Narrative:

I was captain on a B-777. Preflight planning was normal; except for a call to maintenance control about the second time the same write up concerning the #2 engine eec controller was deferred and how much time was remaining. Weather was good. On startup; #2 engine egt 'blipped' once during the acceleration phase; but did not repeat itself at idle. All other indications normal. Approximately 1 hour after takeoff the #2 engine egt became somewhat intermittent. A call to dispatch for any restrs to flight in ETOPS or otherwise was in order. Dispatch replied that it was a no-go for departure; and he would research other limitations. We looked in the maintenance pages under performance to see a secondary (to us) egt reading to see if it remained steady or blipped in unison with the primary egt. It blipped in unison with the primary egt indicator. Other than the somewhat intermittent egt the flight progressed normally until approximately one hour before the fir. A flight attendant in the back reported indications of a fire; namely; an acrid smell. I went back to inspect the aircraft; and started smelling signs of electrical fire at about row 31; increasing in intensity until the aft galley where it is very strong. A sniff test reveals that the electrical smell seems to be emanating from the panels; not from the gaspers; indicating probably not a recirculation fan problem. All galley power is turned off at the stations. I notice the fluorescent lights are turned on. I instruct the galley lights to be turned off. I look at the overhead panels to try to drop them to see if a fire exists and to determine its content. The smell is eye burning now; passenger are noticing and 2 passenger come to the galley and volunteer their services. I say thanks; but I call the cockpit; tell them that I am coming up; and ask them to turn off the recirc fans to increase the cabin airflow to ventilate and to turn the safety belt sign on to discourage others from coming to the back galley. On return to the cockpit; we contact via sat phone maintenance control about how to open the panel to inspect for fire. We learn that we need either a phillips head or possible a torx screwdriver to needed to unlock the panels. The onboard toolkit has no applicable bits for the ratchet wrench included. A flight attendant suggest we use the crash axe to pry open a smaller ceiling light panel located on the forward side of the aft galley. Since part of our training for fire is to feel for heat on a panel; punch a hole in it; and use the fire extinguisher I say ok. Since we cannot find a hot spot; I remind him not to punch a hole but to pry the panel down as we can see more of the overhead with that with the panel down rather than viewing thru a hole chosen at random. The smell is increasing despite power being removed from the immediate area. The two panels are pried down with the axe; a tall flight attendant sticks her head up into the hole and reports no sign of smoke; but a terrible smell. Up in the cockpit; a status message arrives saying recirc fan. Shortly thereafter; the flight attendant reports that the entire aircraft entertainment system shut down by itself. Now; we have a multitude of electrical problems with no real way to tie them together. An eec twice deferred. Write-up says not to replace probes; it is a harness problem. A fluctuating #2 egt a very nasty electrical ozone smell starting in row 31 or so and increasing aft. At least 1 inoperative recirc fan. And spontaneous shutdown of the passenger entertainment system. With the cascading electrical items the first officer and I agree to