Narrative:

I was the PNF captain. We had dropped of passenger in st. Maarten; netherlands antilles (princess juliana international; tncm) after a 2 segment flight from the uk. There was no available ramp space so we were deadheading to ZZZZ for the crew ron. The traffic was extremely heavy. Additionally; major air carriers were departing. There was one controller handling ground and local ATC (given all the traffic; he was doing a superb job of managing everything). By the time we taxied out we were at 13 hours plus of a maximum 14 hours plus company duty day. It had also gotten dark. Our parking stand was located adjacent to the terminal and initially we were told to taxi to runway 9 via taxiway a and hold short of taxiway B. Prior to reaching taxiway B; we had completed all taxi checks and the departure brief. We were concentrating on the taxi out. Upon reaching and holding short of taxiway B; we were cleared to continue our taxi and hold short of the runway. It was extremely dark in this area and the taxiway narrowed; hence the pilot taxiing was 'creeping' along. Our cockpit displays provide us with the capability of electronic charts with aircraft position. Even so; we were being cautious as there are inherent survey errors for third world airports. Our use of the airport diagram chart was for situational awareness only; not guidance. As we could not readily discern any distinguishable hold short lines or signs; the taxiing pilot elected to stop and hold well short of where he thought the hold short line was located. I concurred with his decision. There was a large holding/turning pad located in front of us. Due to the size of the pad and the distance we were from the end of the runway we assumed that we were not close to the hold short line. Shortly thereafter; we received an excited call from ground/local asking if we had taxied past the hold short line. Imagine our puzzlement and consternation as we had never seen a hold short line or any signs indicating such. We were instructed to enter the runway; expedite our back track and exit at taxiway B and hold on taxiway a. As we backtracked on the runway; it became apparent to us what the 'big' problem was for ATC. There was an A340 facing us as he had entered the runway at taxiway D. His size prevented him from using our taxiway; so he was back tracking for departure. With our tail to him and all the radio congestion; we had missed the fact that he would be taxiing past us on the runway for departure prior to us. The apparent issue between us was wing clearance for either his turn around or departure roll. As we waited for the A340's departure; we discussed how we missed the hold line and how we were going to find it the second time around. We were then cleared again to taxi forward and hold short of the runway. In addition to our 3 taxi lights; I was going to turn on our landing lights to help us find the line as we crept along. The taxiing pilot saw the hold short line first and called it out to me. He had almost stopped the aircraft before I saw the line. There were no signs that we could see indicating a hold short line. Further; the painted line was very weathered and worn and faded into the concrete taxiway. It was almost impossible to see from a straight position. The line was easier to see out at the edges on the taxiway (30 plus degrees either side of the nose) further taxi and departure proceeded normally. Upon review: 1) we had briefed regarding the fact of the long crew day and the need to proceed with due care and caution. The taxi was being conducted with both pilot's head out of the cockpit. 2) ATC ground/local was working to the maximum. There was no room for communication miscues or queries on anyone's part. 3) the txwys are dimly lit with what we consider substandard FAA/ICAO lighting. 4) there was no hold short signs or associated lighting. 5) the hold short line paint was in very poor condition and faded into the concrete. 6) the hold short line was not located in an area normally associated with hold short lines. We estimate that we taxied approximately 100 ft past the hold short line. 7) the airport diagram does not reflect this area as a potential 'hot spot.' the area in question on the chart is in fact covered by a wind sock icon. 8) a discussion with another crew in our department revealed that they had experienced some confusion with this area in question in the daytime. We cannot believe that we are the first crew to have taxied past this hold short line. We could tell by the controller's tone that he knew exactly where we were when we were queried on our position. 9) the hold short line in its present state provides for potential aircraft conflicts during nighttime operations. Recommendation: 1) at the very minimum; the airport operator needs to repaint the hold short line in question. 2) lighted signs indicating the presence of the hold short line need to be installed at the soonest possible time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CORPORATE FLT CREW FAILS TO SEE THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 9 AT TNCM AND TAXIES 100 FT BEYOND THE LINE BEFORE BEING QUESTIONED BY THE TOWER.

