Narrative:

The flight had been off the gate for over 90 mins waiting to depart. The departures had been delayed due to thunderstorms south and west. An ACARS message was sent from flight xx to dispatch relaying 'cleared to go at 9000 ft over mol.' there were thunderstorm cells 10-20 NM north of mol with tops of 40000 ft. If flight xx were to fly at 9000 ft to mol; they would be flying under these thunderstorms. I was away from my desk working with the ATC coordinator when the message came in regarding the low altitude clearance. Upon seeing the message; I immediately sent an ACARS message to flight xx stating not to depart with this clearance due to the WX en route; but flight had already taken off. I then sent ACARS messages to flight xx advising of the WX ahead and relaying action to take to avoid the most significant severe WX on the route. Flight xx acknowledged the messages and deviated until clear of the thunderstorms. There are 2 issues that stand out. First; I don't understand how ATC could have given the option of departing at 9000 ft to flight xx. With the severe thunderstorms taking place this appeared to be somewhat reckless and certainly goes against the usual conservative nature of ATC; which is to shut off departure fixes for WX even when that WX appears to not be significant. Regardless; I really don't know what ATC was thinking. Second; the captain of flight xx didn't wait for input from me before taking off on the clearance. While I don't believe that he was intentionally neglectful or cavalier about my input; the concurrence with any route is a joint decision between the captain and dispatcher; and in this case the proposed route is not one I would have approved in light of the severe WX south of ZZZ. And; given the deviation that flight xx had to take to avoid the thunderstorms; my prognosis of the route was correct.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DISPATCHER REPORTS A320 FLT CREW DEPARTING AFTER WEATHER DELAYS; ON ROUTE HE WOULD NOT HAVE APPROVED DUE TO THUNDERSTORMS.

Narrative: THE FLT HAD BEEN OFF THE GATE FOR OVER 90 MINS WAITING TO DEPART. THE DEPS HAD BEEN DELAYED DUE TO TSTMS S AND W. AN ACARS MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM FLT XX TO DISPATCH RELAYING 'CLRED TO GO AT 9000 FT OVER MOL.' THERE WERE TSTM CELLS 10-20 NM N OF MOL WITH TOPS OF 40000 FT. IF FLT XX WERE TO FLY AT 9000 FT TO MOL; THEY WOULD BE FLYING UNDER THESE TSTMS. I WAS AWAY FROM MY DESK WORKING WITH THE ATC COORDINATOR WHEN THE MESSAGE CAME IN REGARDING THE LOW ALT CLRNC. UPON SEEING THE MESSAGE; I IMMEDIATELY SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO FLT XX STATING NOT TO DEPART WITH THIS CLRNC DUE TO THE WX ENRTE; BUT FLT HAD ALREADY TAKEN OFF. I THEN SENT ACARS MESSAGES TO FLT XX ADVISING OF THE WX AHEAD AND RELAYING ACTION TO TAKE TO AVOID THE MOST SIGNIFICANT SEVERE WX ON THE RTE. FLT XX ACKNOWLEDGED THE MESSAGES AND DEVIATED UNTIL CLR OF THE TSTMS. THERE ARE 2 ISSUES THAT STAND OUT. FIRST; I DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW ATC COULD HAVE GIVEN THE OPTION OF DEPARTING AT 9000 FT TO FLT XX. WITH THE SEVERE TSTMS TAKING PLACE THIS APPEARED TO BE SOMEWHAT RECKLESS AND CERTAINLY GOES AGAINST THE USUAL CONSERVATIVE NATURE OF ATC; WHICH IS TO SHUT OFF DEP FIXES FOR WX EVEN WHEN THAT WX APPEARS TO NOT BE SIGNIFICANT. REGARDLESS; I REALLY DON'T KNOW WHAT ATC WAS THINKING. SECOND; THE CAPT OF FLT XX DIDN'T WAIT FOR INPUT FROM ME BEFORE TAKING OFF ON THE CLRNC. WHILE I DON'T BELIEVE THAT HE WAS INTENTIONALLY NEGLECTFUL OR CAVALIER ABOUT MY INPUT; THE CONCURRENCE WITH ANY RTE IS A JOINT DECISION BTWN THE CAPT AND DISPATCHER; AND IN THIS CASE THE PROPOSED RTE IS NOT ONE I WOULD HAVE APPROVED IN LIGHT OF THE SEVERE WX S OF ZZZ. AND; GIVEN THE DEV THAT FLT XX HAD TO TAKE TO AVOID THE TSTMS; MY PROGNOSIS OF THE RTE WAS CORRECT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.