get the aircraft on the ground. Available on the alternates page are ZZZZ1; ZZZZ2; ZZZZ3; and ZZZZ4. Considering the facilities at ZZZZ1; ZZZZ2; ZZZZ3 to handle passenger who may be burned if this fire becomes uncontained; we select ZZZZ4 even though it is a military base. ZZZZ5 can be used if no fire eruption by ZZZZ4. Clearance is obtained from ATC to descend to FL280; and then proceed directly to ZZZZ4. ATC is advised of a probable electrical fire. Dispatch advised. Dispatch tells us ZZZZ4 is a military field;we say we know but is best option right now; and is inline a direct course to ZZZZ5 if we have no further problems. An overweight landing is discussed. Dispatch provides performance numbers and we meet all criteria. We estimate the landing weight at that time as 475000 which is 15000 pounds overweight. We tell dispatch we probably will dump; but much closer to landing than now in case we need the fuel. Later; we pull up landing weights ourselves thru ACARS; and find we are well within all known performance criteria. We confer with maintenance clt and ask them what kind of inspection is required. They reply that a minor inspection is required if the landing was smooth. A call is received from the aft and now two flight attendants are sick and on O2 because of the electrical smell. Other passenger are showing concern. As we approach ZZZZ4; the decision is made to continue to ZZZZ5 because there has been no escalation or evidence of smoke or open flame. Flight attendants are now advising the smell is increasing again. We continue to ZZZZ5 with the absence of fire or smoke in mind. Based on the call to maintenance control and the review of the ACARS landing data an overweight landing is made with a smooth touchdown. Fire and rescue met the aircraft at the parking stand. Due to communication problems; the contract air carrier was treating us as more of a 'weather diversion.' it took me about approximately 15 minutes to get the fire crews to go back to the aft galley to look for fire. Immigration would not let any passenger deplane. Fire crews reported the electrical smell but could find no evidence of fire. Prior to their inspection; the panels pried open with the crash axe were hanging at about a 45 degree angle down. After inspection; they were closer to 60-70 degrees down. It is likely they opened them further because of their bulky fire protection suits.supplemental information from acn 762306: I was first officer performing PNF duties. At approximately 2+45 to 3 hours into the flight; a flight attendant in the aft galley called to say they had a problem and needed help. The flight attendant said they had a strong electrical smell that was getting worst. I asked them to turn off galley power and gave the remainder of the interphone call to the captain. He advised me he would go back and check and directed me to turn off both recirc fans and contact maintenance control on the satcom. I asked if we should wake up the relief pilots and he advised me to wait. I feel we should have woken the relief pilots and had one of them return to cockpit immediately. One flight attendant stayed in cockpit while captain went to aft galley. While he was gone I contacted maintenance control and advised them of the current situation. Maintenance control said that electrical smell was not that uncommon. The captain called me on the interphone to relay information requests to maintenance control. Maintenance control relayed that the smell could be coffee makers; lighting ballast or recirc fans. I advised that galley power was off and recirc fans were off. I told maintenance control to