Narrative:

First officer flying. On rotation and liftoff with a positive rate first officer called for gear up. As I reached for the gear lever my pfd; nd and upper ECAM went blank. Brought gear handle up; but could tell gear did not come up. No audio warnings going off due to inhibits. Stated that I had an electrical failure to first officer and for him to keep flying. I looked to his pfd and nd and his was still working. Also noticed that he had the message 'use manual pitch trim' on his pfd. Said to him that he was in direct law and would have to trim manually. We decided to continue on the heading assigned by tower on takeoff and climb to our first cleared altitude while cleaning up the aircraft. As we leveled at 2500 ft MSL I said to first officer that he would need to use manual throttles; which he did. We leveled at 2500 ft MSL. As we were cleaning up I was watching the ECAM's on the lower ECAM. They were dancing. One would come up then move or go away and another one appear. As we leveled off; one ECAM procedure stayed on top so I did it. It did not seem relevant to our problem; but it was on top so I did it. It was a fadec ECAM which had me put the fadec's in the N1 mode. As I did this I noticed that there were no lights on the buttons to confirm I had done the push. I started the next ECAM but they started jumping around again. All that I watched did not seem to be looking at our problem. One said transponder to position 1 which it was; but the transponder was blank. First flight attendant tried to call twice during this time; but we could not communicate with him. Tried to talk with ATC also on all radios but they were blank. I went through the system pages to see what we had. This was difficult due to having to push the all button. Saw that we had AC bus 2 dc bus 2 and I think dc batt and dc ecc. Hydraulic had green and yellow but no pressures. This electrical problem did not seem right to me. The protections of the aircraft should have been different. Another ECAM that I partly did had me turning off #1 and 3 (2?) adr's. As I started to do this I looked back but the ECAM was gone. I turned off 1 and I think 2 by mistake and later saw that the first officer did not have a speed tape. Another ECAM was landing gear not up; recycle gear lever. I did this but gear did not come up. All this time both the overhead panel and the center console are blank. No fault lights or anything. Later on looked at all the electrical irregularities in the book and none matched the problem we had. We started talking about what we should do. We were both concerned about being around this busy area and not talking to anybody. We decided to turn around and enter a right downwind for ZZZ. With no communication. With the flight attendants we decided to open the cockpit door to let the flight attendant know what was going on. I was concerned due to the fact we had 2 federal air marshals onboard. I quickly opened the door and told the a that we had electrical problems and were going to land; and shut the door. As we were abeam the runways we started to slow down and started the flaps out. We were not sure if they would work; but I watched the slats come out. I thought we should start down so that ATC would maybe see we were coming back and not heading toward ZZZ1. I took the aircraft and started down. We talked of landing on xxr or left; I wanted to go to xxr because that is what they were using for landing. We used