Narrative: I WAS THE PNF CAPT. WE HAD DROPPED OF PAX IN ST. MAARTEN; NETHERLANDS ANTILLES (PRINCESS JULIANA INTERNATIONAL; TNCM) AFTER A 2 SEGMENT FLT FROM THE UK. THERE WAS NO AVAILABLE RAMP SPACE SO WE WERE DEADHEADING TO ZZZZ FOR THE CREW RON. THE TFC WAS EXTREMELY HEAVY. ADDITIONALLY; MAJOR AIR CARRIERS WERE DEPARTING. THERE WAS ONE CTLR HANDLING GND AND LOCAL ATC (GIVEN ALL THE TFC; HE WAS DOING A SUPERB JOB OF MANAGING EVERYTHING). BY THE TIME WE TAXIED OUT WE WERE AT 13 HRS PLUS OF A MAX 14 HRS PLUS COMPANY DUTY DAY. IT HAD ALSO GOTTEN DARK. OUR PARKING STAND WAS LOCATED ADJACENT TO THE TERMINAL AND INITIALLY WE WERE TOLD TO TAXI TO RWY 9 VIA TXWY A AND HOLD SHORT OF TXWY B. PRIOR TO REACHING TXWY B; WE HAD COMPLETED ALL TAXI CHKS AND THE DEP BRIEF. WE WERE CONCENTRATING ON THE TAXI OUT. UPON REACHING AND HOLDING SHORT OF TXWY B; WE WERE CLRED TO CONTINUE OUR TAXI AND HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY. IT WAS EXTREMELY DARK IN THIS AREA AND THE TXWY NARROWED; HENCE THE PLT TAXIING WAS 'CREEPING' ALONG. OUR COCKPIT DISPLAYS PROVIDE US WITH THE CAPABILITY OF ELECTRONIC CHARTS WITH ACFT POSITION. EVEN SO; WE WERE BEING CAUTIOUS AS THERE ARE INHERENT SURVEY ERRORS FOR THIRD WORLD ARPTS. OUR USE OF THE ARPT DIAGRAM CHART WAS FOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ONLY; NOT GUIDANCE. AS WE COULD NOT READILY DISCERN ANY DISTINGUISHABLE HOLD SHORT LINES OR SIGNS; THE TAXIING PLT ELECTED TO STOP AND HOLD WELL SHORT OF WHERE HE THOUGHT THE HOLD SHORT LINE WAS LOCATED. I CONCURRED WITH HIS DECISION. THERE WAS A LARGE HOLDING/TURNING PAD LOCATED IN FRONT OF US. DUE TO THE SIZE OF THE PAD AND THE DISTANCE WE WERE FROM THE END OF THE RWY WE ASSUMED THAT WE WERE NOT CLOSE TO THE HOLD SHORT LINE. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; WE RECEIVED AN EXCITED CALL FROM GND/LOCAL ASKING IF WE HAD TAXIED PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE. IMAGINE OUR PUZZLEMENT AND CONSTERNATION AS WE HAD NEVER SEEN A HOLD SHORT LINE OR ANY SIGNS INDICATING SUCH. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO ENTER THE RWY; EXPEDITE OUR BACK TRACK AND EXIT AT TXWY B AND HOLD ON TXWY A. AS WE BACKTRACKED ON THE RWY; IT BECAME APPARENT TO US WHAT THE 'BIG' PROB WAS FOR ATC. THERE WAS AN A340 FACING US AS HE HAD ENTERED THE RWY AT TXWY D. HIS SIZE PREVENTED HIM FROM USING OUR TXWY; SO HE WAS BACK TRACKING FOR DEP. WITH OUR TAIL TO HIM AND ALL THE RADIO CONGESTION; WE HAD MISSED THE FACT THAT HE WOULD BE TAXIING PAST US ON THE RWY FOR DEP PRIOR TO US. THE