stay on line so that the captain could talk to them on his return to cockpit. On captain's return to cockpit he advised it was bad back there and spoke to maintenance control via satcom. Maintenance control suggested we turn upper recirc fan back on to see if that isolated problem. We turned upper recirc on and asked flight attendant in aft galley to note any change. Within minutes the flight attendant called and said the smell had gotten worse. We turned upper recirc off and soon got a recirc status message. The captain asked maintenance control if there was a way to open the overhead panel in aft galley; they responded with tools that we did not have on board. At the same time one of the flight attendants came to cockpit with update that smell was worst and that they needed to open up the overhead panel. The captain gave the flight attendant permission to use crash axe. I called the relief pilots on the interphone and had them return to cockpit. ATC cleared us to descend to FL280 then turn direct ZZZZ4. We advised dispatch of turnaround and they advised ZZZZ5 would be a more suitable airport. When we entered on the FMC altitude page it showed up as shorter timethan ZZZZ4. We got an ATC request if fire/smoke had stopped. I advised them that we did not have fire or smoke and that we were making precautionary return due to electrical problem. We relayed sobs and estimated arrival time. We had 2 flight attendants require O2. The purser advised us that no passenger required any medical attention. The purser advised us that the two flight attendants would not require medical attention. We advised dispatch that no medical was required. I got current WX and airport NOTAMS. The primary relief pilot reviewed the airport NOTAMS while the secondary relief pilot reviewed overweight landing procedure. The captain coordinated with maintenance control and dispatch about overweight landing. We estimated landing weight at 475000 pounds. All pilots agreed that overweight landing would not adversely affect safe landing and verified landing performance. They had approximately 4 fire support vehicles positioned near our taxiway. I advised the tower that we would be able to taxi off the runway and proceed to parking spot. I also advised them that we did not need any fire support. It took approximately 1+30 hours to get people off plane. Delay was for customs. They advised us to shut down all power prior to leaving aircraft. That was accomplished and door was closed. Rooms had been set up for passenger and crew. Procedures were established for passenger to clear customs; baggage claim and boarding pass requirements. This flight occurred during the timeframe I feel the most fatigue. To me the hours of XA00-XD00 my home local time is the hardest for me to operate at peak. These events happened during those hours.supplemental information from acn 762304: approximately 4 hours into our flight myself and the other relief pilot were awakened in the bunkroom by captain and the flying first officer. They said we were diverting to ZZZZ5 and they needed us to assist in the cockpit. At that point I was unaware of why we were diverting but I got dressed and tried to wake up sufficiently to be able to help out with any additional duties the flying crew had for me. Captain briefed us on what had happened. He also said that in trying to pinpoint the source of the burning smell; he had given the cockpit crash axe to the purser to discreetly take to the aft galley to enable them to pry open an access panel to see if there was any evidence of fire; smoke or arcing in the space overhead the galley. He