Narrative:

As PF; I discovered after block-in that we landed 900 pounds overweight. This was the beginning of the second week of flying for this 4 legs/night intra-europe pairing. The metar winds slightly favored landing to the south. We briefed the arrival and approach for a landing to the south and discussed that if it was offered; we would accept the north landing if winds permitted. Autobrakes 2 was selected and the turnoff taxiway was briefed. The initial approach ATC cleared us for the southern arrival to expect the southern approach. We accepted the intermediate controller's offer of the northern approach with his reported winds of a quartering tailwind 20 degrees off the right wing at 6 KTS. He cleared us the 'high speed' descent. We expeditiously changed runways in the FMC and ILS frequency and course. Descending through FL180 we ran the approach checklist and set the airspeed bugs. Because of fatigue; being rushed; and complacency; the gross weight from the init reference page did not register to the crew. The high approach speed of 147 KTS appeared high but I was concerned more with stopping distance given the slight tailwind component of 3 KTS and high approach speed. We landed in a slight right crab left of centerline. I corrected back to centerline; used idle reverse; and allowed autobrakes 2 to slow us down. We were still about 80 KTS approaching our briefed taxiway turnoff. I announced I would roll to the end. I never felt the 'grab' of autobrakes 2 that we experienced on all the previous 10 flts in the last 7 days. While turning off the runway; left inboard brake temperature indication was a '4.' when we turned in to the parking slot; the left inboard registered '6.' at parking and engine shutdown while waiting to be chocked; it heated up to '7.' we referenced the QRH; followed the checklists for brake cooling schedule and wrote up the brake temperatures. While investigating what caused the overheated brakes; I selected the init reference page and realized the overweight landing. We wrote the brake temperatures in the logbook and made a separate write-up for the overweight landing. The issue of overheated brakes was due to a malfunctioning antiskid system. It is unrelated to the heavy weight landing. Maintenance verified that that tail number had a history of antiskid problems. Final brake temperature indications as written in the logbook were: !7!0!3!3! And !5!0!3!3! -- Note the left inboard '0' brake temperature indications. Lesson learned: routine keeps from doing incorrect actions when we are distraction; fatigued; or otherwise not focused on tasks. It also leads to complacency. Routine and fatigue are unavoidable in our job. As a technique; for the approach checklist item 'airspds;' I will select init reference and verbalize the gross weight and speeds. This is a last chance prompt to myself and the crew to think about landing factors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 PILOT REPORTS AN INADVERTENT OVERWEIGHT LNDG FOLLOWED BY A BRAKE OVERHEAT DUE TO AN ANTI SKID MALFUNCTION.

Narrative: AS PF; I DISCOVERED AFTER BLOCK-IN THAT WE LANDED 900 LBS OVERWT. THIS WAS THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND WK OF FLYING FOR THIS 4 LEGS/NIGHT INTRA-EUROPE PAIRING. THE METAR WINDS SLIGHTLY FAVORED LNDG TO THE S. WE BRIEFED THE ARR AND APCH FOR A LNDG TO THE S AND DISCUSSED THAT IF IT WAS OFFERED; WE WOULD ACCEPT THE N LNDG IF WINDS PERMITTED. AUTOBRAKES 2 WAS SELECTED AND THE TURNOFF TXWY WAS BRIEFED. THE INITIAL APCH ATC CLRED US FOR THE SOUTHERN ARR TO EXPECT THE SOUTHERN APCH. WE ACCEPTED THE INTERMEDIATE CTLR'S OFFER OF THE NORTHERN APCH WITH HIS RPTED WINDS OF A QUARTERING TAILWIND 20 DEGS OFF THE R WING AT 6 KTS. HE CLRED US THE 'HIGH SPD' DSCNT. WE EXPEDITIOUSLY CHANGED RWYS IN THE FMC AND ILS FREQ AND COURSE. DSNDING THROUGH FL180 WE RAN THE APCH CHKLIST AND SET THE AIRSPD BUGS. BECAUSE OF FATIGUE; BEING RUSHED; AND COMPLACENCY; THE GROSS WT FROM THE INIT REF PAGE DID NOT REGISTER TO THE CREW. THE HIGH APCH SPD OF 147 KTS APPEARED HIGH BUT I WAS CONCERNED MORE WITH STOPPING DISTANCE GIVEN THE SLIGHT TAILWIND COMPONENT OF 3 KTS AND HIGH APCH SPD. WE LANDED IN A SLIGHT R CRAB L OF CTRLINE. I CORRECTED BACK TO CTRLINE; USED IDLE REVERSE; AND ALLOWED AUTOBRAKES 2 TO SLOW US DOWN. WE WERE STILL ABOUT 80 KTS APCHING OUR BRIEFED TXWY TURNOFF. I ANNOUNCED I WOULD ROLL TO THE END. I NEVER FELT THE 'GRAB' OF AUTOBRAKES 2 THAT WE EXPERIENCED ON ALL THE PREVIOUS 10 FLTS IN THE LAST 7 DAYS. WHILE TURNING OFF THE RWY; L INBOARD BRAKE TEMP INDICATION WAS A '4.' WHEN WE TURNED IN TO THE PARKING SLOT; THE L INBOARD REGISTERED '6.' AT PARKING AND ENG SHUTDOWN WHILE WAITING TO BE CHOCKED; IT HEATED UP TO '7.' WE REFED THE QRH; FOLLOWED THE CHKLISTS FOR BRAKE COOLING SCHEDULE AND WROTE UP THE BRAKE TEMPS. WHILE INVESTIGATING WHAT CAUSED THE OVERHEATED BRAKES; I SELECTED THE INIT REF PAGE AND REALIZED THE OVERWT LNDG. WE WROTE THE BRAKE TEMPS IN THE LOGBOOK AND MADE A SEPARATE WRITE-UP FOR THE OVERWT LNDG. THE ISSUE OF OVERHEATED BRAKES WAS DUE TO A MALFUNCTIONING ANTISKID SYS. IT IS UNRELATED TO THE HVY WT LNDG. MAINT VERIFIED THAT THAT TAIL NUMBER HAD A HISTORY OF ANTISKID PROBS. FINAL BRAKE TEMP INDICATIONS AS WRITTEN IN THE LOGBOOK WERE: !7!0!3!3! AND !5!0!3!3! -- NOTE THE L INBOARD '0' BRAKE TEMP INDICATIONS. LESSON LEARNED: ROUTINE KEEPS FROM DOING INCORRECT ACTIONS WHEN WE ARE DISTR; FATIGUED; OR OTHERWISE NOT FOCUSED ON TASKS. IT ALSO LEADS TO COMPLACENCY. ROUTINE AND FATIGUE ARE UNAVOIDABLE IN OUR JOB. AS A TECHNIQUE; FOR THE APCH CHKLIST ITEM 'AIRSPDS;' I WILL SELECT INIT REF AND VERBALIZE THE GROSS WT AND SPDS. THIS IS A LAST CHANCE PROMPT TO MYSELF AND THE CREW TO THINK ABOUT LNDG FACTORS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.