the manual gear extension because we wanted to make sure the gear was down. Looked at triple gauge and accul pressure was a zero. Did not know if we had normal brakes; but knew we had green and yellow pres. We decided to land flaps 3 just in case we had to go around. On downwind I notice we had a red flag on sai and it was starting to tumble and not reliable. Used stby airspeed and altimeter to fly. Hard to see them clearly (seemed small at the time). Chose 160 knots for a speed but should have had first officer look up a vls for us in retrospect. As we turned final I could see the fire trucks and was confident ATC had cleared the airspace for us. Normal landing and rollout. Turned off the runway on a high speed turnoff using differential braking. (Worked good.) as we were slowing first officer thought passenger might evacuate upon stopping so he got up and opened the door and commanded to remain seated. We stopped the aircraft but could not communicate with the fire trucks. Opened window and let them know we couldn't. As I looked at the overhead panel I now saw a fault light on the ess transfer switch. I thought why not try it; we were on the ground. I did and AC 2 picked up the ess busses. Lights came on and we could now communicate with ground and the flight attendants and PA. Towed in without a problem.supplemental information from acn 771504: began the takeoff roll normally. The WX was clear skies; unlimited visibility. Winds were strong and gusty from about 260 degrees. Two federal air marshalls were onboard. We weighed about 148000 pounds. Our clearance was to turn right to 239 degrees and climb to 2500 ft MSL. At vr; I; the first officer; rotated at the normal rate to the normal pitch attitude. When the captain raised the landing gear; he replied that he had lost his displays and that I should continue the takeoff. I returned my scan to my instruments in time to see my flight director disappear. ECAM cautions and warnings began to immediately sound. The captain instructed me to continue to fly while he ran the ecams. My pfd (primary flight display) soon displayed; 'set green DOT speed' and the airspeed and altitude tapes turned red. I turned my scan to the standby attitude indicator to effect the leveloff. I called for the flaps to be raised from position 2 to 1; then up. I leveled the aircraft at 2500 ft and 220 KIAS in the clean configuration. My pfd now read; 'use man pitch trim' and the attitude indication appeared correct although the altitude and airspeed were still inoperative and red. As I continued to fly straight ahead; I had little idea what was wrong with the aircraft. I attempted to observe the captain run various ecams with some success. I noticed that both radios were blank and dead. The transponder was blank and dead. I glanced at the overhead panel. I remember no warning/fault/caution lights on anywhere. The captain's pfd and nd were off; as well as the upper ECAM screen. I saw one of the first ECAM's indicating the gear were not up and locked and to 'cycle the gear.' soon thereafter; the captain was running an engine EPR/north ECAM and deselecting the EPR button(south) on the overhead panel. The lower ECAM screen flashed past the engine page and I remember the left engine parameters were all amber X's. I couldn't understand that as both engines seemed responsive. We could hear a loud; roaring noise which was most probably the landing gear; still down. The captain told me