authorized the flight attendants to take this action after determining that we did not have the proper tools to open the fasteners securing those panels. I would like to emphasize that both myself and the other pilot; as the relief crew; were not a party to any of the thought processes leading up to the decision to divert or the use of the crash axe to open the access panels since we were not awakened until after those actions had already been taken. But in light of the loss of certain lighting systems in the aft galley and the powering down of the entire aircraft entertainment system; the decision to divert to ZZZZ5 seemed like a reasonable solution and if anything it was erring on the side of safety. After I was sufficiently awake to be a functioning crew member; captain asked me to go to the aft galley to assess the situation so we had a pilot's perspective on what was going on; what it smelled like; how intense it was and so that I could see in the overhead area. I arrived in the galley to see several flight attendants and a passenger who was an electrical engineer peering into the overhead galley panels looking for smoke; fire or arcing. All reported that they could see no evidence of the origin of the acrid burning smell. I was a bit surprised by the damage that had been done to the panels to get them open so that we could try to trace the origin of the burning smell. But it appeared that the only things affected were the edges of the panels and the sill of the ceiling where the ceiling access panels fit in. Following my personal inspection of the area; I reported back to the cockpit to tell of what I saw and smelled. It seemed to me that the actions of the flight attendants; in shutting

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777 FLUORESCENT BALLAST CAUSED SMOKE IN THE AFT CABIN. AN EMER WAS DECLARED AND THE FLT DIVERTED.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT ON A B-777. PREFLIGHT PLANNING WAS NORMAL; EXCEPT FOR A CALL TO MAINT CTL ABOUT THE SECOND TIME THE SAME WRITE UP CONCERNING THE #2 ENGINE EEC CTLR WAS DEFERRED AND HOW MUCH TIME WAS REMAINING. WEATHER WAS GOOD. ON STARTUP; #2 ENGINE EGT 'BLIPPED' ONCE DURING THE ACCELERATION PHASE; BUT DID NOT REPEAT ITSELF AT IDLE. ALL OTHER INDICATIONS NORMAL. APPROX 1 HOUR AFTER TAKEOFF THE #2 ENG EGT BECAME SOMEWHAT INTERMITTENT. A CALL TO DISPATCH FOR ANY RESTRS TO FLT IN ETOPS OR OTHERWISE WAS IN ORDER. DISPATCH REPLIED THAT IT WAS A NO-GO FOR DEP; AND HE WOULD RESEARCH OTHER LIMITATIONS. WE LOOKED IN THE MAINT PAGES UNDER PERFORMANCE TO SEE A SECONDARY (TO US) EGT READING TO SEE IF IT REMAINED STEADY OR BLIPPED IN UNISON WITH THE PRIMARY EGT. IT BLIPPED IN UNISON WITH THE PRIMARY EGT INDICATOR. OTHER THAN THE SOMEWHAT INTERMITTENT EGT THE FLIGHT PROGRESSED NORMALLY UNTIL APPROX ONE HOUR BEFORE THE FIR. A FLT ATTENDANT IN THE BACK REPORTED INDICATIONS OF A FIRE; NAMELY; AN ACRID SMELL. I WENT BACK TO INSPECT THE ACFT; AND STARTED SMELLING SIGNS OF ELECTRICAL FIRE AT ABOUT ROW 31; INCREASING IN INTENSITY UNTIL THE AFT GALLEY WHERE IT IS VERY STRONG. A SNIFF TEST REVEALS THAT THE ELECTRICAL SMELL SEEMS TO BE EMANATING FROM THE PANELS; NOT FROM THE GASPERS; INDICATING PROBABLY NOT A RECIRCULATION FAN PROBLEM. ALL GALLEY POWER IS TURNED OFF AT THE STATIONS. I NOTICE THE FLUORESCENT LIGHTS ARE TURNED ON. I INSTRUCT THE GALLEY LIGHTS TO BE TURNED OFF. I LOOK AT THE OVERHEAD PANELS TO TRY TO DROP THEM TO SEE IF A FIRE EXISTS AND TO DETERMINE ITS CONTENT. THE SMELL IS EYE BURNING NOW; PAX ARE NOTICING AND 2 PAX COME TO THE GALLEY AND VOLUNTEER THEIR SERVICES. I SAY THANKS; BUT I CALL THE COCKPIT; TELL