Narrative:

The higher ranking PF failed to maintain an ATC required altitude. I was the PNF or copilot. We were cleared for takeoff and assigned a southerly heading and to climb and maintain 10000 ft. The takeoff was uneventful. At 9000 ft we got an audible warning of 1000 ft to level off. I had my head down running checklists. I looked up and we were still in a rapid climb. I notified the PF '200 ft to level off.' he acknowledged. He had been hand flying the aircraft and decided to quickly arm the autoplt in an attempt to capture the 10000 ft altitude. He appeared flustered. ATC then asked if we were maintaining 10000 ft. I replied 'we are trying to...sorry.' albuquerque departure acknowledged. They then told an airliner of our position ahead of them at 10000 ft. They were at 11000 ft. I knew there might be a traffic conflict and looked at the TCAS display to locate nearby traffic. I then looked outside the aircraft to get a visual on any traffic in the vicinity. I then looked back at the altimeter and the PF had leveled at 10650 ft; but had not started a descent to my surprise. I told him 'we need to get the plane down to 10000 ft now!' he again acknowledged and proceeded to use the autoplt to descend at a rate of 600 FPM. I was about to recommend a faster descent rate when ATC cleared us to a higher altitude. The ATC instructions were clear. We had no confusion on that end. I think the PF's lack of experience in the aircraft caused him to act slowly to the problem at hand. I think he also slowed down under pressure. His thinking the autoplt would save him was not correct if the inputs are not accurate. Our department also has a lack of good CRM. I have asked for training in this area for all pilots; but have been denied. The 'mgt' pilots come from a single pilot backgnd and do not like the crew environment and try to fly in a manner that excludes crew involvement. I also think there was a lack of focus on his part. I should have reacted quicker and taken the controls to bring the aircraft to the assigned altitude. I hesitated because he acknowledged the problem and claimed he was correcting. I put my attention to other potential problems that could arise because of the error and expected him to complete his task unassisted. I should not have let his rank and fear of workplace retaliation keep me from acting quickly and decisively to correct the situation and take control as needed. To prevent future occurrences; the flight department needs training in CRM and also needs fundamental changes in leadership position. It is a poor institutional mind-set that leads to problems. There is little to no accountability for poor pilot performance and no chain that one can file complaints or address problems without fear of reprisal. Any mention of safety related issues on our department leads to harsh working conditions and possible slander.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE550 FO RPTS THE INABILITY OF THE CAPT TO LEVEL OFF AT ASSIGNED ALT DUE TO LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN ACFT TYPE.

Narrative: THE HIGHER RANKING PF FAILED TO MAINTAIN AN ATC REQUIRED ALT. I WAS THE PNF OR COPLT. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND ASSIGNED A SOUTHERLY HDG AND TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 10000 FT. THE TKOF WAS UNEVENTFUL. AT 9000 FT WE GOT AN AUDIBLE WARNING OF 1000 FT TO LEVEL OFF. I HAD MY HEAD DOWN RUNNING CHKLISTS. I LOOKED UP AND WE WERE STILL IN A RAPID CLB. I NOTIFIED THE PF '200 FT TO LEVEL OFF.' HE ACKNOWLEDGED. HE HAD BEEN HAND FLYING THE ACFT AND DECIDED TO QUICKLY ARM THE AUTOPLT IN AN ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE THE 10000 FT ALT. HE APPEARED FLUSTERED. ATC THEN ASKED IF WE WERE MAINTAINING 10000 FT. I REPLIED 'WE ARE TRYING TO...SORRY.' ALBUQUERQUE DEP ACKNOWLEDGED. THEY THEN TOLD AN AIRLINER OF OUR POS AHEAD OF THEM AT 10000 FT. THEY WERE AT 11000 FT. I KNEW THERE MIGHT BE A TFC CONFLICT AND LOOKED AT THE TCAS DISPLAY TO LOCATE NEARBY TFC. I THEN LOOKED OUTSIDE THE ACFT TO GET A VISUAL ON ANY TFC IN THE VICINITY. I THEN LOOKED BACK AT THE ALTIMETER AND THE PF HAD LEVELED AT 10650 FT; BUT HAD NOT STARTED A DSCNT TO MY SURPRISE. I TOLD HIM 'WE NEED TO GET THE PLANE DOWN TO 10000 FT NOW!' HE AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGED AND PROCEEDED TO USE THE AUTOPLT TO DSND AT A RATE OF 600 FPM. I WAS ABOUT TO RECOMMEND A FASTER DSCNT RATE WHEN ATC CLRED US TO A HIGHER ALT. THE ATC INSTRUCTIONS WERE CLR. WE HAD NO CONFUSION ON THAT END. I THINK THE PF'S LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THE ACFT CAUSED HIM TO ACT SLOWLY TO THE PROB AT HAND. I THINK HE ALSO SLOWED DOWN UNDER PRESSURE. HIS THINKING THE AUTOPLT WOULD SAVE HIM WAS NOT CORRECT IF THE INPUTS ARE NOT ACCURATE. OUR DEPT ALSO HAS A LACK OF GOOD CRM. I HAVE ASKED FOR TRAINING IN THIS AREA FOR ALL PLTS; BUT HAVE BEEN DENIED. THE 'MGT' PLTS COME FROM A SINGLE PLT BACKGND AND DO NOT LIKE THE CREW ENVIRONMENT AND TRY TO FLY IN A MANNER THAT EXCLUDES CREW INVOLVEMENT. I ALSO THINK THERE WAS A LACK OF FOCUS ON HIS PART. I SHOULD HAVE REACTED QUICKER AND TAKEN THE CTLS TO BRING THE ACFT TO THE ASSIGNED ALT. I HESITATED BECAUSE HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROB AND CLAIMED HE WAS CORRECTING. I PUT MY ATTN TO OTHER POTENTIAL PROBS THAT COULD ARISE BECAUSE OF THE ERROR AND EXPECTED HIM TO COMPLETE HIS TASK UNASSISTED. I SHOULD NOT HAVE LET HIS RANK AND FEAR OF WORKPLACE RETALIATION KEEP ME FROM ACTING QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY TO CORRECT THE SITUATION AND TAKE CTL AS NEEDED. TO PREVENT FUTURE OCCURRENCES; THE FLT DEPT NEEDS TRAINING IN CRM AND ALSO NEEDS FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP POS. IT IS A POOR INSTITUTIONAL MIND-SET THAT LEADS TO PROBS. THERE IS LITTLE TO NO ACCOUNTABILITY FOR POOR PLT PERFORMANCE AND NO CHAIN THAT ONE CAN FILE COMPLAINTS OR ADDRESS PROBS WITHOUT FEAR OF REPRISAL. ANY MENTION OF SAFETY RELATED ISSUES ON OUR DEPT LEADS TO HARSH WORKING CONDITIONS AND POSSIBLE SLANDER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.