of his confusion with what was happening to the airplane. Neither of us really understood what had happened. The only operative instruments were the lower ECAM screen and the attitude function of my pfd. At about this time; perhaps 3 minutes after rotation; the standby attitude gyro rolled about 45 degrees; pitched up about 20 degrees; froze there and died with an orange flag. Nice. As the captain pushed ECAM buttons; the lower screen would change to that system's page which made maintaining situational awareness to aircraft status difficult (normal ECAM procedures use 2 ECAM screens; one to display the problem and the other to display the associated systems page). I recall no warning or caution lights were on anywhere. The whole cockpit except the lower ECAM screen and my attitude of the pfd seemed completely dead. I do remember the 'electrical' page flashing by noting both batteries were connected in green; the entire left side of the electric schematic was amber and only TR2 and AC bus 2 were green and operating. The flight attendant call button rang but neither of us had time to get up and open the door. The interphone was dead. We quickly decided to land as soon as possible. I began a shallow turn to the right to enter a downwind for xxl or xxr at ZZZ. Rolling out and headed northeast; I could plainly see downtown. I made a comment to the captain about staying clear of themetropolitan area not wanting to get shot down by military fighters. I wasn't joking at all. Operating this NORDO aircraft with no squawk at low altitude made me quite uncomfortable. The gear handle had been raised but we could hear the wind noise from extended landing gear. I was unsure of the gear position so I asked the captain to pull the manual gear extension. He then lowered the gear handle and activated the manual gear extension. I slowed to about 210 KIAS and extended the flaps to position 1. We both visually confirmed that the slats had extended. The flight attendant called again. Soon; the captain got up and opened the cockpit door. I wondered what the air marshalls would do. He had a very brief discussion with the flight attendant and returned to his seat. We were on downwind to runway xxr about 3 miles abeam the control tower. Satisfied that we had stabilized the aircraft and could safely land; we briefed a flaps 3 visual approach. We both felt an extreme urgency to get this aircraft on the ground as soon as possible. He took over as the PF as I ran the approach descent and landing checklists. I then assisted in airspeed control; flap extension and bank control to line us up for about a 4 mile straight-in approach. The captain flew a 170 knot; flaps 3 approach. Touchdown occurred in the normal zone and manual brakes were applied. Braking was available although the brake pressure gauge read zero and the accumulator also read zero. At about 60 KIAS I told the captain that I better tell the people to remain seated to prevent an unnecessary evacuation. He agreed. I jumped out of my seat; opened the cockpit door and yelled to the cabin to 'remain seated.' we rolled nearly to the end; exited the runway and waited for the emergency vehicles as all cockpit gauges were still completely dead; we didn't know if the aircraft was still pressurized. We cracked our cockpit windows with little effort and confirmed the cabin was unpressurized. I yelled from my cockpit window to the aircraft rescue and fire fighting personnel that we