THEM THAT I AM COMING UP; AND ASK THEM TO TURN OFF THE RECIRC FANS TO INCREASE THE CABIN AIRFLOW TO VENTILATE AND TO TURN THE SAFETY BELT SIGN ON TO DISCOURAGE OTHERS FROM COMING TO THE BACK GALLEY. ON RETURN TO THE COCKPIT; WE CONTACT VIA SAT PHONE MAINT CTL ABOUT HOW TO OPEN THE PANEL TO INSPECT FOR FIRE. WE LEARN THAT WE NEED EITHER A PHILLIPS HEAD OR POSSIBLE A TORX SCREWDRIVER TO NEEDED TO UNLOCK THE PANELS. THE ONBOARD TOOLKIT HAS NO APPLICABLE BITS FOR THE RATCHET WRENCH INCLUDED. A FLT ATTENDANT SUGGEST WE USE THE CRASH AXE TO PRY OPEN A SMALLER CEILING LIGHT PANEL LOCATED ON THE FORWARD SIDE OF THE AFT GALLEY. SINCE PART OF OUR TRAINING FOR FIRE IS TO FEEL FOR HEAT ON A PANEL; PUNCH A HOLE IN IT; AND USE THE FIRE EXTINGUISHER I SAY OK. SINCE WE CANNOT FIND A HOT SPOT; I REMIND HIM NOT TO PUNCH A HOLE BUT TO PRY THE PANEL DOWN AS WE CAN SEE MORE OF THE OVERHEAD WITH THAT WITH THE PANEL DOWN RATHER THAN VIEWING THRU A HOLE CHOSEN AT RANDOM. THE SMELL IS INCREASING DESPITE POWER BEING REMOVED FROM THE IMMEDIATE AREA. THE TWO PANELS ARE PRIED DOWN WITH THE AXE; A TALL FLT ATTENDANT STICKS HER HEAD UP INTO THE HOLE AND RPTS NO SIGN OF SMOKE; BUT A TERRIBLE SMELL. UP IN THE COCKPIT; A STATUS MESSAGE ARRIVES SAYING RECIRC FAN. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; THE FLT ATTENDANT RPTS THAT THE ENTIRE ACFT ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEM SHUT DOWN BY ITSELF. NOW; WE HAVE A MULTITUDE OF ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS WITH NO REAL WAY TO TIE THEM TOGETHER. AN EEC TWICE DEFERRED. WRITE-UP SAYS NOT TO REPLACE PROBES; IT IS A HARNESS PROBLEM. A FLUCTUATING #2 EGT A VERY NASTY ELECTRICAL OZONE SMELL STARTING IN ROW 31 OR SO AND INCREASING AFT. AT LEAST 1 INOP RECIRC FAN. AND SPONTANEOUS SHUTDOWN OF THE PAX ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEM. WITH THE CASCADING ELECTRICAL ITEMS THE FO AND I AGREE TO GET THE ACFT ON THE GND. AVAILABLE ON THE ALTERNATES PAGE ARE ZZZZ1; ZZZZ2; ZZZZ3; AND ZZZZ4. CONSIDERING THE FACILITIES AT ZZZZ1; ZZZZ2; ZZZZ3 TO HANDLE PAX WHO MAY BE BURNED IF THIS FIRE BECOMES UNCONTAINED; WE SELECT ZZZZ4 EVEN THOUGH IT IS A MILITARY BASE. ZZZZ5 CAN BE USED IF NO FIRE ERUPTION BY ZZZZ4. CLEARANCE IS OBTAINED FROM ATC TO DSND TO FL280; AND THEN PROCEED DIRECTLY TO ZZZZ4. ATC IS ADVISED OF A PROBABLE ELECTRICAL FIRE. DISPATCH ADVISED. DISPATCH TELLS US ZZZZ4 IS A MILITARY FIELD;WE SAY WE KNOW BUT IS BEST OPTION RIGHT NOW; AND IS INLINE A DIRECT COURSE TO ZZZZ5 IF WE HAVE NO FURTHER PROBLEMS. AN OVERWT LNDG IS DISCUSSED. DISPATCH PROVIDES PERFORMANCE NUMBERS AND WE MEET ALL CRITERIA. WE ESTIMATE THE LNDG WT AT THAT TIME AS 475000 WHICH IS 15000 LBS OVERWT. WE TELL DISPATCH WE PROBABLY WILL DUMP; BUT MUCH CLOSER TO LNDG THAN NOW IN CASE WE NEED THE FUEL. LATER; WE PULL UP LNDG WTS OURSELVES THRU ACARS; AND FIND WE ARE WELL WITHIN ALL KNOWN PERFORMANCE CRITERIA. WE CONFER WITH MAINT CLT AND ASK THEM WHAT KIND OF INSPECTION IS REQUIRED. THEY REPLY THAT A MINOR INSPECTION IS REQUIRED IF THE LNDG WAS SMOOTH. A CALL IS RECEIVED FROM THE AFT AND NOW TWO FLT ATTENDANTS ARE SICK AND ON O2 BECAUSE OF THE ELECTRICAL SMELL. OTHER PAX ARE SHOWING CONCERN. AS WE APPROACH ZZZZ4; THE DECISION IS MADE TO CONTINUE TO ZZZZ5 BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN NO ESCALATION OR EVIDENCE OF SMOKE OR OPEN FLAME. FLT ATTENDANTS ARE NOW ADVISING THE SMELL IS INCREASING AGAIN. WE CONTINUE TO ZZZZ5 WITH THE ABSENCE OF FIRE OR SMOKE IN MIND. BASED ON THE CALL TO MAINT CTL AND THE REVIEW OF THE ACARS LNDG DATA AN OVERWT LNDG IS MADE WITH A SMOOTH TOUCHDOWN. FIRE AND RESCUE MET