Narrative:

Aircraft parked and engines shut down at gate. The purser disarmed 1L with the girt bar out of its brackets; and the customer service representative was opening the door. Flight attendant stopped the customer service representative from further opening the door; as she saw the slide coming out from its container. She called for assistance; as she saw a potential slide deployment. I left the flight deck to see the door; partially open; the girt bar fully out of its brackets; and the slide detached from its container. As I inspected the slide and bar; I saw that the girt bar was fully detached from the aircraft; the slide was not connected to its container in any way; and that the slide was not hung up or snagged on the aircraft or jetway in any way. Seeing that it was completely loose; I was able to safely move the slide and girt bar out of the doorway and set it aside in the jetway; allowing the door to fully open; and the de-boarding of the aircraft commence. Flight attendant quick action in preventing the door from being further opened by the unsuspecting customer service representative; and her call for help in a possible dangerous slide deployment; reflects solidly on her awareness and professionalism. This has been a recurring problem on the B737 -- it might reflect a possible design flaw in the container mechanism.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 ACFT FWD ENTRY DOOR (1L) ESCAPE SLIDE WAS STOPPED FROM INADVERTENT DEPLOYMENT BY QUICK ACTION OF FLT ATTENDANT AND CO-PILOT.

Narrative: ACFT PARKED AND ENGS SHUT DOWN AT GATE. THE PURSER DISARMED 1L WITH THE GIRT BAR OUT OF ITS BRACKETS; AND THE CUSTOMER SVC REPRESENTATIVE WAS OPENING THE DOOR. FLT ATTENDANT STOPPED THE CUSTOMER SVC REPRESENTATIVE FROM FURTHER OPENING THE DOOR; AS SHE SAW THE SLIDE COMING OUT FROM ITS CONTAINER. SHE CALLED FOR ASSISTANCE; AS SHE SAW A POTENTIAL SLIDE DEPLOYMENT. I LEFT THE FLT DECK TO SEE THE DOOR; PARTIALLY OPEN; THE GIRT BAR FULLY OUT OF ITS BRACKETS; AND THE SLIDE DETACHED FROM ITS CONTAINER. AS I INSPECTED THE SLIDE AND BAR; I SAW THAT THE GIRT BAR WAS FULLY DETACHED FROM THE ACFT; THE SLIDE WAS NOT CONNECTED TO ITS CONTAINER IN ANY WAY; AND THAT THE SLIDE WAS NOT HUNG UP OR SNAGGED ON THE ACFT OR JETWAY IN ANY WAY. SEEING THAT IT WAS COMPLETELY LOOSE; I WAS ABLE TO SAFELY MOVE THE SLIDE AND GIRT BAR OUT OF THE DOORWAY AND SET IT ASIDE IN THE JETWAY; ALLOWING THE DOOR TO FULLY OPEN; AND THE DE-BOARDING OF THE ACFT COMMENCE. FLT ATTENDANT QUICK ACTION IN PREVENTING THE DOOR FROM BEING FURTHER OPENED BY THE UNSUSPECTING CUSTOMER SVC REPRESENTATIVE; AND HER CALL FOR HELP IN A POSSIBLE DANGEROUS SLIDE DEPLOYMENT; REFLECTS SOLIDLY ON HER AWARENESS AND PROFESSIONALISM. THIS HAS BEEN A RECURRING PROB ON THE B737 -- IT MIGHT REFLECT A POSSIBLE DESIGN FLAW IN THE CONTAINER MECHANISM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.