Narrative:

As we approached runway 29; oak tower informed us to expect takeoff clearance from the hold short line. I wasn't familiar with the implication of this phraseology. There were multiple aircraft inbound to the field. Another carrier landed and I expected to be put on 'the hold' as tower was planning on departing us between that aircraft and a second carrier's rj. After the first carrier cleared the runway; we were given takeoff clearance from the hold short line. The actual clearance was something like 'company; cleared for takeoff; second carrier on 2.5 mi final.' I taxied on the runway and was just beginning to advance the thrust levers when tower told the second carrier to go around; turn right to a 310 degree heading. We were extremely light; 108000 pounds; in a B737-700. Initial climb rate was between 3500 ft and 4000 FPM. Oakland's departures have a 2000 ft hold down until 4 DME. Tower became extremely busy with the go around and our departure. As we approached 1000 ft I knew we were not going to get switched to departure; so I would not get relief from the 2000 ft restriction. At this point a number of events occurred: I called for flaps 1 degree and began to reduce both my climb rate and power. We received a TCAS RA to climb; the green band was between 4000 ft and 4500 FPM. The TCAS then switched to a descend RA with a 2000-2500 FPM rate of descent. I suspect the TCAS sensed the power reduction and slowing of my climb rate; after the initial warning. Tower told the second carrier to turn immediately to a 310 degree heading. As this was occurring my first officer had a visual on the second carrier; at 2000 ft MSL on our right. I began the descent as directed by the TCAS at about 1600 ft MSL and called for flaps up; at which time the TCAS said; 'clear of conflict.' this was immediately followed by a GPWS warning of 'don't sink.' my descent rate reached a maximum of 1500 ft when the 'clear of conflict' occurred. From that point things returned to normal and the rest of the flight was uneventful. When I reached our destination; I called oak tower to get their side of things. I spoke with the controller who had worked the flight; he happened to be a supervisor. He explained the reason for the 'expect clearance from the hold short line' and his inability to put us 'on the hold' which would have avoided the entire situation. I did not realize the operational restrictions certain situations put the tower controllers under. I believe that we; the pilot group at company; should be given an explanation of these restrictions so we might be better prepared to meet the needs of the tower controllers. The initial clearance I was given to 'expect clearance...' had me asking my first officer just what that was about. The oak controller said he was trying to come up with an expeditious way to convey his inability to put us on the hold. During my conversation with this controller I felt he was trying to work with us; trying to move traffic. I certainly don't want to do anything that would discourage this attitude and having a better understanding of their restrictions might help. Apparently; tower controllers have been restricted under certain situations. I believe we could be of help in these cases if we were given an explanation as to when and why a tower controller cannot give a clearance to taxi on the hold. Are there other restrictions that would be helpful to know?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLT CREW DEPARTING OAK REPORTS TCAS RA WITH ACFT ON GO AROUND AT 2000 FEET.

