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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 755512 |
Time | |
Date | 200709 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : oak.airport |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl single value : 5000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : nct.tracon |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Global Express |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Route In Use | approach : visual |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 3500 flight time type : 200 |
ASRS Report | 755512 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : clearance other anomaly other anomaly other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : executed go around flight crew : overrode automation flight crew : regained aircraft control flight crew : became reoriented flight crew : exited adverse environment |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Environmental Factor Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
Captain had very autocratic style ex military and created a hostile intolerant attitude since started with company. FMS are not in dual and PF expected to program everything; even in terminal control area. Captain behavior is unhelpful passive attitude not doing anything unless told; and sometimes not then. Had briefed thoroughly in detail for oak landing runway 29 to be sure he understood exactly what we were doing. Too frequently my experience with this captain was knee jerk reaction on apches. As good VMC and been there before stated; if they offer a visual; will take that; meaning runway 29. As approaching sau; center advised dir oak VOR. This was not in fp so while I was heads down dialing up frequency on CDU to get a fix; did not hear captain accepting visual on runway 27R. Now being vectored downwind descend 3200 ft; he says didn't you hear; we're visual on runway 27R I have it my side; you'd better hurry up. First thought was that runway 27R was too short for comfort 5400 ft and normal ldr 3300 ft. I asked him for qdm and he hands me the airport plate only so now descending to 2100 ft from 4000 ft and distracted trying to set up course on glareshield controls to have something to guide me. Captain is doing nothing. Turn base and try to intercept still in ap but stupidly forgotten that VOR was now set CDU. Getting overloaded now. So take out ap and hand fly. He selects gear down and then says; your speed is good so I'll give you 16 and 30 flap; the latter I did not want at all; as I could see now lined up we were too high and the difficulty of getting down would be worse with limitations. He then says what are you going to do? Do you think you can make it? I said negative ask for an orbit on finals as I did not want to risk trying to land in such a clean machine and run off the end of the runway. Having flown B737-400 & 800 for 4 years in mediterranean into islands with no radar; orbit was a practice to safely regain the profile. I had terrain on my pfd so after ATC agreement started turn clockwise descending to 1500 ft. Terrain shows black edges green just showing so well within terrain clearance. He started shouting he is raising the flaps and gear up when I said leave at 16. He then shouted you're descending and I said yes that's correct. ATC advised there was a cessna at 2 NM; so the calculations were that the orbit would complete well inside. Suddenly he tries to grab the controls; saying I have control. Reluctantly I let go because I don't believe he is situationaly aware; and it turns out he is not. He starts to climb towards the hills south directly in the path of the cessna; TCAS traffic alert at +4 now my terrain is yellow and he is at 2400 ft and I say climb climb which he ignores. We then see a jet flying towards runway 29R base and he says he is following him and turns right so we clear the terrain. In the meantime he is monopolizing the radio unsure of what he is doing and calling to me where is the runway. I say I can't see because we are facing away. Then ATC give us runway 27L which is at least longer so as he turns toward runway 29 I say runway 27L in sight turn right; he gets lined up and I take control and uneventful landing. Clearly he has never done an orbit in this way and he panicked. It is noticeable on apches his high stress levels diminish his capacity. Debrief he changes his story about the orbit and now says he took control because we were close to vref and if I jerked the controls we would stall. Ridiculous considering at and performance of the glex. I believe he put the aircraft in danger; and allowed the situation to develop as he often said he wanted me off the aircraft. My fault was to offer patient support making allowances for him. That let him continue in such unsafe practice particularly the risky way of managing FMC work and non existent multi-crew skills. His personal antipathy to me for what reason I have no idea poisoned the cockpit and was demoralizing to work with. Any challenge he would lose his temper. After flying with airlines corporate live in a comfort zone of their own creation; oblivious to developments of safe practice because if it works why change it.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FO OF CORPORATE ACFT RELATES HOSTILE COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT DURING VISUAL APCH AND LNDG TO OAK.
