Narrative:

Prior to departure; I called dispatch regarding the WX in bji. All other times this past summer with the construction; I had only done visual approachs. I called to verify no construction or NOTAMS associated with runway 25 as I thought I had read something about that a while back. Dispatch checked all NOTAMS and the only NOTAM was regarding the alternate missed approach instructions. All other NOTAMS pertained to runway 13-31. Due to the WX at bji; we needed to do an approach to do the localizer DME 25 (the WX was 1-400). We performed all checklists SOP and received a positive identify. We started the approach. We then noticed that at approximately the FAF the autoplt was capturing a GS. I could not initiate a vertical speed 1000 ft descent and then I disconnected the autoplt. Unsure at why we were receiving erroneous GS information on that approach; we elected to go missed. We had reason to believe that due to a GS indication on this non precision approach (a runway that did not have a published ILS); nighttime and low ceilings and visibility; it was prudent and a safe course of action to go missed. We contacted dispatch and proceeded to tvf. FYI; there is no ILS to runway 25 nor a back course to runway 25 and there were no NOTAMS regarding any work currently being or expected to be performed on runway 25. The next day; I called the chief pilot. I explained the situation and he advised I contact the airport manager to discuss this. I spoke to the airport manager at bji and he advised us that they were testing the ILS for runway 25 and forgot to turn it off. He said this was new and was to be commissioned soon. I advised him that these testings were not in the NOTAMS and we should have been made aware that they were testing an ILS that we had no knowledge of. He did not seem to understand why it was important to relay such information prior to forgetting to turn the system off. Based on the cancellations these past few days; I do not know if we were the first and only flight to attempt a flight into bji. He said we should have just ignored the GS indications. Again; I tried to explain why we should have known this information if they were testing an ILS that we did not know existed. And that we should have no indicated GS indications on an approach to a runway that had a localizer DME approach only. He seemed to think that our procedures should just be to ignore information and that I should have disregarded the GS. I told him this is what we had to do as a safety issue since we had no way of knowing why we were getting those indications since there was no information about it; anywhere! He then threatened not to allow our air carrier into bji if this was the case with our erroneous procedures. Then he threatened not to have the ILS commissioned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF SA34 MAKE GAR AT BJI WHEN AUTOPLT ATTEMPTS TO CAPTURE A GLIDE SLOPE SIGNAL THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THERE. FLT CREW LATER LEARNS A YET TO BE COMMISSIONED ILS HAD BEEN TESTED AND NOT TURNED OFF FOLLOWING THE TEST.

Narrative: PRIOR TO DEP; I CALLED DISPATCH REGARDING THE WX IN BJI. ALL OTHER TIMES THIS PAST SUMMER WITH THE CONSTRUCTION; I HAD ONLY DONE VISUAL APCHS. I CALLED TO VERIFY NO CONSTRUCTION OR NOTAMS ASSOCIATED WITH RWY 25 AS I THOUGHT I HAD READ SOMETHING ABOUT THAT A WHILE BACK. DISPATCH CHKED ALL NOTAMS AND THE ONLY NOTAM WAS REGARDING THE ALTERNATE MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS. ALL OTHER NOTAMS PERTAINED TO RWY 13-31. DUE TO THE WX AT BJI; WE NEEDED TO DO AN APCH TO DO THE LOC DME 25 (THE WX WAS 1-400). WE PERFORMED ALL CHKLISTS SOP AND RECEIVED A POSITIVE IDENT. WE STARTED THE APCH. WE THEN NOTICED THAT AT APPROX THE FAF THE AUTOPLT WAS CAPTURING A GS. I COULD NOT INITIATE A VERT SPD 1000 FT DSCNT AND THEN I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT. UNSURE AT WHY WE WERE RECEIVING ERRONEOUS GS INFO ON THAT APCH; WE ELECTED TO GO MISSED. WE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT DUE TO A GS INDICATION ON THIS NON PRECISION APCH (A RWY THAT DID NOT HAVE A PUBLISHED ILS); NIGHTTIME AND LOW CEILINGS AND VISIBILITY; IT WAS PRUDENT AND A SAFE COURSE OF ACTION TO GO MISSED. WE CONTACTED DISPATCH AND PROCEEDED TO TVF. FYI; THERE IS NO ILS TO RWY 25 NOR A BACK COURSE TO RWY 25 AND THERE WERE NO NOTAMS REGARDING ANY WORK CURRENTLY BEING OR EXPECTED TO BE PERFORMED ON RWY 25. THE NEXT DAY; I CALLED THE CHIEF PLT. I EXPLAINED THE SITUATION AND HE ADVISED I CONTACT THE ARPT MGR TO DISCUSS THIS. I SPOKE TO THE ARPT MGR AT BJI AND HE ADVISED US THAT THEY WERE TESTING THE ILS FOR RWY 25 AND FORGOT TO TURN IT OFF. HE SAID THIS WAS NEW AND WAS TO BE COMMISSIONED SOON. I ADVISED HIM THAT THESE TESTINGS WERE NOT IN THE NOTAMS AND WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE AWARE THAT THEY WERE TESTING AN ILS THAT WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF. HE DID NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND WHY IT WAS IMPORTANT TO RELAY SUCH INFO PRIOR TO FORGETTING TO TURN THE SYS OFF. BASED ON THE CANCELLATIONS THESE PAST FEW DAYS; I DO NOT KNOW IF WE WERE THE FIRST AND ONLY FLT TO ATTEMPT A FLT INTO BJI. HE SAID WE SHOULD HAVE JUST IGNORED THE GS INDICATIONS. AGAIN; I TRIED TO EXPLAIN WHY WE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THIS INFO IF THEY WERE TESTING AN ILS THAT WE DID NOT KNOW EXISTED. AND THAT WE SHOULD HAVE NO INDICATED GS INDICATIONS ON AN APCH TO A RWY THAT HAD A LOC DME APCH ONLY. HE SEEMED TO THINK THAT OUR PROCS SHOULD JUST BE TO IGNORE INFO AND THAT I SHOULD HAVE DISREGARDED THE GS. I TOLD HIM THIS IS WHAT WE HAD TO DO AS A SAFETY ISSUE SINCE WE HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING WHY WE WERE GETTING THOSE INDICATIONS SINCE THERE WAS NO INFO ABOUT IT; ANYWHERE! HE THEN THREATENED NOT TO ALLOW OUR ACR INTO BJI IF THIS WAS THE CASE WITH OUR ERRONEOUS PROCS. THEN HE THREATENED NOT TO HAVE THE ILS COMMISSIONED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.