37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 769931 |
Time | |
Date | 200801 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 3000 msl bound upper : 13000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Weather Elements | Ice |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : zzz.tracon |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : initial |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
ASRS Report | 769931 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
ASRS Report | 769932 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : flap disagree other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : declared emergency other |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
On departure; called for slats retract. First officer moved handle and slats did retract; however; the handle would not lock into the up/retract detent. When holding the handle all the way to the up/retract stop; the slats appeared to be fully retracted. The handle would slide back on its own with an accompanying disagree light when not being held. We continued our climb out thinking that we may be able to correct the problem. When it looked like we would not be able to correct the problem; we advised ATC that we would like to level at 13000 ft and we may be returning. We consulted with maintenance. Their feeling was a broken spring in the handle and that we should return. We advised ATC that we would be returning. Based on the fact that the first officer and I were not 100% sure of what was causing the problem; we elected to land overweight while we felt we still had control over the flaps/slats. Initially I had declined rescue equipment. While notifying dispatch; he wanted to verify that we had declared an emergency. Things were a little busy up to this point; but my memory was jogged that an overweight landing constitutes an emergency. I declared an emergency with ATC. We consulted the QRH and volume 1 for overweight landing procedures. On downwind; we were offered a longer runway with the wind out of 160 degrees. We accepted. We had notified the flight attendants and the passenger of a normal landing. The rescue equipment was standing by. The #1 flight attendant called up and asked me to explain to the passenger about the rescue equipment. I did. We taxied to the gate. I made entries in the log for the flap/slat handle and the overweight landing. Maintenance found a linkage for the up/retract detent was stiff and required cleaning and lubrication. In summary; with doubt as to what the particular defect might be; I elected to exercise emergency authority/authorized for an overweight landing.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: MD80 FLT CREW REPORTS FLAP HANDLE FAILURE AFTER DEPARTURE; ALLOWING FLAP HANDLE TO MOVE ON ITS OWN. AFTER CONSULTING WITH MAINTENANCE FLT CREW RETURNS FOR OVERWEIGHT LANDING.
Narrative: ON DEP; CALLED FOR SLATS RETRACT. FO MOVED HANDLE AND SLATS DID RETRACT; HOWEVER; THE HANDLE WOULD NOT LOCK INTO THE UP/RETRACT DETENT. WHEN HOLDING THE HANDLE ALL THE WAY TO THE UP/RETRACT STOP; THE SLATS APPEARED TO BE FULLY RETRACTED. THE HANDLE WOULD SLIDE BACK ON ITS OWN WITH AN ACCOMPANYING DISAGREE LIGHT WHEN NOT BEING HELD. WE CONTINUED OUR CLBOUT THINKING THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO CORRECT THE PROB. WHEN IT LOOKED LIKE WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CORRECT THE PROB; WE ADVISED ATC THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO LEVEL AT 13000 FT AND WE MAY BE RETURNING. WE CONSULTED WITH MAINT. THEIR FEELING WAS A BROKEN SPRING IN THE HANDLE AND THAT WE SHOULD RETURN. WE ADVISED ATC THAT WE WOULD BE RETURNING. BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE FO AND I WERE NOT 100% SURE OF WHAT WAS CAUSING THE PROB; WE ELECTED TO LAND OVERWT WHILE WE FELT WE STILL HAD CTL OVER THE FLAPS/SLATS. INITIALLY I HAD DECLINED RESCUE EQUIP. WHILE NOTIFYING DISPATCH; HE WANTED TO VERIFY THAT WE HAD DECLARED AN EMER. THINGS WERE A LITTLE BUSY UP TO THIS POINT; BUT MY MEMORY WAS JOGGED THAT AN OVERWT LNDG CONSTITUTES AN EMER. I DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC. WE CONSULTED THE QRH AND VOLUME 1 FOR OVERWT LNDG PROCS. ON DOWNWIND; WE WERE OFFERED A LONGER RWY WITH THE WIND OUT OF 160 DEGS. WE ACCEPTED. WE HAD NOTIFIED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND THE PAX OF A NORMAL LNDG. THE RESCUE EQUIP WAS STANDING BY. THE #1 FLT ATTENDANT CALLED UP AND ASKED ME TO EXPLAIN TO THE PAX ABOUT THE RESCUE EQUIP. I DID. WE TAXIED TO THE GATE. I MADE ENTRIES IN THE LOG FOR THE FLAP/SLAT HANDLE AND THE OVERWT LNDG. MAINT FOUND A LINKAGE FOR THE UP/RETRACT DETENT WAS STIFF AND REQUIRED CLEANING AND LUBRICATION. IN SUMMARY; WITH DOUBT AS TO WHAT THE PARTICULAR DEFECT MIGHT BE; I ELECTED TO EXERCISE EMER AUTH FOR AN OVERWT LNDG.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.