Narrative:

I was the first officer of flight X. Captain was pilot monitoring. Preflight and pushback were normal until engine startup. Captain had briefed start duties and announced the start sequence. After being cleared to start from the ground handler we commenced the start sequence of the left engine. Captain monitored outside the flight deck while I accomplished the engine start procedure. The start appeared normal until I noted that the egt; although rising within normal parameters; was a bit higher than usual. There was a slight tailwind and I looked down to ensure there wasn't a flashing fuel flow indication. The fuel flow was steady and my next glance at the egt showed just below the limitation and the temperature was coming down. The engine stabilized after the start and I commenced the start of the second engine. The second engine started as normal but had exceeded start limitations. Captain and I noted the over-temperature and began to discuss the situation. I ceased my after start flow when we both agreed that we had in fact over-temped the right engine on start. It was at this time we noted that the air conditioning supply switches were in the 'hp bld off' position. I could only confirm that I had stopped the after start flow at the packs but could not confirm with certainty that I had moved the switch in executing the after start flow although this was my intent per the checklist. At this point we began single engine taxi back to the gate. We notified maintenance of a definite over-temperature of the right engine and a possible over-temperature of the left engine. Supplemental information from acn 753077: the primary contributing factors to the incident appear to be the first officer's failure to properly follow/confirm 'before engine start checklist' procedures and also the first officer's lack of experience/proficiency in the aircraft. First officer had only been on the aircraft 4 months with only about 20 hours/month.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 FLT CREW PERFORMED ENG START WITHOUT PROPER CONFIGN. AS A RESULT; BOTH ENGS EXCEEDED THEIR MAX START TEMP DURING START.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO OF FLT X. CAPT WAS PLT MONITORING. PREFLT AND PUSHBACK WERE NORMAL UNTIL ENG STARTUP. CAPT HAD BRIEFED START DUTIES AND ANNOUNCED THE START SEQUENCE. AFTER BEING CLRED TO START FROM THE GND HANDLER WE COMMENCED THE START SEQUENCE OF THE L ENG. CAPT MONITORED OUTSIDE THE FLT DECK WHILE I ACCOMPLISHED THE ENG START PROC. THE START APPEARED NORMAL UNTIL I NOTED THAT THE EGT; ALTHOUGH RISING WITHIN NORMAL PARAMETERS; WAS A BIT HIGHER THAN USUAL. THERE WAS A SLIGHT TAILWIND AND I LOOKED DOWN TO ENSURE THERE WASN'T A FLASHING FUEL FLOW INDICATION. THE FUEL FLOW WAS STEADY AND MY NEXT GLANCE AT THE EGT SHOWED JUST BELOW THE LIMITATION AND THE TEMP WAS COMING DOWN. THE ENG STABILIZED AFTER THE START AND I COMMENCED THE START OF THE SECOND ENG. THE SECOND ENG STARTED AS NORMAL BUT HAD EXCEEDED START LIMITATIONS. CAPT AND I NOTED THE OVER-TEMP AND BEGAN TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION. I CEASED MY AFTER START FLOW WHEN WE BOTH AGREED THAT WE HAD IN FACT OVER-TEMPED THE R ENG ON START. IT WAS AT THIS TIME WE NOTED THAT THE AIR CONDITIONING SUPPLY SWITCHES WERE IN THE 'HP BLD OFF' POS. I COULD ONLY CONFIRM THAT I HAD STOPPED THE AFTER START FLOW AT THE PACKS BUT COULD NOT CONFIRM WITH CERTAINTY THAT I HAD MOVED THE SWITCH IN EXECUTING THE AFTER START FLOW ALTHOUGH THIS WAS MY INTENT PER THE CHKLIST. AT THIS POINT WE BEGAN SINGLE ENG TAXI BACK TO THE GATE. WE NOTIFIED MAINT OF A DEFINITE OVER-TEMP OF THE R ENG AND A POSSIBLE OVER-TEMP OF THE L ENG. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 753077: THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE INCIDENT APPEAR TO BE THE FO'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY FOLLOW/CONFIRM 'BEFORE ENG START CHKLIST' PROCS AND ALSO THE FO'S LACK OF EXPERIENCE/PROFICIENCY IN THE ACFT. FO HAD ONLY BEEN ON THE ACFT 4 MONTHS WITH ONLY ABOUT 20 HRS/MONTH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.