Narrative: CAPT HAD VERY AUTOCRATIC STYLE EX MILITARY AND CREATED A HOSTILE INTOLERANT ATTITUDE SINCE STARTED WITH COMPANY. FMS ARE NOT IN DUAL AND PF EXPECTED TO PROGRAM EVERYTHING; EVEN IN TERMINAL CONTROL AREA. CAPT BEHAVIOR IS UNHELPFUL PASSIVE ATTITUDE NOT DOING ANYTHING UNLESS TOLD; AND SOMETIMES NOT THEN. HAD BRIEFED THOROUGHLY IN DETAIL FOR OAK LNDG RWY 29 TO BE SURE HE UNDERSTOOD EXACTLY WHAT WE WERE DOING. TOO FREQUENTLY MY EXPERIENCE WITH THIS CAPT WAS KNEE JERK REACTION ON APCHES. AS GOOD VMC AND BEEN THERE BEFORE STATED; IF THEY OFFER A VISUAL; WILL TAKE THAT; MEANING RWY 29. AS APCHING SAU; CENTER ADVISED DIR OAK VOR. THIS WAS NOT IN FP SO WHILE I WAS HEADS DOWN DIALING UP FREQ ON CDU TO GET A FIX; DID NOT HEAR CAPT ACCEPTING VISUAL ON RWY 27R. NOW BEING VECTORED DOWNWIND DSND 3200 FT; HE SAYS DIDN'T YOU HEAR; WE'RE VISUAL ON RWY 27R I HAVE IT MY SIDE; YOU'D BETTER HURRY UP. FIRST THOUGHT WAS THAT RWY 27R WAS TOO SHORT FOR COMFORT 5400 FT AND NORMAL LDR 3300 FT. I ASKED HIM FOR QDM AND HE HANDS ME THE AIRPORT PLATE ONLY SO NOW DSNDING TO 2100 FT FROM 4000 FT AND DISTRACTED TRYING TO SET UP COURSE ON GLARESHIELD CONTROLS TO HAVE SOMETHING TO GUIDE ME. CAPT IS DOING NOTHING. TURN BASE AND TRY TO INTERCEPT STILL IN AP BUT STUPIDLY FORGOTTEN THAT VOR WAS NOW SET CDU. GETTING OVERLOADED NOW. SO TAKE OUT AP AND HAND FLY. HE SELECTS GEAR DOWN AND THEN SAYS; YOUR SPEED IS GOOD SO I'LL GIVE YOU 16 AND 30 FLAP; THE LATTER I DID NOT WANT AT ALL; AS I COULD SEE NOW LINED UP WE WERE TOO HIGH AND THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING DOWN WOULD BE WORSE WITH LIMITATIONS. HE THEN SAYS WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO? DO YOU THINK YOU CAN MAKE IT? I SAID NEGATIVE ASK FOR AN ORBIT ON FINALS AS I DID NOT WANT TO RISK TRYING TO LAND IN SUCH A CLEAN MACHINE AND RUN OFF THE END OF THE RWY. HAVING FLOWN B737-400 & 800 FOR 4 YEARS IN MEDITERRANEAN INTO ISLANDS WITH NO RADAR; ORBIT WAS A PRACTICE TO SAFELY REGAIN THE PROFILE. I HAD TERRAIN ON MY PFD SO AFTER ATC AGREEMENT STARTED TURN CLOCKWISE DSNDING TO 1500 FT. TERRAIN SHOWS BLACK EDGES GREEN JUST SHOWING SO WELL WITHIN TERRAIN CLRNC. HE STARTED SHOUTING HE IS RAISING THE FLAPS AND GEAR UP WHEN I SAID LEAVE AT 16. HE THEN SHOUTED YOU'RE DSNDING AND I SAID YES THAT'S CORRECT. ATC ADVISED THERE WAS A CESSNA AT 2 NM; SO THE CALCULATIONS WERE THAT THE ORBIT WOULD COMPLETE WELL INSIDE. SUDDENLY HE TRIES TO GRAB THE CONTROLS; SAYING I HAVE CONTROL. RELUCTANTLY I LET GO BECAUSE I DON'T BELIEVE HE IS SITUATIONALY AWARE; AND IT TURNS OUT HE IS NOT. HE STARTS TO CLIMB TOWARDS THE HILLS S DIRECTLY IN THE PATH OF THE CESSNA; TCAS TFC ALERT AT +4 NOW MY TERRAIN IS YELLOW AND HE IS AT 2400 FT AND I SAY CLB CLB WHICH HE IGNORES. WE THEN SEE A JET FLYING TOWARDS RWY 29R BASE AND HE SAYS HE IS FOLLOWING HIM AND TURNS R SO WE CLR THE TERRAIN. IN THE MEANTIME HE IS MONOPOLIZING THE RADIO UNSURE OF WHAT HE IS DOING AND CALLING TO ME WHERE IS THE RWY. I SAY I CAN'T SEE BECAUSE WE ARE FACING AWAY. THEN ATC GIVE US RWY 27L WHICH IS AT LEAST LONGER SO AS HE TURNS TOWARD RWY 29 I SAY RWY 27L IN SIGHT TURN R; HE GETS LINED UP AND I TAKE CONTROL AND UNEVENTFUL LNDG. CLEARLY HE HAS NEVER DONE AN ORBIT IN THIS WAY AND HE PANICKED. IT IS NOTICEABLE ON APCHES HIS HIGH STRESS LEVELS DIMINISH HIS CAPACITY. DEBRIEF HE CHANGES HIS STORY ABOUT THE ORBIT AND NOW SAYS HE TOOK CONTROL BECAUSE WE WERE CLOSE TO VREF AND IF I JERKED THE CONTROLS WE WOULD STALL. RIDICULOUS CONSIDERING AT AND PERFORMANCE OF THE GLEX. I BELIEVE HE PUT THE ACFT IN DANGER; AND ALLOWED THE SITUATION TO DEVELOP AS HE OFTEN SAID HE WANTED ME OFF THE ACFT. MY FAULT WAS TO OFFER PATIENT SUPPORT MAKING ALLOWANCES FOR HIM. THAT LET HIM CONTINUE IN SUCH UNSAFE PRACTICE PARTICULARLY THE RISKY WAY OF MANAGING FMC WORK AND NON EXISTENT MULTI-CREW SKILLS. HIS PERSONAL ANTIPATHY TO ME FOR WHAT REASON I HAVE NO IDEA POISONED THE COCKPIT AND WAS DEMORALIZING TO WORK WITH. ANY CHALLENGE HE WOULD LOSE HIS TEMPER. AFTER FLYING WITH AIRLINES CORPORATE LIVE IN A COMFORT ZONE OF THEIR OWN CREATION; OBLIVIOUS TO DEVELOPMENTS OF SAFE PRACTICE BECAUSE IF IT WORKS WHY CHANGE IT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.