Narrative:

On takeoff from ZZZZ the crew of a falcon 900EX easy experienced what the crew was convinced was a failure of the #1 engine at or around V1. The aircraft made a normal takeoff; the crew discussed the problem and then made the decision to divert to an airport that their maintenance department advised was the best place to have the problem evaluated. What follows is the report given to maintenance personnel upon arrival. On departure from ZZZZ falcon 900EX easy; experienced a failure of the #1 engine. The aircraft had just completed an oceanic crossing. All passenger were deplaned and the aircraft readied for departure requiring no services before starting for the short trip to ZZZZ1. On departure from ZZZZ full power was smoothly applied and all 3 engines came up to takeoff power. At 80 KTS the captain moved his hand from the tiller to the control yoke and the airplane began to move slightly left of the centerline. The captain returned his hand to the tiller momentarily and then rotated at the call V2 rotate. At 200 ft AGL the cas message #1 engine fail appeared. After flying the SID the crew discussed attempting to relight the engine. It was decided that because the flight was not in jeopardy and there was no way of knowing if the engine had sustained some sort of damage that the engine should be secured and the aircraft be taken to the closest available maintenance facility. The aircraft then diverted without incident to ZZZZ2. It was not until a week later that the crew was advised that the data downloaded from the ship's fdr (flight data recorder) indicated that the engine in fact had never been started. After replaying this scenario over and over in my head I still have trouble understanding how that could have happened. We have procedures ingrained from yrs of operating similar aircraft that we do not stray from. The last call on the line up check is cas (crew alerting system) messages clear! On this takeoff the cas system was in fact clear. With all power levers over the cutoff gate one would assume to see some indication of an engine not being started. Specifically: 1) no oil pressure. 2) no hydraulic pump pressure. 3) generator not online. 4) no fuel pressure. Additionally; sophisticated aircraft like the falcon easy have advanced warning system that advise the crew when a takeoff is being attempted and killer items are not configured correctly; ie; flaps; speed brakes; pitot heat; trims. An aural warning of no takeoff; no takeoff; will normally sound. Falcon jet's response to this line of reasoning is that the aircraft is certified to be flown on 2 engines and so having 1 engine not started does not constitute a departure warning. The evidence that was produced by the fdr seems irrefutable and yet I still find it difficult to believe that the engine was never started and that this very experienced crew could make it to the end of the runway and depart in that confign. The easy cockpit system is designed to increase crew awareness and improve the level of safety. While this is true there is also a tendency in such an aircraft to lull the crew into a false sense of security. If I was to make a recommendation it would be that the crew alerting system include the addition of a warning that a thrust lever is in the takeoff position and the engine is in fact not producing any power.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DA 900EX FLT CREW DEPARTS WITHOUT STARTING NUMBER ONE ENGINE; DISCOVERING THE FACT AND ASSUMING ENGINE FAILURE WHEN AIRBORNE.

