Narrative:

This report is in reference to specific situations and a general tone of operation at company X. Over the past yr; a basic regard for human safety has become non-existent at this operator. One of the main issues at hand is our maintenance department; which currently performs almost no maintenance whatsoever on the aircraft it is set to maintain. The aircraft are typically sent to maintenance with discrepancies and returned to service without correction of the original issue. Most times aircraft are written up 4-5 times for the same item before the problem is corrected. An extreme example of this problem is aircraft X; which has been written up over 100 times for the pressurization failing in-flight. Still to this day; it has yet to be corrected. All of the taws in the E120 fleet are out of date. Some are so out of date that the last revision was in 2005. Many of the aircraft in the fleet are operating at this time under an improper MEL. The company continues to operate under the methodology that if you do not fly the aircraft; you will be fired. Along with that; a&P professionals are threatened with their jobs if they do not have the aircraft ready to fly on time. Most of the time the aircraft discrepancies are signed off by an inspector; without taking any physical corrective action on the aircraft itself. A comprehensive check of the maintenance records will reveal the current behavior of the department. The company continues along this dangerous and self-destructive path under the supervision of our coo; the director of maintenance; and the poi. All men are fully aware of the dangerous maintenance activities that occur and have done nothing to improve safety for the crew and passenger. It would be in the best interest of the general public if the FAA were to investigate the actions of company X and the airworthiness of the fleet currently operating. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated the pressurization failures continue to happen on one of his company's EMB120's. The taws (terrain awareness warning system) have just been upgraded on most of the emb-120's; at least to the 2006 version. Numerous engine failures in one week. Reporter feels they had an excellent maintenance department until the new coo arrived. Reporter also noted the emergency exit at row 6-F is not functional on their emb-120's due to seat row 5-F does not break forward; allowing for the right hand exit plug to be pulled in and give access to the exit. These are full fuselage side exit plugs that run from the overhead bins to the floor. Reporter believes that his company's director of operations is basically reflecting the coo's mandate from a financial position on the maintenance department.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CAPTAIN REPORTS OF HIS AIRLINE'S SERIOUS MAINT DEFICIENCIES; THREATS OF FIRING PILOTS; IMPROPER MEL DEFERRALS; TAWS TWO YEARS OUT OF DATE.

Narrative: THIS RPT IS IN REF TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS AND A GENERAL TONE OF OP AT COMPANY X. OVER THE PAST YR; A BASIC REGARD FOR HUMAN SAFETY HAS BECOME NON-EXISTENT AT THIS OPERATOR. ONE OF THE MAIN ISSUES AT HAND IS OUR MAINT DEPT; WHICH CURRENTLY PERFORMS ALMOST NO MAINT WHATSOEVER ON THE ACFT IT IS SET TO MAINTAIN. THE ACFT ARE TYPICALLY SENT TO MAINT WITH DISCREPANCIES AND RETURNED TO SVC WITHOUT CORRECTION OF THE ORIGINAL ISSUE. MOST TIMES ACFT ARE WRITTEN UP 4-5 TIMES FOR THE SAME ITEM BEFORE THE PROB IS CORRECTED. AN EXTREME EXAMPLE OF THIS PROB IS ACFT X; WHICH HAS BEEN WRITTEN UP OVER 100 TIMES FOR THE PRESSURIZATION FAILING INFLT. STILL TO THIS DAY; IT HAS YET TO BE CORRECTED. ALL OF THE TAWS IN THE E120 FLEET ARE OUT OF DATE. SOME ARE SO OUT OF DATE THAT THE LAST REVISION WAS IN 2005. MANY OF THE ACFT IN THE FLEET ARE OPERATING AT THIS TIME UNDER AN IMPROPER MEL. THE COMPANY CONTINUES TO OPERATE UNDER THE METHODOLOGY THAT IF YOU DO NOT FLY THE ACFT; YOU WILL BE FIRED. ALONG WITH THAT; A&P PROFESSIONALS ARE THREATENED WITH THEIR JOBS IF THEY DO NOT HAVE THE ACFT READY TO FLY ON TIME. MOST OF THE TIME THE ACFT DISCREPANCIES ARE SIGNED OFF BY AN INSPECTOR; WITHOUT TAKING ANY PHYSICAL CORRECTIVE ACTION ON THE ACFT ITSELF. A COMPREHENSIVE CHK OF THE MAINT RECORDS WILL REVEAL THE CURRENT BEHAVIOR OF THE DEPT. THE COMPANY CONTINUES ALONG THIS DANGEROUS AND SELF-DESTRUCTIVE PATH UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF OUR COO; THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT; AND THE POI. ALL MEN ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE DANGEROUS MAINT ACTIVITIES THAT OCCUR AND HAVE DONE NOTHING TO IMPROVE SAFETY FOR THE CREW AND PAX. IT WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC IF THE FAA WERE TO INVESTIGATE THE ACTIONS OF COMPANY X AND THE AIRWORTHINESS OF THE FLEET CURRENTLY OPERATING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE PRESSURIZATION FAILURES CONTINUE TO HAPPEN ON ONE OF HIS COMPANY'S EMB120'S. THE TAWS (TERRAIN AWARENESS WARNING SYSTEM) HAVE JUST BEEN UPGRADED ON MOST OF THE EMB-120'S; AT LEAST TO THE 2006 VERSION. NUMEROUS ENGINE FAILURES IN ONE WEEK. REPORTER FEELS THEY HAD AN EXCELLENT MAINTENANCE DEPT UNTIL THE NEW COO ARRIVED. REPORTER ALSO NOTED THE EMERGENCY EXIT AT ROW 6-F IS NOT FUNCTIONAL ON THEIR EMB-120'S DUE TO SEAT ROW 5-F DOES NOT BREAK FORWARD; ALLOWING FOR THE RIGHT HAND EXIT PLUG TO BE PULLED IN AND GIVE ACCESS TO THE EXIT. THESE ARE FULL FUSELAGE SIDE EXIT PLUGS THAT RUN FROM THE OVERHEAD BINS TO THE FLOOR. REPORTER BELIEVES THAT HIS COMPANY'S DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS IS BASICALLY REFLECTING THE COO'S MANDATE FROM A FINANCIAL POSITION ON THE MAINTENANCE DEPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.