Narrative:

Poor maintenance action (lack of action) on air carrier X's part caused an aborted takeoff. Late transportation from hotel caused a late arrival to ZZZ. We decided to look at the flight papers in the remote flight planning room closer to our gate. Papers showed maintenance had a gripe the day before with the right generator CSD temperature gauge. Actual wording: rt gen drive rise temperature is off scale T O hide side. In temperature normal at 80. No fault lights showing. Deffered per mx control. Swapped temperature ind's. Ran engines; problem stays with rt engine. Check'd oil service per MM-24-11-00-101 check's ok. Need more time troubleshooting. MEL operations placard. Defect: rise function of #2 gen drive oil temperature indicator inoperative. Flight crew: a) associated 'low oil pressure' light and 'high oil temperature' light must operate normally. The plane over-nighted in ZZZ. Maintenance could not figure out why the full scale deflection on the right CSD rise temperature. Instead of researching the problem they signed it off with the statement 'need more time to troubleshooting.' as a result of not enough time to troubleshoot during a ron (routine overnight); we experienced a master caution light on the takeoff roll around 70 KTS. Takeoff aborted. The overhead light that triggered the master caution came from the right gen CSD. We cleared the runway; informed the passenger; contact maintenance; and proceeded to shut down the right engine to prevent any possible further damage. Taxi back to the gate was uneventful. We were met by 3 mechanics. The very first words out of their mouths were 'we would like to defer the right generator. Will you take the plane back out?' I used to never worry about the maintenance at air carrier X. Times have changed dramatically and so has the maintenance standards of our planes. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states this issue of having to refuse aircraft because of safety of flight issues; just to get maintenance to fix to an item; places undue pressure on flight crews. This aborted takeoff could have been avoided; not to mention the potential dangers inherent with any rejected takeoff (rejected takeoff's) procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 PILOT REPORTS OF POOR MAINT ACTION (LACK OF ACTION) BY HIS CARRIER CAUSED AN ABORTED TAKEOFF. BELIEVES MAINT CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE.

Narrative: POOR MAINT ACTION (LACK OF ACTION) ON ACR X'S PART CAUSED AN ABORTED TKOF. LATE TRANSPORTATION FROM HOTEL CAUSED A LATE ARR TO ZZZ. WE DECIDED TO LOOK AT THE FLT PAPERS IN THE REMOTE FLT PLANNING ROOM CLOSER TO OUR GATE. PAPERS SHOWED MAINT HAD A GRIPE THE DAY BEFORE WITH THE R GENERATOR CSD TEMP GAUGE. ACTUAL WORDING: RT GEN DRIVE RISE TEMP IS OFF SCALE T O HIDE SIDE. IN TEMP NORMAL AT 80. NO FAULT LIGHTS SHOWING. DEFFERED PER MX CTL. SWAPPED TEMP IND'S. RAN ENGS; PROB STAYS WITH RT ENG. CHK'D OIL SVC PER MM-24-11-00-101 CHK'S OK. NEED MORE TIME TROUBLESHOOTING. MEL OPS PLACARD. DEFECT: RISE FUNCTION OF #2 GEN DRIVE OIL TEMP INDICATOR INOPERATIVE. FLT CREW: A) ASSOCIATED 'LOW OIL PRESSURE' LIGHT AND 'HIGH OIL TEMP' LIGHT MUST OPERATE NORMALLY. THE PLANE OVER-NIGHTED IN ZZZ. MAINT COULD NOT FIGURE OUT WHY THE FULL SCALE DEFLECTION ON THE R CSD RISE TEMP. INSTEAD OF RESEARCHING THE PROB THEY SIGNED IT OFF WITH THE STATEMENT 'NEED MORE TIME TO TROUBLESHOOTING.' AS A RESULT OF NOT ENOUGH TIME TO TROUBLESHOOT DURING A RON (ROUTINE OVERNIGHT); WE EXPERIENCED A MASTER CAUTION LIGHT ON THE TKOF ROLL AROUND 70 KTS. TKOF ABORTED. THE OVERHEAD LIGHT THAT TRIGGERED THE MASTER CAUTION CAME FROM THE R GEN CSD. WE CLRED THE RWY; INFORMED THE PAX; CONTACT MAINT; AND PROCEEDED TO SHUT DOWN THE R ENG TO PREVENT ANY POSSIBLE FURTHER DAMAGE. TAXI BACK TO THE GATE WAS UNEVENTFUL. WE WERE MET BY 3 MECHS. THE VERY FIRST WORDS OUT OF THEIR MOUTHS WERE 'WE WOULD LIKE TO DEFER THE R GENERATOR. WILL YOU TAKE THE PLANE BACK OUT?' I USED TO NEVER WORRY ABOUT THE MAINT AT ACR X. TIMES HAVE CHANGED DRAMATICALLY AND SO HAS THE MAINT STANDARDS OF OUR PLANES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATES THIS ISSUE OF HAVING TO REFUSE ACFT BECAUSE OF SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUES; JUST TO GET MAINT TO FIX TO AN ITEM; PLACES UNDUE PRESSURE ON FLIGHT CREWS. THIS ABORTED TAKEOFF COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED; NOT TO MENTION THE POTENTIAL DANGERS INHERENT WITH ANY REJECTED TAKEOFF (RTO'S) PROCEDURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.