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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 744530 |
Time | |
Date | 200709 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sjc.airport |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl single value : 1900 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : sjc.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : sjc.tower |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | PC-12 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : radar controller : local |
Qualification | controller : non radar controller : radar |
Experience | controller limited radar : 20 |
ASRS Report | 744534 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne less severe |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment : tcas other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : took evasive action |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | FAA |
Primary Problem | FAA |
Narrative:
Norcal (licke) position vectored Y for a visual approach to runway 29 and X visual approach runway 30L. They both checked on my frequency at about an 8 mi final and both aircraft; when they checked on; said they had each other in sight. I assume the licke controller advised them to do so. I suppressed the conflict alert at this time. X then advised that he was receiving a TCAS on Y and that although he had the aircraft in sight that he was required by company policy to comply with what TCAS was telling him. X requested what the missed approach procedure would be in the event that he went around. I gave the pilot the missed approach information and advised him that I had him and Y in sight and that they were well clear of his flight path. The pilot initiated a missed approach at about a 2 mi final and about 1200 ft. The WX was reported clear and visibility was greater than 10 mi. It seemed ridiculous that this 'policy' allows very little room for common sense and latitude for the pilot to ignore TCAS. The added workload that is placed not only on the controllers but also on the pilot seems excessive.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: SJC CTLR DESCRIBED TCAS RA GAR INCIDENT ON PARALLEL RWYS WHEN BOTH ACFT ACCEPTED VISUAL SEPARATION RESPONSIBILITY.
Narrative: NORCAL (LICKE) POS VECTORED Y FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 29 AND X VISUAL APCH RWY 30L. THEY BOTH CHKED ON MY FREQ AT ABOUT AN 8 MI FINAL AND BOTH ACFT; WHEN THEY CHKED ON; SAID THEY HAD EACH OTHER IN SIGHT. I ASSUME THE LICKE CTLR ADVISED THEM TO DO SO. I SUPPRESSED THE CONFLICT ALERT AT THIS TIME. X THEN ADVISED THAT HE WAS RECEIVING A TCAS ON Y AND THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD THE ACFT IN SIGHT THAT HE WAS REQUIRED BY COMPANY POLICY TO COMPLY WITH WHAT TCAS WAS TELLING HIM. X REQUESTED WHAT THE MISSED APCH PROC WOULD BE IN THE EVENT THAT HE WENT AROUND. I GAVE THE PLT THE MISSED APCH INFO AND ADVISED HIM THAT I HAD HIM AND Y IN SIGHT AND THAT THEY WERE WELL CLR OF HIS FLT PATH. THE PLT INITIATED A MISSED APCH AT ABOUT A 2 MI FINAL AND ABOUT 1200 FT. THE WX WAS RPTED CLR AND VISIBILITY WAS GREATER THAN 10 MI. IT SEEMED RIDICULOUS THAT THIS 'POLICY' ALLOWS VERY LITTLE ROOM FOR COMMON SENSE AND LATITUDE FOR THE PLT TO IGNORE TCAS. THE ADDED WORKLOAD THAT IS PLACED NOT ONLY ON THE CTLRS BUT ALSO ON THE PLT SEEMS EXCESSIVE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.