THE ACFT AT THE PARKING STAND. DUE TO COM PROBLEMS; THE CONTRACT ACR WAS TREATING US AS MORE OF A 'WEATHER DIVERSION.' IT TOOK ME ABOUT APPROX 15 MINUTES TO GET THE FIRE CREWS TO GO BACK TO THE AFT GALLEY TO LOOK FOR FIRE. IMMIGRATION WOULD NOT LET ANY PAX DEPLANE. FIRE CREWS RPTED THE ELECTRICAL SMELL BUT COULD FIND NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE. PRIOR TO THEIR INSPECTION; THE PANELS PRIED OPEN WITH THE CRASH AXE WERE HANGING AT ABOUT A 45 DEGREE ANGLE DOWN. AFTER INSPECTION; THEY WERE CLOSER TO 60-70 DEGS DOWN. IT IS LIKELY THEY OPENED THEM FURTHER BECAUSE OF THEIR BULKY FIRE PROTECTION SUITS.SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 762306: I WAS FO PERFORMING PNF DUTIES. AT APPROX 2+45 TO 3 HOURS INTO THE FLT; A FLT ATTENDANT IN THE AFT GALLEY CALLED TO SAY THEY HAD A PROBLEM AND NEEDED HELP. THE FLT ATTENDANT SAID THEY HAD A STRONG ELECTRICAL SMELL THAT WAS GETTING WORST. I ASKED THEM TO TURN OFF GALLEY POWER AND GAVE THE REMAINDER OF THE INTERPHONE CALL TO THE CAPT. HE ADVISED ME HE WOULD GO BACK AND CHECK AND DIRECTED ME TO TURN OFF BOTH RECIRC FANS AND CONTACT MAINT CTL ON THE SATCOM. I ASKED IF WE SHOULD WAKE UP THE RELIEF PLTS AND HE ADVISED ME TO WAIT. I FEEL WE SHOULD HAVE WOKEN THE RELIEF PLTS AND HAD ONE OF THEM RETURN TO COCKPIT IMMEDIATELY. ONE FLT ATTENDANT STAYED IN COCKPIT WHILE CAPT WENT TO AFT GALLEY. WHILE HE WAS GONE I CONTACTED MAINT CTL AND ADVISED THEM OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. MAINT CTL SAID THAT ELECTRICAL SMELL WAS NOT THAT UNCOMMON. THE CAPT CALLED ME ON THE INTERPHONE TO RELAY INFORMATION REQUESTS TO MAINT CTL. MAINT CTL RELAYED THAT THE SMELL COULD BE COFFEE MAKERS; LIGHTING BALLAST OR RECIRC FANS. I ADVISED THAT GALLEY POWER WAS OFF AND RECIRC FANS WERE OFF. I TOLD MAINT CTL TO STAY ON LINE SO THAT THE CAPT COULD TALK TO THEM ON HIS RETURN TO COCKPIT. ON CAPT'S RETURN TO COCKPIT HE ADVISED IT WAS BAD BACK THERE AND SPOKE TO MAINT CTL VIA SATCOM. MAINT CTL SUGGESTED WE TURN UPPER RECIRC FAN BACK ON TO SEE IF THAT ISOLATED PROBLEM. WE TURNED UPPER RECIRC ON AND ASKED FLT ATTENDANT IN AFT GALLEY TO NOTE ANY CHANGE. WITHIN MINUTES THE FLT ATTENDANT CALLED AND SAID THE SMELL HAD GOTTEN WORSE. WE TURNED UPPER RECIRC OFF AND SOON GOT A RECIRC STATUS MESSAGE. THE CAPT ASKED MAINT CTL IF THERE WAS A WAY TO OPEN THE OVERHEAD PANEL IN AFT GALLEY; THEY RESPONDED WITH TOOLS THAT WE DID NOT HAVE ON BOARD. AT THE SAME TIME ONE OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS CAME TO COCKPIT WITH UPDATE THAT SMELL WAS WORST AND THAT THEY NEEDED TO OPEN UP THE OVERHEAD PANEL. THE CAPT GAVE THE FA PERMISSION TO USE CRASH AXE. I CALLED THE RELIEF PLTS ON THE INTERPHONE AND HAD THEM RETURN TO COCKPIT. ATC CLRED US TO DSND TO FL280 THEN TURN DIRECT ZZZZ4. WE ADVISED DISPATCH OF TURNAROUND AND THEY ADVISED ZZZZ5 WOULD BE A MORE SUITABLE ARPT. WHEN WE ENTERED ON THE FMC ALT PAGE IT SHOWED UP AS SHORTER TIMETHAN ZZZZ4. WE GOT AN ATC REQUEST IF FIRE/SMOKE HAD STOPPED. I ADVISED THEM THAT WE DID NOT HAVE FIRE OR SMOKE AND THAT WE WERE MAKING PRECAUTIONARY RETURN DUE TO ELECTRICAL PROBLEM. WE RELAYED SOBS AND ESTIMATED ARRIVAL TIME. WE HAD 2 FLT ATTENDANTS REQUIRE O2. THE PURSER ADVISED US THAT NO PAX REQUIRED ANY MEDICAL ATTENTION. THE PURSER ADVISED US THAT THE TWO FLT ATTENDANTS WOULD NOT REQUIRE MEDICAL ATTENTION. WE ADVISED DISPATCH THAT NO MEDICAL WAS REQUIRED. I GOT CURRENT WX AND ARPT NOTAMS. THE PRIMARY RELIEF PILOT REVIEWED THE ARPT NOTAMS WHILE THE SECONDARY RELIEF PILOT REVIEWED OVERWT LNDG PROC. THE CAPT COORDINATED WITH MAINT CTL AND DISPATCH ABOUT OVERWT LNDG. WE ESTIMATED