needed a tow tug to take us to the gate. While waiting for the tug; the captain reached up and selected the 'AC essential' bus button; which read; 'fault.' upon selecting that; 'altn' illuminated under the light and full electrical power was restored to the aircraft. The aircraft still 'believed' it was airborne; however. It was waiting for me to complete the landing checklist on the lower ECAM screen. I don't recall any ECAM instructing the captain to select the 'essential AC bus' button in flight. Several visual scans of the overhead panel in-flight; by me; indicated the entire panel was dark. I ran the tow in checklist and we were towed uneventfully to the gate. Given the massive extent of the electrical failure and the associated loss of almost all cockpit indications and gauges; and the fact that I was hand flying on standby instruments; it was very difficult for me to understand and diagnose what was happening to the aircraft. I don't believe the A320 electrical backup and automatic-switching systems were working properly. If ZZZ had low ceilings and visibility that day and if my attitude indication on my pfd had not returned; the aircraft may have been lost; as the standby attitude gyro failed.callback conversation with reporter acn 771490 revealed the following information: the reporter stated that he had no additional information about this event although his air carrier had just issued a notice for airbus pilots about operating the aircraft with the loss of electrical power following this event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320'S ENTIRE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM FAILED AFTER TKOF POSSIBLY BECAUSE OF AN ESSENTIAL BUS FAULT. THE CREW RETURNED TO LAND NORDO IN AN EMER CONDITION.

Narrative: FO FLYING. ON ROTATION AND LIFTOFF WITH A POSITIVE RATE FO CALLED FOR GEAR UP. AS I REACHED FOR THE GEAR LEVER MY PFD; ND AND UPPER ECAM WENT BLANK. BROUGHT GEAR HANDLE UP; BUT COULD TELL GEAR DID NOT COME UP. NO AUDIO WARNINGS GOING OFF DUE TO INHIBITS. STATED THAT I HAD AN ELECTRICAL FAILURE TO FO AND FOR HIM TO KEEP FLYING. I LOOKED TO HIS PFD AND ND AND HIS WAS STILL WORKING. ALSO NOTICED THAT HE HAD THE MESSAGE 'USE MANUAL PITCH TRIM' ON HIS PFD. SAID TO HIM THAT HE WAS IN DIRECT LAW AND WOULD HAVE TO TRIM MANUALLY. WE DECIDED TO CONTINUE ON THE HEADING ASSIGNED BY TWR ON TKOF AND CLIMB TO OUR FIRST CLRED ALTITUDE WHILE CLEANING UP THE ACFT. AS WE LEVELED AT 2500 FT MSL I SAID TO FO THAT HE WOULD NEED TO USE MANUAL THROTTLES; WHICH HE DID. WE LEVELED AT 2500 FT MSL. AS WE WERE CLEANING UP I WAS WATCHING THE ECAM'S ON THE LOWER ECAM. THEY WERE DANCING. ONE WOULD COME UP THEN MOVE OR GO AWAY AND ANOTHER ONE APPEAR. AS WE LEVELED OFF; ONE ECAM PROC STAYED ON TOP SO I DID IT. IT DID NOT SEEM RELEVANT TO OUR PROBLEM; BUT IT WAS ON TOP SO I DID IT. IT WAS A FADEC ECAM WHICH HAD ME PUT THE FADEC'S IN THE N1 MODE. AS I DID THIS I NOTICED THAT THERE WERE NO LIGHTS ON THE BUTTONS TO CONFIRM I HAD DONE THE PUSH. I STARTED THE NEXT ECAM BUT THEY STARTED JUMPING AROUND AGAIN. ALL THAT I WATCHED DID NOT SEEM TO BE LOOKING AT OUR PROBLEM. ONE SAID XPONDER TO POSITION 1 WHICH IT WAS; BUT THE XPONDER WAS BLANK. FIRST FLT ATTENDANT TRIED TO CALL TWICE DURING THIS TIME; BUT WE COULD NOT COMMUNICATE WITH HIM. TRIED TO TALK WITH ATC ALSO ON ALL RADIOS BUT THEY WERE BLANK. I WENT THROUGH THE SYSTEM PAGES TO SEE WHAT WE HAD. THIS WAS DIFFICULT DUE TO HAVING TO PUSH THE ALL