Narrative:

ZBW assumes control of pvd approach control airspace at the end of their operating hours. Pvd approach control faxes a copy of local NOTAMS to ZBW prior to closure. NOTAMS for the night showed a closure of runway 5/23. Winds at pvd were approximately 210 degrees 20 KTS gusting 40 KTS. If the NOTAMS were correct; aircraft would be landing on runway 34 with a significant crosswind. The first arrival to pvd after the closure questioned the runway closure. The pilot indicated that they had spoken to the 'tower cabin attendant' and that the runway was in fact open. Attempts were made to speak with operations personnel at pvd to confirm this information. Confirmation was received that runway 5/23 would remain open until the 'arrs' were in. The communications chain was not properly followed during this evolution. Further; a cancellation of the runway closure NOTAM would have eliminated confusion. The situation was made more workload intensive by the fact that facility supervisors at ZBW misread predicted traffic for the period of time immediately following the closure of pvd approach. A defined communication protocol should be developed and adhered to; so that after hours operations at pvd may be safely conducted.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZBW CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING THE PVD ARPT INFO PROVIDED AT THE SECTOR WHEN ZBW ASSUMES THE AIRSPACE.

Narrative: ZBW ASSUMES CTL OF PVD APCH CTL AIRSPACE AT THE END OF THEIR OPERATING HRS. PVD APCH CTL FAXES A COPY OF LCL NOTAMS TO ZBW PRIOR TO CLOSURE. NOTAMS FOR THE NIGHT SHOWED A CLOSURE OF RWY 5/23. WINDS AT PVD WERE APPROX 210 DEGS 20 KTS GUSTING 40 KTS. IF THE NOTAMS WERE CORRECT; ACFT WOULD BE LNDG ON RWY 34 WITH A SIGNIFICANT XWIND. THE FIRST ARR TO PVD AFTER THE CLOSURE QUESTIONED THE RWY CLOSURE. THE PLT INDICATED THAT THEY HAD SPOKEN TO THE 'TWR CAB' AND THAT THE RWY WAS IN FACT OPEN. ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO SPEAK WITH OPS PERSONNEL AT PVD TO CONFIRM THIS INFO. CONFIRMATION WAS RECEIVED THAT RWY 5/23 WOULD REMAIN OPEN UNTIL THE 'ARRS' WERE IN. THE COMS CHAIN WAS NOT PROPERLY FOLLOWED DURING THIS EVOLUTION. FURTHER; A CANCELLATION OF THE RWY CLOSURE NOTAM WOULD HAVE ELIMINATED CONFUSION. THE SITUATION WAS MADE MORE WORKLOAD INTENSIVE BY THE FACT THAT FACILITY SUPVRS AT ZBW MISREAD PREDICTED TFC FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE CLOSURE OF PVD APCH. A DEFINED COM PROTOCOL SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AND ADHERED TO; SO THAT AFTER HRS OPS AT PVD MAY BE SAFELY CONDUCTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.