORDERED. FOR THE NEXT TWO (2) HRS; THE CRW ATCT FACILITY WAS IN COMPLETE TURMOIL. WE REALLY HAD NO IDEA ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH THIS. WE WERE SHORT STAFFED; SIGNIFICANTLY BUSY (THE NEED FOR THE VFR TWR); AND NOW FORCED TO COME UP WITH A GAME PLAN TO DO SOMETHING WE ARE NOT TRAINED TO DO; NOR HAVE PROCS TO FOLLOW. THE ACFT WERE PUT INTO MANY UNSAFE SITUATIONS TO INCLUDE: CONSTRUCTION ON AND AROUND THE ARPT; SAFETY EQUIP NOT MONITORED; A CHANGE WITH ROUTINE OPS; LCL WX NOT DISSEMINATED VIA ATIS; AN INABILITY TO ADJUST AIRFIELD LIGHTING PANEL; UNFAMILIAR ACFT ON THE GND; AND THE LIST GOES ON. ONE INSTANCE A HELI; ON AN ACTIVE RESCUE FLT; WAS DELAYED BECAUSE OF THE OP. ALSO ANOTHER ACFT CALLED ON APCH FREQ BECAUSE HE WAS LOST ON THE ARPT AND COULD NOT FIND THE FBO. I INFORMED HIM OF THE LOCATION. WHEN THE PLT CROSSED THE RWY; HE THEN BROADCASTED ON THE APCH FREQ THAT HE WAS XING THE RWY INSTEAD OF THE FREQ WE HAD DESIGNATED AS THE UNICOM. LUCKY FOR HIM THAT THERE WERE NO OTHER ACFT ON FINAL OR DEPARTING AT THAT TIME. ANOTHER ACFT WAS REQUIRED TO GO AROUND DUE TO AN UNSAFE GS INDICATION. WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE WHETHER THE GS INDICATOR INDICATED GREEN OR NOT. CRW IS NOT DESIGNED OR INTENDED TO CLOSE AT ANY TIME! IT IS A 24 HR FACILITY. THIS MGR'S DIRECTION; CONTRARY TO BOTH CTLR'S JUDGEMENT ON DUTY; COMPROMISED THE SAFETY OF THE FLYING PUBLIC AND PUT THE CAREERS OF BOTH CTLRS IN JEOPARDY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.