Narrative:

Cruising along to ord with indianapolis ARTCC; the controller instructed us to descend from FL360 to FL320. After we acknowledged the new clearance both the captain and I agreed; in the interest of safety; that the new clearance would jeopardize considerably our fuel reserves into the destination airport since it (ord) was still 415 NM away (halfway on the route). At that moment the FMS was showing approximately 45 minutes of fuel overhead our destination at FL360/mach 73. A descent with speed changes and possible vectoring was not acceptable. We told the controller we were unable to accept FL320 because that altitude at this distance; with the stronger than forecast headwinds; would burn our fuel reserve. We explained the situation to her; that this was too early for us to start down due to the strong headwinds; to which she replied that they always did this kind of descent this far away every day for the route of flight into ord and that our request would require a lot coordination between her and the next sectors along our route. She then amended our clearance to stay up at FL360 and to switch our frequency to the next controller. After we switched and checked-in the new controller gave us a phone number to call the ARTCC quality assurance department. In all honesty we were shocked by this and queried her if that was really necessary; she replied that her supervisor wanted to talk to us but she didn't have a problem with us from her end. We copied the clearance and continued on our way to ord. We never declared min fuel status but if we had taken the new altitude we would have been forced to declare it and we may have ended up somewhere else instead of our destination. The other subsequent controllers (in chicago ARTCC) were very helpful and accommodated our request helping us out a lot and keeping safety in mind. We decided to stay up at altitude to maintain an adequate fuel reserve in accordance with far's. We understand there are letters of agreement between ARTCC facilities in order to maintain the expeditious flow of traffic into major airports and help controller workload; but the efficiency of these agreements are questionable (at best) in helping user aircraft conserve fuel. The decision was made in the interest of safety; since the fuel was adequate to dispatch but the unusually strong headwinds changed our fuel situation forcing the captain to make a command decision to keep the safety of our passenger ahead of anything else. I have no problem with controllers; they do an outstanding job. In our case the change of 'routine' that our situation presented gave us the impression that it annoyed the controller since she had to coordinate with the subsequent sectors in order to accommodate us. Our clearance was issued 415 NM away from ord!!! This is flying our route without any shortcuts. Flying around with 50 passenger that far away in the low 30's to high 20's burns a considerable amount of fuel and on top of that the strong headwinds complicate the situation further. Maybe the arrival needs to be revised or alternate means of arrival devised when an aircraft falls into this situation.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that the forecast cruise winds were in error; and the actual headwind component encountered was at least 30 KTS greater than forecast. No alternate fuel was required or boarded. Reporter stated that on some occasions; additional fuel for contingencies only allows for as little as 5 mins additional flight time over the 45 min far required reserve fuel. Apparently; it is not uncommon for the flight dispatcher to question the captain if he feels it necessary to add fuel.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB 145 ENCOUNTERED HEADWINDS GREATER THAN FORECAST; AND THE REDUCED FUEL SITUATION RESULTED IN THEIR INABILITY TO ACCEPT AN EARLY DESCENT TO ACCOMMODATE ATC.

