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Attributes | |
ACN | 760056 |
Time | |
Date | 200710 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sfo.airport |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B767-300 and 300 ER |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground other : gate arrival ground : maintenance |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
ASRS Report | 760056 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground less severe non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took precautionary avoidance action |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
Approaching the gate I observed numerous pieces of equipment (loaders; bag carts; tractor; towbar; and power cart) well within the equipment clear lines so I stopped the aircraft short in accordance with our flight manual and ramp procedures. With the brake parked; I pointed and gestured to communicate the need to move the equipment beyond the lines. The guide man's immediate response was to throw the orange wands toward the aircraft with like a look of disgust. I called operations and requested the assistance of a ramp supervisor when the ramp scene looked like it was about to boil over. Eventually; the individual; who appeared to be the supervisor; coordinated the movement of the equipment and then connected his headset to the aircraft. I informed him the equipment appeared to be clear and I was ready to move forward. Hazardous incident. Before the supervisor on the headset had disconnected and moved safely away from the nose gear a guide man (different from the first guide man; I believe) signaled to taxi ahead. I nearly released the brake to move the aircraft forward when I realized I had not seen the supervisor emerge from under the aircraft. In fact; he was sill on the headset! Since these kinds of events occur on a continuing basis; particularly at domestic locations (I almost never see a problem at international stations); and management has not taken steps to correct the ramp safety problems; I presume they are more concerned with on-time performance than complying with established safety rules. With that in mind; management should note this flight was delayed 12 mins waiting for the gate area to be cleared; maybe that would be adequate motivation to effect a change. This is my 7TH report on this subject just since feb/xa/07. This does not include the numerous reports I have submitted concerning the gate area not being cleared for arrival.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B767 FLT CREW REFUSED TO ENTER GATE AREA WITH EQUIPMENT LOCATED BEYOND THE 'CLEAR LINES.'
Narrative: APCHING THE GATE I OBSERVED NUMEROUS PIECES OF EQUIP (LOADERS; BAG CARTS; TRACTOR; TOWBAR; AND PWR CART) WELL WITHIN THE EQUIP CLR LINES SO I STOPPED THE ACFT SHORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR FLT MANUAL AND RAMP PROCS. WITH THE BRAKE PARKED; I POINTED AND GESTURED TO COMMUNICATE THE NEED TO MOVE THE EQUIP BEYOND THE LINES. THE GUIDE MAN'S IMMEDIATE RESPONSE WAS TO THROW THE ORANGE WANDS TOWARD THE ACFT WITH LIKE A LOOK OF DISGUST. I CALLED OPS AND REQUESTED THE ASSISTANCE OF A RAMP SUPVR WHEN THE RAMP SCENE LOOKED LIKE IT WAS ABOUT TO BOIL OVER. EVENTUALLY; THE INDIVIDUAL; WHO APPEARED TO BE THE SUPVR; COORDINATED THE MOVEMENT OF THE EQUIP AND THEN CONNECTED HIS HEADSET TO THE ACFT. I INFORMED HIM THE EQUIP APPEARED TO BE CLR AND I WAS READY TO MOVE FORWARD. HAZARDOUS INCIDENT. BEFORE THE SUPVR ON THE HEADSET HAD DISCONNECTED AND MOVED SAFELY AWAY FROM THE NOSE GEAR A GUIDE MAN (DIFFERENT FROM THE FIRST GUIDE MAN; I BELIEVE) SIGNALED TO TAXI AHEAD. I NEARLY RELEASED THE BRAKE TO MOVE THE ACFT FORWARD WHEN I REALIZED I HAD NOT SEEN THE SUPVR EMERGE FROM UNDER THE ACFT. IN FACT; HE WAS SILL ON THE HEADSET! SINCE THESE KINDS OF EVENTS OCCUR ON A CONTINUING BASIS; PARTICULARLY AT DOMESTIC LOCATIONS (I ALMOST NEVER SEE A PROB AT INTL STATIONS); AND MGMNT HAS NOT TAKEN STEPS TO CORRECT THE RAMP SAFETY PROBS; I PRESUME THEY ARE MORE CONCERNED WITH ON-TIME PERFORMANCE THAN COMPLYING WITH ESTABLISHED SAFETY RULES. WITH THAT IN MIND; MGMNT SHOULD NOTE THIS FLT WAS DELAYED 12 MINS WAITING FOR THE GATE AREA TO BE CLRED; MAYBE THAT WOULD BE ADEQUATE MOTIVATION TO EFFECT A CHANGE. THIS IS MY 7TH RPT ON THIS SUBJECT JUST SINCE FEB/XA/07. THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THE NUMEROUS REPORTS I HAVE SUBMITTED CONCERNING THE GATE AREA NOT BEING CLRED FOR ARR.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.