Narrative:

Local control east (lce); attempting a squeeze play; was distraction by performing functions of ground control as well. Lce issued incomplete runway exit instructions to the military learjet. Thinking that the aircraft would exit at K4 high speed then transition to taxiway J northbound to FBO; lce turned their attention to the arrival (a citation) versus the B747 in position runway 1R (destination halfway around the world). Lce cleared the B747 for takeoff. Neither lce nor the tower team observed that the learjet was still on the runway; beyond the last high speed turnoff trying desperately to accelerate to the taxiway at the far end. An amass alert was heard the moment the B747 reached departure state. Lce immediately canceled the takeoff clearance and sent the arrival around. The H/B747 aborted takeoff; having reached approximately 97 KTS; exited the runway; was taxied back for takeoff but had to wait in the hold block for brakes to cool. Had amass not sounded the alarm and had the H/B747 accelerated beyond decision speed; we probably would have had a collision on the runway. Amass saved the day. Note: this B747 normally takes about 11000 to get airborne. OAT; 70 degrees F. There are so many lessons to be learned from this incident. It will be presented at to the controller workforce. But one factor that led to confusion is that the crew of the LJ35 was using a government airfield diagram that showed taxiway J as wrapping around and joining the runway at the approach end of runway 19L. In fact; this taxiway was re-designated as taxiway J1 in aug/xa/06. All were briefed and signs were changed. The commercial charts depict it correctly; but both the green facility directory and approach plate diagram still have it wrong. Phonecon with the LJ35 PIC determined that they were using the uncorrected chart. Whereas they were slow enough to exit at K4 (18 KTS); the only place they saw where taxiway J joined the runway (according to their diagram) was at the end. Hearing the B747 commence takeoff; they accelerated to 55 KTS to taxi to the end. ATC called airport operations on jun/fri/07 to ask them to issue a NOTAM about the incorrect government charts. The NOTAM has not been issued as of jun/mon/07 am. ATC called the operations again on jun/xb/07 to; once again; request that a NOTAM be issued. This is a critical oversight that could have led to a tenerife-like situation and needs to be addressed by airport operations as soon as possible.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: IAD CTLR OBSERVER DESCRIBED OPERROR WHEN ACR WAS CLRED FOR TKOF WITH LNDG TFC STILL ON RWY; CITING CHARTING ERRORS AS CONTRIBUTORY.

Narrative: LCL CTL E (LCE); ATTEMPTING A SQUEEZE PLAY; WAS DISTR BY PERFORMING FUNCTIONS OF GND CTL AS WELL. LCE ISSUED INCOMPLETE RWY EXIT INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MIL LEARJET. THINKING THAT THE ACFT WOULD EXIT AT K4 HIGH SPD THEN TRANSITION TO TXWY J NBOUND TO FBO; LCE TURNED THEIR ATTN TO THE ARR (A CITATION) VERSUS THE B747 IN POS RWY 1R (DEST HALFWAY AROUND THE WORLD). LCE CLRED THE B747 FOR TKOF. NEITHER LCE NOR THE TWR TEAM OBSERVED THAT THE LEARJET WAS STILL ON THE RWY; BEYOND THE LAST HIGH SPD TURNOFF TRYING DESPERATELY TO ACCELERATE TO THE TXWY AT THE FAR END. AN AMASS ALERT WAS HEARD THE MOMENT THE B747 REACHED DEP STATE. LCE IMMEDIATELY CANCELED THE TKOF CLRNC AND SENT THE ARR AROUND. THE H/B747 ABORTED TKOF; HAVING REACHED APPROX 97 KTS; EXITED THE RWY; WAS TAXIED BACK FOR TKOF BUT HAD TO WAIT IN THE HOLD BLOCK FOR BRAKES TO COOL. HAD AMASS NOT SOUNDED THE ALARM AND HAD THE H/B747 ACCELERATED BEYOND DECISION SPD; WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE HAD A COLLISION ON THE RWY. AMASS SAVED THE DAY. NOTE: THIS B747 NORMALLY TAKES ABOUT 11000 TO GET AIRBORNE. OAT; 70 DEGS F. THERE ARE SO MANY LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THIS INCIDENT. IT WILL BE PRESENTED AT TO THE CTLR WORKFORCE. BUT ONE FACTOR THAT LED TO CONFUSION IS THAT THE CREW OF THE LJ35 WAS USING A GOV AIRFIELD DIAGRAM THAT SHOWED TXWY J AS WRAPPING AROUND AND JOINING THE RWY AT THE APCH END OF RWY 19L. IN FACT; THIS TXWY WAS RE-DESIGNATED AS TXWY J1 IN AUG/XA/06. ALL WERE BRIEFED AND SIGNS WERE CHANGED. THE COMMERCIAL CHARTS DEPICT IT CORRECTLY; BUT BOTH THE GREEN FACILITY DIRECTORY AND APCH PLATE DIAGRAM STILL HAVE IT WRONG. PHONECON WITH THE LJ35 PIC DETERMINED THAT THEY WERE USING THE UNCORRECTED CHART. WHEREAS THEY WERE SLOW ENOUGH TO EXIT AT K4 (18 KTS); THE ONLY PLACE THEY SAW WHERE TXWY J JOINED THE RWY (ACCORDING TO THEIR DIAGRAM) WAS AT THE END. HEARING THE B747 COMMENCE TKOF; THEY ACCELERATED TO 55 KTS TO TAXI TO THE END. ATC CALLED ARPT OPS ON JUN/FRI/07 TO ASK THEM TO ISSUE A NOTAM ABOUT THE INCORRECT GOV CHARTS. THE NOTAM HAS NOT BEEN ISSUED AS OF JUN/MON/07 AM. ATC CALLED THE OPS AGAIN ON JUN/XB/07 TO; ONCE AGAIN; REQUEST THAT A NOTAM BE ISSUED. THIS IS A CRITICAL OVERSIGHT THAT COULD HAVE LED TO A TENERIFE-LIKE SITUATION AND NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED BY ARPT OPS ASAP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.