Narrative:

I first briefed the first officer on how I expect the operation of the flight to be handled as per the SOP, and briefed him that if he doesn't like anything about the operation of the flight to please speak up. We then did a before start checklist. The first officer then said that on taxi out I would have to make a hard left turn to avoid getting within 3 ft (company minimum separation) of the left wing of aircraft. I agreed with him and told him to make sure we had at least 3 ft clearance with the wings. I also told him not to be hesitant to step on the brakes and stop the aircraft if he needed to. After completing the taxi checklist, we taxied out under the guidance of a marshaller and a 'wing walker' on the right wing. The left wing was clear of any obstructions. The wing walker was giving 'non standard' signals with 'thumbs up.' the first officer requested standard signals by holding his hands about 3 ft apart. At the same time the first officer said to stop the aircraft and I did. The marshaller looked at the wingtip and began to flag us out again. We moved no more than 1 ft, then the first officer said to stop and we both stepped on the brakes and stopped the aircraft. I set the parking brake and called for a ramp supervisor and maintenance to come out and look at the wingtip. When the ramp supervisor came out, he told me to shut down both engines. I did so and got out of the airplane to look at the wing. My wingtip was brushing the wingtip of aircraft. I entered the discrepancy in the logbook. If our rampers were trained to a much higher standard we would not have this problem. Maybe if we increased the minimum clearance limit to 5 ft or maybe 10 ft then this might happen less frequently. This problem is the biggest problem we have on the ramp. Near misses happen many times every day. The first officer cannot judge the distance between the wing and any obstacles at the angle he must look, and the captain is in a tough situation because he must also watch the marshaller. If the crew cannot trust the marshaller and wing walkers, then the operation at least while taxi out of ramp cannot be a safe one. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the wing walker had never been qualified for the position and was holding 1 thumb up as she was trying to wave a 'stop' to the marshaller. The PIC was pleased that the first officer did apply braking in accord with his previous cockpit/flight crew briefing. The aircraft had not actually been damaged and was flown that day without needing repairs. Reporter cites a looseness about the management's attitude about the ramp situation and the close proximity of the aircraft wingtips.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIRLINE MAINT PROC AND GND CREW TRAINING DEFICIENCIES ARE INDICATED AFTER A WINGTIP STRIKE OCCURS BTWN 2 ACFT DURING A RAMP OP RAMP DEP PROC.

Narrative: I FIRST BRIEFED THE FO ON HOW I EXPECT THE OP OF THE FLT TO BE HANDLED AS PER THE SOP, AND BRIEFED HIM THAT IF HE DOESN'T LIKE ANYTHING ABOUT THE OP OF THE FLT TO PLEASE SPEAK UP. WE THEN DID A BEFORE START CHKLIST. THE FO THEN SAID THAT ON TAXI OUT I WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A HARD L TURN TO AVOID GETTING WITHIN 3 FT (COMPANY MINIMUM SEPARATION) OF THE L WING OF ACFT. I AGREED WITH HIM AND TOLD HIM TO MAKE SURE WE HAD AT LEAST 3 FT CLRNC WITH THE WINGS. I ALSO TOLD HIM NOT TO BE HESITANT TO STEP ON THE BRAKES AND STOP THE ACFT IF HE NEEDED TO. AFTER COMPLETING THE TAXI CHKLIST, WE TAXIED OUT UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF A MARSHALLER AND A 'WING WALKER' ON THE R WING. THE L WING WAS CLR OF ANY OBSTRUCTIONS. THE WING WALKER WAS GIVING 'NON STANDARD' SIGNALS WITH 'THUMBS UP.' THE FO REQUESTED STANDARD SIGNALS BY HOLDING HIS HANDS ABOUT 3 FT APART. AT THE SAME TIME THE FO SAID TO STOP THE ACFT AND I DID. THE MARSHALLER LOOKED AT THE WINGTIP AND BEGAN TO FLAG US OUT AGAIN. WE MOVED NO MORE THAN 1 FT, THEN THE FO SAID TO STOP AND WE BOTH STEPPED ON THE BRAKES AND STOPPED THE ACFT. I SET THE PARKING BRAKE AND CALLED FOR A RAMP SUPVR AND MAINT TO COME OUT AND LOOK AT THE WINGTIP. WHEN THE RAMP SUPVR CAME OUT, HE TOLD ME TO SHUT DOWN BOTH ENGS. I DID SO AND GOT OUT OF THE AIRPLANE TO LOOK AT THE WING. MY WINGTIP WAS BRUSHING THE WINGTIP OF ACFT. I ENTERED THE DISCREPANCY IN THE LOGBOOK. IF OUR RAMPERS WERE TRAINED TO A MUCH HIGHER STANDARD WE WOULD NOT HAVE THIS PROB. MAYBE IF WE INCREASED THE MINIMUM CLRNC LIMIT TO 5 FT OR MAYBE 10 FT THEN THIS MIGHT HAPPEN LESS FREQUENTLY. THIS PROB IS THE BIGGEST PROB WE HAVE ON THE RAMP. NEAR MISSES HAPPEN MANY TIMES EVERY DAY. THE FO CANNOT JUDGE THE DISTANCE BTWN THE WING AND ANY OBSTACLES AT THE ANGLE HE MUST LOOK, AND THE CAPT IS IN A TOUGH SIT BECAUSE HE MUST ALSO WATCH THE MARSHALLER. IF THE CREW CANNOT TRUST THE MARSHALLER AND WING WALKERS, THEN THE OP AT LEAST WHILE TAXI OUT OF RAMP CANNOT BE A SAFE ONE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE WING WALKER HAD NEVER BEEN QUALIFIED FOR THE POS AND WAS HOLDING 1 THUMB UP AS SHE WAS TRYING TO WAVE A 'STOP' TO THE MARSHALLER. THE PIC WAS PLEASED THAT THE FO DID APPLY BRAKING IN ACCORD WITH HIS PREVIOUS COCKPIT/FLC BRIEFING. THE ACFT HAD NOT ACTUALLY BEEN DAMAGED AND WAS FLOWN THAT DAY WITHOUT NEEDING REPAIRS. RPTR CITES A LOOSENESS ABOUT THE MGMNT'S ATTITUDE ABOUT THE RAMP SIT AND THE CLOSE PROX OF THE ACFT WINGTIPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.