BUTTON. SAW THAT WE HAD AC BUS 2 DC BUS 2 AND I THINK DC BATT AND DC ECC. HYD HAD GREEN AND YELLOW BUT NO PRESSURES. THIS ELECTRICAL PROBLEM DID NOT SEEM RIGHT TO ME. THE PROTECTIONS OF THE ACFT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT. ANOTHER ECAM THAT I PARTLY DID HAD ME TURNING OFF #1 AND 3 (2?) ADR'S. AS I STARTED TO DO THIS I LOOKED BACK BUT THE ECAM WAS GONE. I TURNED OFF 1 AND I THINK 2 BY MISTAKE AND LATER SAW THAT THE FO DID NOT HAVE A SPEED TAPE. ANOTHER ECAM WAS LNDG GEAR NOT UP; RECYCLE GEAR LEVER. I DID THIS BUT GEAR DID NOT COME UP. ALL THIS TIME BOTH THE OVERHEAD PANEL AND THE CENTER CONSOLE ARE BLANK. NO FAULT LIGHTS OR ANYTHING. LATER ON LOOKED AT ALL THE ELECTRICAL IRREGULARITIES IN THE BOOK AND NONE MATCHED THE PROBLEM WE HAD. WE STARTED TALKING ABOUT WHAT WE SHOULD DO. WE WERE BOTH CONCERNED ABOUT BEING AROUND THIS BUSY AREA AND NOT TALKING TO ANYBODY. WE DECIDED TO TURN AROUND AND ENTER A R DOWNWIND FOR ZZZ. WITH NO COM. WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS WE DECIDED TO OPEN THE COCKPIT DOOR TO LET THE FLT ATTENDANT KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON. I WAS CONCERNED DUE TO THE FACT WE HAD 2 FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS ONBOARD. I QUICKLY OPENED THE DOOR AND TOLD THE A THAT WE HAD ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS AND WERE GOING TO LAND; AND SHUT THE DOOR. AS WE WERE ABEAM THE RWYS WE STARTED TO SLOW DOWN AND STARTED THE FLAPS OUT. WE WERE NOT SURE IF THEY WOULD WORK; BUT I WATCHED THE SLATS COME OUT. I THOUGHT WE SHOULD START DOWN SO THAT ATC WOULD MAYBE SEE WE WERE COMING BACK AND NOT HEADING TOWARD ZZZ1. I TOOK THE ACFT AND STARTED DOWN. WE TALKED OF LNDG ON XXR OR L; I WANTED TO GO TO XXR BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT THEY WERE USING FOR LNDG. WE USED THE MANUAL GEAR EXTENSION BECAUSE WE WANTED TO MAKE SURE THE GEAR WAS DOWN. LOOKED AT TRIPLE GAUGE AND ACCUL PRESSURE WAS A ZERO. DID NOT KNOW IF WE HAD NORMAL BRAKES; BUT KNEW WE HAD GREEN AND YELLOW PRES. WE DECIDED TO LAND FLAPS 3 JUST IN CASE WE HAD TO GO AROUND. ON DOWNWIND I NOTICE WE HAD A RED FLAG ON SAI AND IT WAS STARTING TO TUMBLE AND NOT RELIABLE. USED STBY AIRSPEED AND ALTIMETER TO FLY. HARD TO SEE THEM CLRLY (SEEMED SMALL AT THE TIME). CHOSE 160 KNOTS FOR A SPEED BUT SHOULD HAVE HAD FO LOOK UP A VLS FOR US IN RETROSPECT. AS WE TURNED FINAL I COULD SEE THE FIRE TRUCKS AND WAS CONFIDENT ATC HAD CLRED THE AIRSPACE FOR US. NORMAL LNDG AND ROLLOUT. TURNED OFF THE RWY ON A HIGH SPEED TURNOFF USING DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING. (WORKED GOOD.) AS WE WERE SLOWING FO THOUGHT PAX MIGHT EVACUATE UPON STOPPING SO HE GOT UP AND OPENED THE DOOR AND COMMANDED TO REMAIN SEATED. WE STOPPED THE ACFT BUT COULD NOT COMMUNICATE WITH THE FIRE TRUCKS. OPENED WINDOW AND LET THEM KNOW WE COULDN'T. AS I LOOKED AT THE OVERHEAD PANEL I NOW SAW A FAULT LIGHT ON THE ESS TRANSFER SWITCH. I THOUGHT WHY NOT TRY IT; WE WERE ON THE GND. I DID AND AC 2 PICKED UP THE ESS BUSSES. LIGHTS CAME ON AND WE COULD NOW COMMUNICATE WITH GND AND THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND PA. TOWED IN WITHOUT A PROBLEM.SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 771504: BEGAN THE TAKEOFF ROLL NORMALLY. THE WX WAS CLR SKIES; UNLIMITED VISIBILITY. WINDS WERE STRONG AND GUSTY FROM ABOUT 260 DEGS. TWO FEDERAL AIR MARSHALLS WERE ONBOARD. WE WEIGHED ABOUT 148000 LBS. OUR CLRNC WAS TO TURN