LNDG WT AT 475000 LBS. ALL PLTS AGREED THAT OVERWT LNDG WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFE LNDG AND VERIFIED LNDG PERFORMANCE. THEY HAD APPROX 4 FIRE SUPPORT VEHICLES POSITIONED NEAR OUR TXWY. I ADVISED THE TOWER THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO TAXI OFF THE RWY AND PROCEED TO PARKING SPOT. I ALSO ADVISED THEM THAT WE DID NOT NEED ANY FIRE SUPPORT. IT TOOK APPROX 1+30 HOURS TO GET PEOPLE OFF PLANE. DELAY WAS FOR CUSTOMS. THEY ADVISED US TO SHUT DOWN ALL POWER PRIOR TO LEAVING ACFT. THAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND DOOR WAS CLOSED. ROOMS HAD BEEN SET UP FOR PAX AND CREW. PROCEDURES WERE ESTABLISHED FOR PAX TO CLEAR CUSTOMS; BAGGAGE CLAIM AND BOARDING PASS REQUIREMENTS. THIS FLIGHT OCCURRED DURING THE TIMEFRAME I FEEL THE MOST FATIGUE. TO ME THE HOURS OF XA00-XD00 MY HOME LOCAL TIME IS THE HARDEST FOR ME TO OPERATE AT PEAK. THESE EVENTS HAPPENED DURING THOSE HOURS.SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 762304: APPROX 4 HOURS INTO OUR FLT MYSELF AND THE OTHER RELIEF PILOT WERE AWAKENED IN THE BUNKROOM BY CAPT AND THE FLYING FO. THEY SAID WE WERE DIVERTING TO ZZZZ5 AND THEY NEEDED US TO ASSIST IN THE COCKPIT. AT THAT POINT I WAS UNAWARE OF WHY WE WERE DIVERTING BUT I GOT DRESSED AND TRIED TO WAKE UP SUFFICIENTLY TO BE ABLE TO HELP OUT WITH ANY ADDITIONAL DUTIES THE FLYING CREW HAD FOR ME. CAPT BRIEFED US ON WHAT HAD HAPPENED. HE ALSO SAID THAT IN TRYING TO PINPOINT THE SOURCE OF THE BURNING SMELL; HE HAD GIVEN THE COCKPIT CRASH AXE TO THE PURSER TO DISCREETLY TAKE TO THE AFT GALLEY TO ENABLE THEM TO PRY OPEN AN ACCESS PANEL TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANY EVIDENCE OF FIRE; SMOKE OR ARCING IN THE SPACE OVERHEAD THE GALLEY. HE AUTHORIZED THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO TAKE THIS ACTION AFTER DETERMINING THAT WE DID NOT HAVE THE PROPER TOOLS TO OPEN THE FASTENERS SECURING THOSE PANELS. I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT BOTH MYSELF AND THE OTHER PLT; AS THE RELIEF CREW; WERE NOT A PARTY TO ANY OF THE THOUGHT PROCESSES LEADING UP TO THE DECISION TO DIVERT OR THE USE OF THE CRASH AXE TO OPEN THE ACCESS PANELS SINCE WE WERE NOT AWAKENED UNTIL AFTER THOSE ACTIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN. BUT IN LIGHT OF THE LOSS OF CERTAIN LIGHTING SYSTEMS IN THE AFT GALLEY AND THE POWERING DOWN OF THE ENTIRE ACFT ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEM; THE DECISION TO DIVERT TO ZZZZ5 SEEMED LIKE A REASONABLE SOLUTION AND IF ANYTHING IT WAS ERRING ON THE SIDE OF SAFETY. AFTER I WAS SUFFICIENTLY AWAKE TO BE A FUNCTIONING CREW MEMBER; CAPT ASKED ME TO GO TO THE AFT GALLEY TO ASSESS THE SITUATION SO WE HAD A PILOT'S PERSPECTIVE ON WHAT WAS GOING ON; WHAT IT SMELLED LIKE; HOW INTENSE IT WAS AND SO THAT I COULD SEE IN THE OVERHEAD AREA. I ARRIVED IN THE GALLEY TO SEE SEVERAL FLT ATTENDANTS AND A PAX WHO WAS AN ELECTRICAL ENGINEER PEERING INTO THE OVERHEAD GALLEY PANELS LOOKING FOR SMOKE; FIRE OR ARCING. ALL RPTED THAT THEY COULD SEE NO EVIDENCE OF THE ORIGIN OF THE ACRID BURNING SMELL. I WAS A BIT SURPRISED BY THE DAMAGE THAT HAD BEEN DONE TO THE PANELS TO GET THEM OPEN SO THAT WE COULD TRY TO TRACE THE ORIGIN OF THE BURNING SMELL. BUT IT APPEARED THAT THE ONLY THINGS AFFECTED WERE THE EDGES OF THE PANELS AND THE SILL OF THE CEILING WHERE THE CEILING ACCESS PANELS FIT IN. FOLLOWING MY PERSONAL INSPECTION OF THE AREA; I RPTED BACK TO THE COCKPIT TO TELL OF WHAT I SAW AND SMELLED. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS; IN SHUTTING

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.