Narrative:

Received the aircraft from previous crew with an MEL write-up for #1 engine anti-ice valve failed and locked in the open position with the high stage valve locked closed. I read up on all of the items pertaining to this write-up. A significant weight penalty and some power reductions for climb and cruise. I called dispatch to ensure they had considered the weight penalties since there was no indication that they had done so on my release. The current dispatcher was unsure and had to spend about 5 mins with him while he tried to figure out if the dispatcher who had actually prepared my release had done this. We had to hold off the fueling until we were sure of this; so I needed to speak to dispatch right away. I was on the phone with him while the inbound captain was trying to debrief me. Her concern with the aircraft had been whether or not you could go into icing conditions; but this was quite clear on the MEL; so she had no further information for me regarding this particular MEL. I took off on runway xx and a few seconds after applying power; got a master caution light. I aborted the takeoff at less than 40 KTS and taxied off the runway; and noted it was the amber engine anti-ice light above the blue light which was MEL'ed. I realized it was due to over-pressure with that valve being locked open and felt it was part of the MEL. I elected to return to the runway and take off with an information-only write-up. When we landed; I spoke to maintenance control and told them I was surprised the MEL didn't warn me this would happen. They then realized it shouldn't have happened because maintenance was supposed to pull that cannon plug to prevent this. Called contract maintenance who discovered it had not been pulled. They pulled it and wrote it in the logbook. I realize now that this does not qualify as an information-only write-up and should have gone back to the gate. I made the mistake of presuming that a few other capts had been flying it like this; so must be normal for this write-up. We often have master cautions on recall for an MEL write-up; but of course never during a takeoff roll. Caution on recall just prior to takeoff leads us to think that a master caution associated with an MEL is normal. It is never normal on takeoff roll.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-700 PILOT ABORTED TKOF AFTER MASTER CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED FOR #1 ENG ANTI-ICE VALVE WHICH HAD BEEN DEFERRED IN OPEN POSITION. CANON PLUG FOR ANTI-ICE VALVE HAD NOT BEEN DISCONNECTED; AS REQUIRED UNDER MEL.

Narrative: RECEIVED THE ACFT FROM PREVIOUS CREW WITH AN MEL WRITE-UP FOR #1 ENG ANTI-ICE VALVE FAILED AND LOCKED IN THE OPEN POS WITH THE HIGH STAGE VALVE LOCKED CLOSED. I READ UP ON ALL OF THE ITEMS PERTAINING TO THIS WRITE-UP. A SIGNIFICANT WT PENALTY AND SOME PWR REDUCTIONS FOR CLB AND CRUISE. I CALLED DISPATCH TO ENSURE THEY HAD CONSIDERED THE WT PENALTIES SINCE THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT THEY HAD DONE SO ON MY RELEASE. THE CURRENT DISPATCHER WAS UNSURE AND HAD TO SPEND ABOUT 5 MINS WITH HIM WHILE HE TRIED TO FIGURE OUT IF THE DISPATCHER WHO HAD ACTUALLY PREPARED MY RELEASE HAD DONE THIS. WE HAD TO HOLD OFF THE FUELING UNTIL WE WERE SURE OF THIS; SO I NEEDED TO SPEAK TO DISPATCH RIGHT AWAY. I WAS ON THE PHONE WITH HIM WHILE THE INBOUND CAPT WAS TRYING TO DEBRIEF ME. HER CONCERN WITH THE ACFT HAD BEEN WHETHER OR NOT YOU COULD GO INTO ICING CONDITIONS; BUT THIS WAS QUITE CLR ON THE MEL; SO SHE HAD NO FURTHER INFO FOR ME REGARDING THIS PARTICULAR MEL. I TOOK OFF ON RWY XX AND A FEW SECONDS AFTER APPLYING PWR; GOT A MASTER CAUTION LIGHT. I ABORTED THE TKOF AT LESS THAN 40 KTS AND TAXIED OFF THE RWY; AND NOTED IT WAS THE AMBER ENG ANTI-ICE LIGHT ABOVE THE BLUE LIGHT WHICH WAS MEL'ED. I REALIZED IT WAS DUE TO OVER-PRESSURE WITH THAT VALVE BEING LOCKED OPEN AND FELT IT WAS PART OF THE MEL. I ELECTED TO RETURN TO THE RWY AND TAKE OFF WITH AN INFO-ONLY WRITE-UP. WHEN WE LANDED; I SPOKE TO MAINT CTL AND TOLD THEM I WAS SURPRISED THE MEL DIDN'T WARN ME THIS WOULD HAPPEN. THEY THEN REALIZED IT SHOULDN'T HAVE HAPPENED BECAUSE MAINT WAS SUPPOSED TO PULL THAT CANNON PLUG TO PREVENT THIS. CALLED CONTRACT MAINT WHO DISCOVERED IT HAD NOT BEEN PULLED. THEY PULLED IT AND WROTE IT IN THE LOGBOOK. I REALIZE NOW THAT THIS DOES NOT QUALIFY AS AN INFO-ONLY WRITE-UP AND SHOULD HAVE GONE BACK TO THE GATE. I MADE THE MISTAKE OF PRESUMING THAT A FEW OTHER CAPTS HAD BEEN FLYING IT LIKE THIS; SO MUST BE NORMAL FOR THIS WRITE-UP. WE OFTEN HAVE MASTER CAUTIONS ON RECALL FOR AN MEL WRITE-UP; BUT OF COURSE NEVER DURING A TKOF ROLL. CAUTION ON RECALL JUST PRIOR TO TKOF LEADS US TO THINK THAT A MASTER CAUTION ASSOCIATED WITH AN MEL IS NORMAL. IT IS NEVER NORMAL ON TKOF ROLL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.