Narrative:

I recently had an FAA guy on my jumpseat and have 2 concerns. I asked him how it was that the FAA and air carrier could approve a guy getting checked out in mhtg without ever seeing a landing on runway 2. He said that he knew that was the FAA and air carrier approved policy but that; and he was pleased about this; none of the check airmen guys were signing guys off unless they had seen runway 2. Ok; let's think about this. In effect; the FAA and air carrier are saying: we have a policy in place that our experts (the check airmen and the guys who fly there) do not think is safe and we are glad that they are not complying with that policy. Maybe the guys at the FAA and the air carrier can't see how; frankly; silly that thinking is; but the guys on the line sure do. Somehow; I guess; correcting the flawed policy hasn't occurred to them. I recently spoke with a check airman who; when I asked about some of the high altitude cities; said that he was not allowed to address his concerns with anyone other than his direct superior; sort of a military chain of command thing; and that his direct superior basically doesn't want to hear his concerns. The FAA and air carrier have disregarded the check airman and the line guys who see the threats in sequ; mhtg; sllp and other places; but for some reason have ignored their safety concerns. Air carrier needs to return to the safety first policy that they have abandoned; and the FAA needs to step up to their responsibility for oversight. Both entities bear responsibility in this. Both the FAA and air carrier can and should do better.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757-200 PLT IS CONCERNED THAT NEITHER THE FAA NOR HIS COMPANY TRAINING DIVISION REQUIRE A TRAINING ENTRY TO MHTG; YET STATE THEY ALWAYS CONDUCT ONE PRIOR TO RELEASING A PLT FOR SOLO ENTRIES BECAUSE OF THE UNUSUAL AND DEMANDING NATURE OF THE RWY 02 ARRIVAL.

Narrative: I RECENTLY HAD AN FAA GUY ON MY JUMPSEAT AND HAVE 2 CONCERNS. I ASKED HIM HOW IT WAS THAT THE FAA AND ACR COULD APPROVE A GUY GETTING CHKED OUT IN MHTG WITHOUT EVER SEEING A LNDG ON RWY 2. HE SAID THAT HE KNEW THAT WAS THE FAA AND ACR APPROVED POLICY BUT THAT; AND HE WAS PLEASED ABOUT THIS; NONE OF THE CHK AIRMEN GUYS WERE SIGNING GUYS OFF UNLESS THEY HAD SEEN RWY 2. OK; LET'S THINK ABOUT THIS. IN EFFECT; THE FAA AND ACR ARE SAYING: WE HAVE A POLICY IN PLACE THAT OUR EXPERTS (THE CHK AIRMEN AND THE GUYS WHO FLY THERE) DO NOT THINK IS SAFE AND WE ARE GLAD THAT THEY ARE NOT COMPLYING WITH THAT POLICY. MAYBE THE GUYS AT THE FAA AND THE ACR CAN'T SEE HOW; FRANKLY; SILLY THAT THINKING IS; BUT THE GUYS ON THE LINE SURE DO. SOMEHOW; I GUESS; CORRECTING THE FLAWED POLICY HASN'T OCCURRED TO THEM. I RECENTLY SPOKE WITH A CHK AIRMAN WHO; WHEN I ASKED ABOUT SOME OF THE HIGH ALT CITIES; SAID THAT HE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO ADDRESS HIS CONCERNS WITH ANYONE OTHER THAN HIS DIRECT SUPERIOR; SORT OF A MIL CHAIN OF COMMAND THING; AND THAT HIS DIRECT SUPERIOR BASICALLY DOESN'T WANT TO HEAR HIS CONCERNS. THE FAA AND ACR HAVE DISREGARDED THE CHK AIRMAN AND THE LINE GUYS WHO SEE THE THREATS IN SEQU; MHTG; SLLP AND OTHER PLACES; BUT FOR SOME REASON HAVE IGNORED THEIR SAFETY CONCERNS. ACR NEEDS TO RETURN TO THE SAFETY FIRST POLICY THAT THEY HAVE ABANDONED; AND THE FAA NEEDS TO STEP UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR OVERSIGHT. BOTH ENTITIES BEAR RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS. BOTH THE FAA AND ACR CAN AND SHOULD DO BETTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.