R TO 239 DEGS AND CLB TO 2500 FT MSL. AT VR; I; THE FO; ROTATED AT THE NORMAL RATE TO THE NORMAL PITCH ATTITUDE. WHEN THE CAPT RAISED THE LNDG GEAR; HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD LOST HIS DISPLAYS AND THAT I SHOULD CONTINUE THE TAKEOFF. I RETURNED MY SCAN TO MY INSTRUMENTS IN TIME TO SEE MY FLT DIRECTOR DISAPPEAR. ECAM CAUTIONS AND WARNINGS BEGAN TO IMMEDIATELY SOUND. THE CAPT INSTRUCTED ME TO CONTINUE TO FLY WHILE HE RAN THE ECAMS. MY PFD (PRIMARY FLIGHT DISPLAY) SOON DISPLAYED; 'SET GREEN DOT SPEED' AND THE AIRSPEED AND ALTITUDE TAPES TURNED RED. I TURNED MY SCAN TO THE STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR TO EFFECT THE LEVELOFF. I CALLED FOR THE FLAPS TO BE RAISED FROM POSITION 2 TO 1; THEN UP. I LEVELED THE ACFT AT 2500 FT AND 220 KIAS IN THE CLEAN CONFIGURATION. MY PFD NOW READ; 'USE MAN PITCH TRIM' AND THE ATTITUDE INDICATION APPEARED CORRECT ALTHOUGH THE ALTITUDE AND AIRSPEED WERE STILL INOPERATIVE AND RED. AS I CONTINUED TO FLY STRAIGHT AHEAD; I HAD LITTLE IDEA WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE ACFT. I ATTEMPTED TO OBSERVE THE CAPT RUN VARIOUS ECAMS WITH SOME SUCCESS. I NOTICED THAT BOTH RADIOS WERE BLANK AND DEAD. THE TRANSPONDER WAS BLANK AND DEAD. I GLANCED AT THE OVERHEAD PANEL. I REMEMBER NO WARNING/FAULT/CAUTION LIGHTS ON ANYWHERE. THE CAPT'S PFD AND ND WERE OFF; AS WELL AS THE UPPER ECAM SCREEN. I SAW ONE OF THE FIRST ECAM'S INDICATING THE GEAR WERE NOT UP AND LOCKED AND TO 'CYCLE THE GEAR.' SOON THEREAFTER; THE CAPT WAS RUNNING AN ENGINE EPR/N ECAM AND DESELECTING THE EPR BUTTON(S) ON THE OVERHEAD PANEL. THE LOWER ECAM SCREEN FLASHED PAST THE ENGINE PAGE AND I REMEMBER THE LEFT ENGINE PARAMETERS WERE ALL AMBER X'S. I COULDN'T UNDERSTAND THAT AS BOTH ENGINES SEEMED RESPONSIVE. WE COULD HEAR A LOUD; ROARING NOISE WHICH WAS MOST PROBABLY THE LNDG GEAR; STILL DOWN. THE CAPT TOLD ME OF HIS CONFUSION WITH WHAT WAS HAPPENING TO THE AIRPLANE. NEITHER OF US REALLY UNDERSTOOD WHAT HAD HAPPENED. THE ONLY OPERATIVE INSTRUMENTS WERE THE LOWER ECAM SCREEN AND THE ATTITUDE FUNCTION OF MY PFD. AT ABOUT THIS TIME; PERHAPS 3 MINUTES AFTER ROTATION; THE STANDBY ATTITUDE GYRO ROLLED ABOUT 45 DEGS; PITCHED UP ABOUT 20 DEGS; FROZE THERE AND DIED WITH AN ORANGE FLAG. NICE. AS THE CAPT PUSHED ECAM BUTTONS; THE LOWER SCREEN WOULD CHANGE TO THAT SYSTEM'S PAGE WHICH MADE MAINTAINING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS TO ACFT STATUS DIFFICULT (NORMAL ECAM PROCS USE 2 ECAM SCREENS; ONE TO DISPLAY THE PROBLEM AND THE OTHER TO DISPLAY THE ASSOCIATED SYSTEMS PAGE). I RECALL NO WARNING OR CAUTION LIGHTS WERE ON ANYWHERE. THE WHOLE COCKPIT EXCEPT THE LOWER ECAM SCREEN AND MY ATTITUDE OF THE PFD SEEMED COMPLETELY DEAD. I DO REMEMBER THE 'ELECTRICAL' PAGE FLASHING BY NOTING BOTH BATTERIES WERE CONNECTED IN GREEN; THE ENTIRE L SIDE OF THE ELECTRIC SCHEMATIC WAS AMBER AND ONLY TR2 AND AC BUS 2 WERE GREEN AND OPERATING. THE FLT ATTENDANT CALL BUTTON RANG BUT NEITHER OF US HAD TIME TO GET UP AND OPEN THE DOOR. THE INTERPHONE WAS DEAD. WE QUICKLY DECIDED TO LAND ASAP. I BEGAN A SHALLOW TURN TO THE R TO ENTER A DOWNWIND FOR XXL OR XXR AT ZZZ. ROLLING OUT AND HEADED NE; I COULD PLAINLY SEE DOWNTOWN. I MADE A COMMENT TO THE CAPT ABOUT STAYING CLEAR OF THEMETROPOLITAN AREA NOT WANTING TO GET SHOT DOWN BY MIL FIGHTERS. I WASN'T JOKING AT ALL. OPERATING THIS NORDO ACFT WITH NO SQUAWK AT LOW ALTITUDE MADE ME QUITE UNCOMFORTABLE. THE GEAR HANDLE