Narrative:

Perceived time restraint; 'gotta get the flight out on time at all costs' mentality placed on the ground crews by management. Communication breakdown between ramp crew and cockpit crew. No procedure in place for ramp crew to ask a specific pilot (captain; first officer) for chocks and power. During pushback from gate; ramp crew failed to remove aft nose gear chock. Aircraft was jolted as it appeared to ride over the chock. Towbar shear pin broke. No injuries onboard the aircraft although the 3 flight attendants were tossed around a bit. Aircraft was moved a few ft back from the jetway position. We had den maintenance come out and inspect the nose gear for possible damage. After nose gear was deemed safe by maintenance we passed the logbook out through the cockpit window for a signoff of the inspection. We then resumed the pushback without returning to the gate or opening the aircraft cabin door. Before the inspection we did not want to move the aircraft forward or back to prevent any further possible damage. After inspection it just made sense to pass the logbook out of the window to the mechanic standing on a belt loader. Since we were already showing pushed off of the gate we did not amend the release time although we discussed it with dx. We technically were already pushed back. A report was telephoned in by me. Not sure why it didn't show up here that it was phoned in. My first officer also filled out a report. One last comment; ramp crew will ask either pilot if it is ok to remove chocks. While they did not ask me I assumed that they asked my first officer or just pulled them because the driver indicated verbally that the walkaround was complete and that they were ready for pushback. Large jolt; bump and chock skidding indicated to everyone on board; and tug driver; that there was a problem. We thought we hit something in the cockpit. One assigned pushback crew should communicate with only one cockpit crew; ie; tug driver and captain or left wing walker and first officer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PUSH BACK CREW ATTEMPTS TO PUSH B737-300 WITHOUT FIRST REMOVING CHOCK FROM BEHIND NOSE WHEEL RESULTING IN SHEAR PIN FAILURE IN TOW BAR.

Narrative: PERCEIVED TIME RESTRAINT; 'GOTTA GET THE FLT OUT ON TIME AT ALL COSTS' MENTALITY PLACED ON THE GND CREWS BY MGMNT. COM BREAKDOWN BTWN RAMP CREW AND COCKPIT CREW. NO PROC IN PLACE FOR RAMP CREW TO ASK A SPECIFIC PLT (CAPT; FO) FOR CHOCKS AND PWR. DURING PUSHBACK FROM GATE; RAMP CREW FAILED TO REMOVE AFT NOSE GEAR CHOCK. ACFT WAS JOLTED AS IT APPEARED TO RIDE OVER THE CHOCK. TOWBAR SHEAR PIN BROKE. NO INJURIES ONBOARD THE ACFT ALTHOUGH THE 3 FLT ATTENDANTS WERE TOSSED AROUND A BIT. ACFT WAS MOVED A FEW FT BACK FROM THE JETWAY POS. WE HAD DEN MAINT COME OUT AND INSPECT THE NOSE GEAR FOR POSSIBLE DAMAGE. AFTER NOSE GEAR WAS DEEMED SAFE BY MAINT WE PASSED THE LOGBOOK OUT THROUGH THE COCKPIT WINDOW FOR A SIGNOFF OF THE INSPECTION. WE THEN RESUMED THE PUSHBACK WITHOUT RETURNING TO THE GATE OR OPENING THE ACFT CABIN DOOR. BEFORE THE INSPECTION WE DID NOT WANT TO MOVE THE ACFT FORWARD OR BACK TO PREVENT ANY FURTHER POSSIBLE DAMAGE. AFTER INSPECTION IT JUST MADE SENSE TO PASS THE LOGBOOK OUT OF THE WINDOW TO THE MECH STANDING ON A BELT LOADER. SINCE WE WERE ALREADY SHOWING PUSHED OFF OF THE GATE WE DID NOT AMEND THE RELEASE TIME ALTHOUGH WE DISCUSSED IT WITH DX. WE TECHNICALLY WERE ALREADY PUSHED BACK. A RPT WAS TELEPHONED IN BY ME. NOT SURE WHY IT DIDN'T SHOW UP HERE THAT IT WAS PHONED IN. MY FO ALSO FILLED OUT A RPT. ONE LAST COMMENT; RAMP CREW WILL ASK EITHER PLT IF IT IS OK TO REMOVE CHOCKS. WHILE THEY DID NOT ASK ME I ASSUMED THAT THEY ASKED MY FO OR JUST PULLED THEM BECAUSE THE DRIVER INDICATED VERBALLY THAT THE WALKAROUND WAS COMPLETE AND THAT THEY WERE READY FOR PUSHBACK. LARGE JOLT; BUMP AND CHOCK SKIDDING INDICATED TO EVERYONE ON BOARD; AND TUG DRIVER; THAT THERE WAS A PROB. WE THOUGHT WE HIT SOMETHING IN THE COCKPIT. ONE ASSIGNED PUSHBACK CREW SHOULD COMMUNICATE WITH ONLY ONE COCKPIT CREW; IE; TUG DRIVER AND CAPT OR L WING WALKER AND FO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.