Narrative: CRUISING ALONG TO ORD WITH INDIANAPOLIS ARTCC; THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO DSND FROM FL360 TO FL320. AFTER WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEW CLRNC BOTH THE CAPT AND I AGREED; IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY; THAT THE NEW CLRNC WOULD JEOPARDIZE CONSIDERABLY OUR FUEL RESERVES INTO THE DEST ARPT SINCE IT (ORD) WAS STILL 415 NM AWAY (HALFWAY ON THE RTE). AT THAT MOMENT THE FMS WAS SHOWING APPROXIMATELY 45 MINUTES OF FUEL OVERHEAD OUR DESTINATION AT FL360/MACH 73. A DSCNT WITH SPEED CHANGES AND POSSIBLE VECTORING WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. WE TOLD THE CTLR WE WERE UNABLE TO ACCEPT FL320 BECAUSE THAT ALTITUDE AT THIS DISTANCE; WITH THE STRONGER THAN FORECAST HEADWINDS; WOULD BURN OUR FUEL RESERVE. WE EXPLAINED THE SITUATION TO HER; THAT THIS WAS TOO EARLY FOR US TO START DOWN DUE TO THE STRONG HEADWINDS; TO WHICH SHE REPLIED THAT THEY ALWAYS DID THIS KIND OF DSCNT THIS FAR AWAY EVERY DAY FOR THE RTE OF FLT INTO ORD AND THAT OUR REQUEST WOULD REQUIRE A LOT COORD BETWEEN HER AND THE NEXT SECTORS ALONG OUR ROUTE. SHE THEN AMENDED OUR CLRNC TO STAY UP AT FL360 AND TO SWITCH OUR FREQ TO THE NEXT CTLR. AFTER WE SWITCHED AND CHECKED-IN THE NEW CTLR GAVE US A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL THE ARTCC QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPT. IN ALL HONESTY WE WERE SHOCKED BY THIS AND QUERIED HER IF THAT WAS REALLY NECESSARY; SHE REPLIED THAT HER SUPERVISOR WANTED TO TALK TO US BUT SHE DIDN'T HAVE A PROBLEM WITH US FROM HER END. WE COPIED THE CLRNC AND CONTINUED ON OUR WAY TO ORD. WE NEVER DECLARED MIN FUEL STATUS BUT IF WE HAD TAKEN THE NEW ALTITUDE WE WOULD HAVE BEEN FORCED TO DECLARE IT AND WE MAY HAVE ENDED UP SOMEWHERE ELSE INSTEAD OF OUR DEST. THE OTHER SUBSEQUENT CTLRS (IN CHICAGO ARTCC) WERE VERY HELPFUL AND ACCOMMODATED OUR REQUEST HELPING US OUT A LOT AND KEEPING SAFETY IN MIND. WE DECIDED TO STAY UP AT ALTITUDE TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE FUEL RESERVE IN ACCORDANCE WITH FAR'S. WE UNDERSTAND THERE ARE LETTERS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN ARTCC FACILITIES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE EXPEDITIOUS FLOW OF TFC INTO MAJOR ARPTS AND HELP CTLR WORKLOAD; BUT THE EFFICIENCY OF THESE AGREEMENTS ARE QUESTIONABLE (AT BEST) IN HELPING USER ACFT CONSERVE FUEL. THE DECISION WAS MADE IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY; SINCE THE FUEL WAS ADEQUATE TO DISPATCH BUT THE UNUSUALLY STRONG HEADWINDS CHANGED OUR FUEL SITUATION FORCING THE CAPT TO MAKE A COMMAND DECISION TO KEEP THE SAFETY OF OUR PAX AHEAD OF ANYTHING ELSE. I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH CTLRS; THEY DO AN OUTSTANDING JOB. IN OUR CASE THE CHANGE OF 'ROUTINE' THAT OUR SITUATION PRESENTED GAVE US THE IMPRESSION THAT IT ANNOYED THE CTLR SINCE SHE HAD TO COORDINATE WITH THE SUBSEQUENT SECTORS IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE US. OUR CLRNC WAS ISSUED 415 NM AWAY FROM ORD!!! THIS IS FLYING OUR RTE WITHOUT ANY SHORTCUTS. FLYING AROUND WITH 50 PAX THAT FAR AWAY IN THE LOW 30'S TO HIGH 20'S BURNS A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF FUEL AND ON TOP OF THAT THE STRONG HEADWINDS COMPLICATE THE SITUATION FURTHER. MAYBE THE ARR NEEDS TO BE REVISED OR ALTERNATE MEANS OF ARR DEVISED WHEN AN ACFT FALLS INTO THIS SITUATION.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT THE FORECAST CRUISE WINDS WERE IN ERROR; AND THE ACTUAL HEADWIND COMPONENT ENCOUNTERED WAS AT LEAST 30 KTS GREATER THAN FORECAST. NO ALTERNATE FUEL WAS REQUIRED OR BOARDED. RPTR STATED THAT ON SOME OCCASIONS; ADDITIONAL FUEL FOR CONTINGENCIES ONLY ALLOWS FOR AS LITTLE AS 5 MINS ADDITIONAL FLT TIME OVER THE 45 MIN FAR REQUIRED RESERVE FUEL. APPARENTLY; IT IS NOT UNCOMMON FOR THE FLT DISPATCHER TO QUESTION THE CAPT IF HE FEELS IT NECESSARY TO ADD FUEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.