Narrative: AS WE APCHED RWY 29; OAK TWR INFORMED US TO EXPECT TKOF CLRNC FROM THE HOLD SHORT LINE. I WASN'T FAMILIAR WITH THE IMPLICATION OF THIS PHRASEOLOGY. THERE WERE MULTIPLE ACFT INBOUND TO THE FIELD. ANOTHER CARRIER LANDED AND I EXPECTED TO BE PUT ON 'THE HOLD' AS TWR WAS PLANNING ON DEPARTING US BTWN THAT ACFT AND A SECOND CARRIER'S RJ. AFTER THE FIRST CARRIER CLRED THE RWY; WE WERE GIVEN TKOF CLRNC FROM THE HOLD SHORT LINE. THE ACTUAL CLRNC WAS SOMETHING LIKE 'COMPANY; CLRED FOR TKOF; SECOND CARRIER ON 2.5 MI FINAL.' I TAXIED ON THE RWY AND WAS JUST BEGINNING TO ADVANCE THE THRUST LEVERS WHEN TWR TOLD THE SECOND CARRIER TO GO AROUND; TURN R TO A 310 DEG HDG. WE WERE EXTREMELY LIGHT; 108000 LBS; IN A B737-700. INITIAL CLB RATE WAS BTWN 3500 FT AND 4000 FPM. OAKLAND'S DEPS HAVE A 2000 FT HOLD DOWN UNTIL 4 DME. TWR BECAME EXTREMELY BUSY WITH THE GAR AND OUR DEP. AS WE APCHED 1000 FT I KNEW WE WERE NOT GOING TO GET SWITCHED TO DEP; SO I WOULD NOT GET RELIEF FROM THE 2000 FT RESTRICTION. AT THIS POINT A NUMBER OF EVENTS OCCURRED: I CALLED FOR FLAPS 1 DEG AND BEGAN TO REDUCE BOTH MY CLB RATE AND PWR. WE RECEIVED A TCAS RA TO CLB; THE GREEN BAND WAS BTWN 4000 FT AND 4500 FPM. THE TCAS THEN SWITCHED TO A DSND RA WITH A 2000-2500 FPM RATE OF DSCNT. I SUSPECT THE TCAS SENSED THE PWR REDUCTION AND SLOWING OF MY CLB RATE; AFTER THE INITIAL WARNING. TWR TOLD THE SECOND CARRIER TO TURN IMMEDIATELY TO A 310 DEG HDG. AS THIS WAS OCCURRING MY FO HAD A VISUAL ON THE SECOND CARRIER; AT 2000 FT MSL ON OUR R. I BEGAN THE DSCNT AS DIRECTED BY THE TCAS AT ABOUT 1600 FT MSL AND CALLED FOR FLAPS UP; AT WHICH TIME THE TCAS SAID; 'CLR OF CONFLICT.' THIS WAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A GPWS WARNING OF 'DON'T SINK.' MY DSCNT RATE REACHED A MAX OF 1500 FT WHEN THE 'CLR OF CONFLICT' OCCURRED. FROM THAT POINT THINGS RETURNED TO NORMAL AND THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. WHEN I REACHED OUR DEST; I CALLED OAK TWR TO GET THEIR SIDE OF THINGS. I SPOKE WITH THE CTLR WHO HAD WORKED THE FLT; HE HAPPENED TO BE A SUPVR. HE EXPLAINED THE REASON FOR THE 'EXPECT CLRNC FROM THE HOLD SHORT LINE' AND HIS INABILITY TO PUT US 'ON THE HOLD' WHICH WOULD HAVE AVOIDED THE ENTIRE SITUATION. I DID NOT REALIZE THE OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS CERTAIN SITUATIONS PUT THE TWR CTLRS UNDER. I BELIEVE THAT WE; THE PLT GROUP AT COMPANY; SHOULD BE GIVEN AN EXPLANATION OF THESE RESTRICTIONS SO WE MIGHT BE BETTER PREPARED TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE TWR CTLRS. THE INITIAL CLRNC I WAS GIVEN TO 'EXPECT CLRNC...' HAD ME ASKING MY FO JUST WHAT THAT WAS ABOUT. THE OAK CTLR SAID HE WAS TRYING TO COME UP WITH AN EXPEDITIOUS WAY TO CONVEY HIS INABILITY TO PUT US ON THE HOLD. DURING MY CONVERSATION WITH THIS CTLR I FELT HE WAS TRYING TO WORK WITH US; TRYING TO MOVE TFC. I CERTAINLY DON'T WANT TO DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD DISCOURAGE THIS ATTITUDE AND HAVING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR RESTRICTIONS MIGHT HELP. APPARENTLY; TWR CTLRS HAVE BEEN RESTRICTED UNDER CERTAIN SITUATIONS. I BELIEVE WE COULD BE OF HELP IN THESE CASES IF WE WERE GIVEN AN EXPLANATION AS TO WHEN AND WHY A TWR CTLR CANNOT GIVE A CLRNC TO TAXI ON THE HOLD. ARE THERE OTHER RESTRICTIONS THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.