Narrative: ON TKOF FROM ZZZZ THE CREW OF A FALCON 900EX EASY EXPERIENCED WHAT THE CREW WAS CONVINCED WAS A FAILURE OF THE #1 ENG AT OR AROUND V1. THE ACFT MADE A NORMAL TKOF; THE CREW DISCUSSED THE PROB AND THEN MADE THE DECISION TO DIVERT TO AN ARPT THAT THEIR MAINT DEPT ADVISED WAS THE BEST PLACE TO HAVE THE PROB EVALUATED. WHAT FOLLOWS IS THE RPT GIVEN TO MAINT PERSONNEL UPON ARR. ON DEP FROM ZZZZ FALCON 900EX EASY; EXPERIENCED A FAILURE OF THE #1 ENG. THE ACFT HAD JUST COMPLETED AN OCEANIC XING. ALL PAX WERE DEPLANED AND THE ACFT READIED FOR DEP REQUIRING NO SVCS BEFORE STARTING FOR THE SHORT TRIP TO ZZZZ1. ON DEP FROM ZZZZ FULL PWR WAS SMOOTHLY APPLIED AND ALL 3 ENGS CAME UP TO TKOF PWR. AT 80 KTS THE CAPT MOVED HIS HAND FROM THE TILLER TO THE CTL YOKE AND THE AIRPLANE BEGAN TO MOVE SLIGHTLY L OF THE CTRLINE. THE CAPT RETURNED HIS HAND TO THE TILLER MOMENTARILY AND THEN ROTATED AT THE CALL V2 ROTATE. AT 200 FT AGL THE CAS MESSAGE #1 ENG FAIL APPEARED. AFTER FLYING THE SID THE CREW DISCUSSED ATTEMPTING TO RELIGHT THE ENG. IT WAS DECIDED THAT BECAUSE THE FLT WAS NOT IN JEOPARDY AND THERE WAS NO WAY OF KNOWING IF THE ENG HAD SUSTAINED SOME SORT OF DAMAGE THAT THE ENG SHOULD BE SECURED AND THE ACFT BE TAKEN TO THE CLOSEST AVAILABLE MAINT FACILITY. THE ACFT THEN DIVERTED WITHOUT INCIDENT TO ZZZZ2. IT WAS NOT UNTIL A WK LATER THAT THE CREW WAS ADVISED THAT THE DATA DOWNLOADED FROM THE SHIP'S FDR (FLT DATA RECORDER) INDICATED THAT THE ENG IN FACT HAD NEVER BEEN STARTED. AFTER REPLAYING THIS SCENARIO OVER AND OVER IN MY HEAD I STILL HAVE TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING HOW THAT COULD HAVE HAPPENED. WE HAVE PROCS INGRAINED FROM YRS OF OPERATING SIMILAR ACFT THAT WE DO NOT STRAY FROM. THE LAST CALL ON THE LINE UP CHK IS CAS (CREW ALERTING SYS) MESSAGES CLR! ON THIS TKOF THE CAS SYS WAS IN FACT CLR. WITH ALL PWR LEVERS OVER THE CUTOFF GATE ONE WOULD ASSUME TO SEE SOME INDICATION OF AN ENG NOT BEING STARTED. SPECIFICALLY: 1) NO OIL PRESSURE. 2) NO HYD PUMP PRESSURE. 3) GENERATOR NOT ONLINE. 4) NO FUEL PRESSURE. ADDITIONALLY; SOPHISTICATED ACFT LIKE THE FALCON EASY HAVE ADVANCED WARNING SYS THAT ADVISE THE CREW WHEN A TKOF IS BEING ATTEMPTED AND KILLER ITEMS ARE NOT CONFIGURED CORRECTLY; IE; FLAPS; SPD BRAKES; PITOT HEAT; TRIMS. AN AURAL WARNING OF NO TKOF; NO TKOF; WILL NORMALLY SOUND. FALCON JET'S RESPONSE TO THIS LINE OF REASONING IS THAT THE ACFT IS CERTIFIED TO BE FLOWN ON 2 ENGS AND SO HAVING 1 ENG NOT STARTED DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A DEP WARNING. THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRODUCED BY THE FDR SEEMS IRREFUTABLE AND YET I STILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE ENG WAS NEVER STARTED AND THAT THIS VERY EXPERIENCED CREW COULD MAKE IT TO THE END OF THE RWY AND DEPART IN THAT CONFIGN. THE EASY COCKPIT SYS IS DESIGNED TO INCREASE CREW AWARENESS AND IMPROVE THE LEVEL OF SAFETY. WHILE THIS IS TRUE THERE IS ALSO A TENDENCY IN SUCH AN ACFT TO LULL THE CREW INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. IF I WAS TO MAKE A RECOMMENDATION IT WOULD BE THAT THE CREW ALERTING SYS INCLUDE THE ADDITION OF A WARNING THAT A THRUST LEVER IS IN THE TKOF POS AND THE ENG IS IN FACT NOT PRODUCING ANY PWR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.