APPARENT ISSUE BETWEEN US WAS WING CLRNC FOR EITHER HIS TURN AROUND OR DEP ROLL. AS WE WAITED FOR THE A340'S DEP; WE DISCUSSED HOW WE MISSED THE HOLD LINE AND HOW WE WERE GOING TO FIND IT THE SECOND TIME AROUND. WE WERE THEN CLRED AGAIN TO TAXI FORWARD AND HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY. IN ADDITION TO OUR 3 TAXI LIGHTS; I WAS GOING TO TURN ON OUR LNDG LIGHTS TO HELP US FIND THE LINE AS WE CREPT ALONG. THE TAXIING PLT SAW THE HOLD SHORT LINE FIRST AND CALLED IT OUT TO ME. HE HAD ALMOST STOPPED THE ACFT BEFORE I SAW THE LINE. THERE WERE NO SIGNS THAT WE COULD SEE INDICATING A HOLD SHORT LINE. FURTHER; THE PAINTED LINE WAS VERY WEATHERED AND WORN AND FADED INTO THE CONCRETE TXWY. IT WAS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE FROM A STRAIGHT POSITION. THE LINE WAS EASIER TO SEE OUT AT THE EDGES ON THE TXWY (30 PLUS DEGS EITHER SIDE OF THE NOSE) FURTHER TAXI AND DEP PROCEEDED NORMALLY. UPON REVIEW: 1) WE HAD BRIEFED REGARDING THE FACT OF THE LONG CREW DAY AND THE NEED TO PROCEED WITH DUE CARE AND CAUTION. THE TAXI WAS BEING CONDUCTED WITH BOTH PLT'S HEAD OUT OF THE COCKPIT. 2) ATC GND/LOCAL WAS WORKING TO THE MAX. THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR COMMUNICATION MISCUES OR QUERIES ON ANYONE'S PART. 3) THE TXWYS ARE DIMLY LIT WITH WHAT WE CONSIDER SUBSTANDARD FAA/ICAO LIGHTING. 4) THERE WAS NO HOLD SHORT SIGNS OR ASSOCIATED LIGHTING. 5) THE HOLD SHORT LINE PAINT WAS IN VERY POOR CONDITION AND FADED INTO THE CONCRETE. 6) THE HOLD SHORT LINE WAS NOT LOCATED IN AN AREA NORMALLY ASSOCIATED WITH HOLD SHORT LINES. WE ESTIMATE THAT WE TAXIED APPROX 100 FT PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE. 7) THE ARPT DIAGRAM DOES NOT REFLECT THIS AREA AS A POTENTIAL 'HOT SPOT.' THE AREA IN QUESTION ON THE CHART IS IN FACT COVERED BY A WIND SOCK ICON. 8) A DISCUSSION WITH ANOTHER CREW IN OUR DEPARTMENT REVEALED THAT THEY HAD EXPERIENCED SOME CONFUSION WITH THIS AREA IN QUESTION IN THE DAYTIME. WE CANNOT BELIEVE THAT WE ARE THE FIRST CREW TO HAVE TAXIED PAST THIS HOLD SHORT LINE. WE COULD TELL BY THE CTLR'S TONE THAT HE KNEW EXACTLY WHERE WE WERE WHEN WE WERE QUERIED ON OUR POSITION. 9) THE HOLD SHORT LINE IN ITS PRESENT STATE PROVIDES FOR POTENTIAL ACFT CONFLICTS DURING NIGHTTIME OPS. RECOMMENDATION: 1) AT THE VERY MINIMUM; THE ARPT OPERATOR NEEDS TO REPAINT THE HOLD SHORT LINE IN QUESTION. 2) LIGHTED SIGNS INDICATING THE PRESENCE OF THE HOLD SHORT LINE NEED TO BE INSTALLED AT THE SOONEST POSSIBLE TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.