Narrative:

During a planned flight to bgbw I needed to divert to my alternate (bgsf) after missing the approach into bgbw and needed to deviate from my assigned en route altitude ensuring I would have adequate fuel in bgsf. The flight was planned at FL380 to bgbw with enough fuel to divert to bgsf and land with 600 pounds of fuel (1 hours worth) in bgsf. We were assigned FL340 and then quickly lowered to FL280 en route to bgbw. During the flight; I continuously monitored the fuel remaining and WX to bgbw. At every waypoint I ensured that the fuel remaining was equal to or greater than estimated fuel remaining which was critical in my decision to continue to bgbw. The WX continued to hold and meet the required 1500 ft ceiling and visibility requirements to allow a successful approach and landing in bgbw. As we arrived overhead the airport to begin the approach; the WX was reported to be at minimums. At the MDA; I did not see the airport and executed a missed approach and contacted ATC informing them of our intentions to divert to bgsf. ATC cleared us to FL250 and direct to bgsf. The alternate routing and performance were planned at FL250; maximum range cruise; a 4 KT headwind and direct. Leveled at FL250 our headwind component was in excess of 60 KTS and the FMS was calculating landing with 200 pounds of fuel; not enough. We began to request higher altitudes and were eventually given FL320. The FMS calculated landing fuel at 410 pounds. Still not enough to land comfortably and little to no fuel to hold in the event a problem was encountered in bgsf. At this time we had lost radio contact with ATC and had intermittent radio contact with an aircraft that was relaying messages to/from ATC. Electing to climb to FL385 to ensure adequate fuel in bgsf seemed to be the only alternative due to the higher than expected winds en route to the alternate. FL385 seemed the logical choice combining aircraft performance factors and avoiding any possible conflicts with other traffic if any. The remainder of the flight proved uneventful and we landed with 630 pounds of fuel. The requirement to climb ever higher was necessitated by stronger than forecast/planned winds and ATC's inability to accommodate our request within the required time frame. Operating any aircraft with limited range over the north atlantic is very challenging and can require pilots to make difficult choices despite solid planning and flight execution. I have learned the following lessons: 1) when the alternate is more than 300 NM (389 NM in this case); carry more fuel than what is flight planned by a software program. 2) when operating over the north atlantic never plan a flight above FL280. The north atlantic is a non-radar environment and ATC response time and capabilities are limited. If higher altitudes are assigned -- great; but don't plan on it. 3) never hesitate to do what is required to ensure the safe outcome of the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER A MISSED APCH AT BGBW; A C525 PILOT DIVERTED TO BGSF; BUT BECAUSE OF HIGH ENROUTE WINDS CLBED ABOVE ATC AUTHORIZED ALT TO CONSERVE FUEL.

Narrative: DURING A PLANNED FLT TO BGBW I NEEDED TO DIVERT TO MY ALTERNATE (BGSF) AFTER MISSING THE APCH INTO BGBW AND NEEDED TO DEVIATE FROM MY ASSIGNED ENRTE ALT ENSURING I WOULD HAVE ADEQUATE FUEL IN BGSF. THE FLT WAS PLANNED AT FL380 TO BGBW WITH ENOUGH FUEL TO DIVERT TO BGSF AND LAND WITH 600 LBS OF FUEL (1 HRS WORTH) IN BGSF. WE WERE ASSIGNED FL340 AND THEN QUICKLY LOWERED TO FL280 ENRTE TO BGBW. DURING THE FLT; I CONTINUOUSLY MONITORED THE FUEL REMAINING AND WX TO BGBW. AT EVERY WAYPOINT I ENSURED THAT THE FUEL REMAINING WAS EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN ESTIMATED FUEL REMAINING WHICH WAS CRITICAL IN MY DECISION TO CONTINUE TO BGBW. THE WX CONTINUED TO HOLD AND MEET THE REQUIRED 1500 FT CEILING AND VISIBILITY REQUIREMENTS TO ALLOW A SUCCESSFUL APCH AND LNDG IN BGBW. AS WE ARRIVED OVERHEAD THE ARPT TO BEGIN THE APCH; THE WX WAS RPTED TO BE AT MINIMUMS. AT THE MDA; I DID NOT SEE THE ARPT AND EXECUTED A MISSED APCH AND CONTACTED ATC INFORMING THEM OF OUR INTENTIONS TO DIVERT TO BGSF. ATC CLRED US TO FL250 AND DIRECT TO BGSF. THE ALTERNATE ROUTING AND PERFORMANCE WERE PLANNED AT FL250; MAX RANGE CRUISE; A 4 KT HEADWIND AND DIRECT. LEVELED AT FL250 OUR HEADWIND COMPONENT WAS IN EXCESS OF 60 KTS AND THE FMS WAS CALCULATING LNDG WITH 200 LBS OF FUEL; NOT ENOUGH. WE BEGAN TO REQUEST HIGHER ALTS AND WERE EVENTUALLY GIVEN FL320. THE FMS CALCULATED LNDG FUEL AT 410 LBS. STILL NOT ENOUGH TO LAND COMFORTABLY AND LITTLE TO NO FUEL TO HOLD IN THE EVENT A PROB WAS ENCOUNTERED IN BGSF. AT THIS TIME WE HAD LOST RADIO CONTACT WITH ATC AND HAD INTERMITTENT RADIO CONTACT WITH AN ACFT THAT WAS RELAYING MESSAGES TO/FROM ATC. ELECTING TO CLB TO FL385 TO ENSURE ADEQUATE FUEL IN BGSF SEEMED TO BE THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE DUE TO THE HIGHER THAN EXPECTED WINDS ENRTE TO THE ALTERNATE. FL385 SEEMED THE LOGICAL CHOICE COMBINING ACFT PERFORMANCE FACTORS AND AVOIDING ANY POSSIBLE CONFLICTS WITH OTHER TFC IF ANY. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT PROVED UNEVENTFUL AND WE LANDED WITH 630 LBS OF FUEL. THE REQUIREMENT TO CLB EVER HIGHER WAS NECESSITATED BY STRONGER THAN FORECAST/PLANNED WINDS AND ATC'S INABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE OUR REQUEST WITHIN THE REQUIRED TIME FRAME. OPERATING ANY ACFT WITH LIMITED RANGE OVER THE NORTH ATLANTIC IS VERY CHALLENGING AND CAN REQUIRE PLTS TO MAKE DIFFICULT CHOICES DESPITE SOLID PLANNING AND FLT EXECUTION. I HAVE LEARNED THE FOLLOWING LESSONS: 1) WHEN THE ALTERNATE IS MORE THAN 300 NM (389 NM IN THIS CASE); CARRY MORE FUEL THAN WHAT IS FLT PLANNED BY A SOFTWARE PROGRAM. 2) WHEN OPERATING OVER THE NORTH ATLANTIC NEVER PLAN A FLT ABOVE FL280. THE NORTH ATLANTIC IS A NON-RADAR ENVIRONMENT AND ATC RESPONSE TIME AND CAPABILITIES ARE LIMITED. IF HIGHER ALTS ARE ASSIGNED -- GREAT; BUT DON'T PLAN ON IT. 3) NEVER HESITATE TO DO WHAT IS REQUIRED TO ENSURE THE SAFE OUTCOME OF THE FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.