HAD BEEN RAISED BUT WE COULD HEAR THE WIND NOISE FROM EXTENDED LNDG GEAR. I WAS UNSURE OF THE GEAR POSITION SO I ASKED THE CAPT TO PULL THE MANUAL GEAR EXTENSION. HE THEN LOWERED THE GEAR HANDLE AND ACTIVATED THE MANUAL GEAR EXTENSION. I SLOWED TO ABOUT 210 KIAS AND EXTENDED THE FLAPS TO POSITION 1. WE BOTH VISUALLY CONFIRMED THAT THE SLATS HAD EXTENDED. THE FLT ATTENDANT CALLED AGAIN. SOON; THE CAPT GOT UP AND OPENED THE COCKPIT DOOR. I WONDERED WHAT THE AIR MARSHALLS WOULD DO. HE HAD A VERY BRIEF DISCUSSION WITH THE FLIGHT ATTENDANT AND RETURNED TO HIS SEAT. WE WERE ON DOWNWIND TO RWY XXR ABOUT 3 MILES ABEAM THE CTL TOWER. SATISFIED THAT WE HAD STABILIZED THE ACFT AND COULD SAFELY LAND; WE BRIEFED A FLAPS 3 VISUAL APCH. WE BOTH FELT AN EXTREME URGENCY TO GET THIS ACFT ON THE GND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE TOOK OVER AS THE PF AS I RAN THE APCH DSCNT AND LNDG CHKLISTS. I THEN ASSISTED IN AIRSPEED CTL; FLAP EXTENSION AND BANK CTL TO LINE US UP FOR ABOUT A 4 MILE STRAIGHT-IN APCH. THE CAPT FLEW A 170 KNOT; FLAPS 3 APCH. TOUCHDOWN OCCURRED IN THE NORMAL ZONE AND MANUAL BRAKES WERE APPLIED. BRAKING WAS AVAILABLE ALTHOUGH THE BRAKE PRESSURE GAUGE READ ZERO AND THE ACCUMULATOR ALSO READ ZERO. AT ABOUT 60 KIAS I TOLD THE CAPT THAT I BETTER TELL THE PEOPLE TO REMAIN SEATED TO PREVENT AN UNNECESSARY EVACUATION. HE AGREED. I JUMPED OUT OF MY SEAT; OPENED THE COCKPIT DOOR AND YELLED TO THE CABIN TO 'REMAIN SEATED.' WE ROLLED NEARLY TO THE END; EXITED THE RWY AND WAITED FOR THE EMER VEHICLES AS ALL COCKPIT GAUGES WERE STILL COMPLETELY DEAD; WE DIDN'T KNOW IF THE ACFT WAS STILL PRESSURIZED. WE CRACKED OUR COCKPIT WINDOWS WITH LITTLE EFFORT AND CONFIRMED THE CABIN WAS UNPRESSURIZED. I YELLED FROM MY COCKPIT WINDOW TO THE ACFT RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING PERSONNEL THAT WE NEEDED A TOW TUG TO TAKE US TO THE GATE. WHILE WAITING FOR THE TUG; THE CAPT REACHED UP AND SELECTED THE 'AC ESSENTIAL' BUS BUTTON; WHICH READ; 'FAULT.' UPON SELECTING THAT; 'ALTN' ILLUMINATED UNDER THE LIGHT AND FULL ELECTRICAL POWER WAS RESTORED TO THE ACFT. THE ACFT STILL 'BELIEVED' IT WAS AIRBORNE; HOWEVER. IT WAS WAITING FOR ME TO COMPLETE THE LNDG CHKLIST ON THE LOWER ECAM SCREEN. I DON'T RECALL ANY ECAM INSTRUCTING THE CAPT TO SELECT THE 'ESSENTIAL AC BUS' BUTTON IN FLT. SEVERAL VISUAL SCANS OF THE OVERHEAD PANEL INFLT; BY ME; INDICATED THE ENTIRE PANEL WAS DARK. I RAN THE TOW IN CHKLIST AND WE WERE TOWED UNEVENTFULLY TO THE GATE. GIVEN THE MASSIVE EXTENT OF THE ELECTRICAL FAILURE AND THE ASSOCIATED LOSS OF ALMOST ALL COCKPIT INDICATIONS AND GAUGES; AND THE FACT THAT I WAS HAND FLYING ON STANDBY INSTRUMENTS; IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO UNDERSTAND AND DIAGNOSE WHAT WAS HAPPENING TO THE ACFT. I DON'T BELIEVE THE A320 ELECTRICAL BACKUP AND AUTO-SWITCHING SYSTEMS WERE WORKING PROPERLY. IF ZZZ HAD LOW CEILINGS AND VISIBILITY THAT DAY AND IF MY ATTITUDE INDICATION ON MY PFD HAD NOT RETURNED; THE ACFT MAY HAVE BEEN LOST; AS THE STANDBY ATTITUDE GYRO FAILED.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 771490 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT HE HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFO ABOUT THIS EVENT ALTHOUGH HIS ACR HAD JUST ISSUED A NOTICE FOR AIRBUS PLTS ABOUT OPERATING THE ACFT WITH THE LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER FOLLOWING THIS EVENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.