Narrative:

I was dispatching flight X to ZZZ1. At the time of filing to ZZZ1; the taf was reporting for the time of arrival into ZZZ1 a ceiling of 10000 feet broken and 6 statute miles visibility. The closest weather event to the estimated time of arrival (xd:30) was a tempo from XA00 to XC00 indicating a low ceiling in the area. With this information from the taf and watching the weather trends on radar and other weather charts; it was not necessary to plan the flight with an alternate airport or any more fuel than what was added for the flight. They were planned to arrive into ZZZ1 with 6200 pounds plus of fuel (about an hour's worth of fuel). As the aircraft was arriving; a new taf and an ATIS came out indicating 1/8 SM and freezing fog. We had three aircraft arriving into ZZZ1 in the same time-frame. Flight X called into dispatch and advised they were just east of ZZZ and due to headwinds; were down to 5400 pounds of fuel (nearing their 45 minute reserve). Upon talking with the captain; we did not want to take the risk of going to any of the other airports in the region listed in our operations specifications because we were going to use some of our 45 minute reserve; if not run out of fuel. Another option was to declare an emergency and fly an unauthorized CAT ii approach into ZZZ2 (unfortunately; the weather report there was 1/4 SM and 100 vv; which is below minimums for a CAT ii approach). The third option was to divert to ZZZ. I agreed with the captain for this airport because the weather was VFR; it has a long adequate runway (we also called and received permission to land at 118000 pounds from the airport operations). I also knew that they had airline services; which gave us a tsa option if we needed to deplane the passengers. I called the airport and made sure they also had enough fuel and air stairs to service our aircraft; which they confirmed. In my mind; and in the interest of the passenger safety; this was where we needed to go. After refueling; it took us a while to get the takeoff performance numbers. Upon receiving the numbers; I was advised by my vp of operations to give the crew the numbers and shortly thereafter; we departed. In regards to whether we should declare or not declare an emergency; the captain felt that we were not going to land below 4000 pounds of fuel (emergency fuel as stated in the flight operations manual) and I also agree that the flight was completed safely in an urgent; but not critical (emergency) state. Our decisions as a dispatch/flight crew were based on the presumption that to continue to any other airport besides ZZZ; we would have created an emergency situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR DISPATCHER REPORTS FLIGHT DIVERTING TO ARPT NOT IN ACR OPS SPEC AFTER DESTINATION WX GOES FROM VMC FORECAST TO BELOW IFR MINIMUMS AND FUEL BECOMES AN ISSUE.

Narrative: I WAS DISPATCHING FLIGHT X TO ZZZ1. AT THE TIME OF FILING TO ZZZ1; THE TAF WAS REPORTING FOR THE TIME OF ARRIVAL INTO ZZZ1 A CEILING OF 10000 FEET BROKEN AND 6 STATUTE MILES VISIBILITY. THE CLOSEST WEATHER EVENT TO THE ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL (XD:30) WAS A TEMPO FROM XA00 TO XC00 INDICATING A LOW CEILING IN THE AREA. WITH THIS INFORMATION FROM THE TAF AND WATCHING THE WEATHER TRENDS ON RADAR AND OTHER WEATHER CHARTS; IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO PLAN THE FLIGHT WITH AN ALTERNATE AIRPORT OR ANY MORE FUEL THAN WHAT WAS ADDED FOR THE FLIGHT. THEY WERE PLANNED TO ARRIVE INTO ZZZ1 WITH 6200 LBS PLUS OF FUEL (ABOUT AN HOUR'S WORTH OF FUEL). AS THE AIRCRAFT WAS ARRIVING; A NEW TAF AND AN ATIS CAME OUT INDICATING 1/8 SM AND FREEZING FOG. WE HAD THREE AIRCRAFT ARRIVING INTO ZZZ1 IN THE SAME TIME-FRAME. FLIGHT X CALLED INTO DISPATCH AND ADVISED THEY WERE JUST EAST OF ZZZ AND DUE TO HEADWINDS; WERE DOWN TO 5400 LBS OF FUEL (NEARING THEIR 45 MINUTE RESERVE). UPON TALKING WITH THE CAPTAIN; WE DID NOT WANT TO TAKE THE RISK OF GOING TO ANY OF THE OTHER AIRPORTS IN THE REGION LISTED IN OUR OPS SPECS BECAUSE WE WERE GOING TO USE SOME OF OUR 45 MINUTE RESERVE; IF NOT RUN OUT OF FUEL. ANOTHER OPTION WAS TO DECLARE AN EMERGENCY AND FLY AN UNAUTHORIZED CAT II APPROACH INTO ZZZ2 (UNFORTUNATELY; THE WEATHER REPORT THERE WAS 1/4 SM AND 100 VV; WHICH IS BELOW MINIMUMS FOR A CAT II APPROACH). THE THIRD OPTION WAS TO DIVERT TO ZZZ. I AGREED WITH THE CAPTAIN FOR THIS AIRPORT BECAUSE THE WEATHER WAS VFR; IT HAS A LONG ADEQUATE RUNWAY (WE ALSO CALLED AND RECEIVED PERMISSION TO LAND AT 118000 LBS FROM THE AIRPORT OPERATIONS). I ALSO KNEW THAT THEY HAD AIRLINE SERVICES; WHICH GAVE US A TSA OPTION IF WE NEEDED TO DEPLANE THE PASSENGERS. I CALLED THE AIRPORT AND MADE SURE THEY ALSO HAD ENOUGH FUEL AND AIR STAIRS TO SERVICE OUR AIRCRAFT; WHICH THEY CONFIRMED. IN MY MIND; AND IN THE INTEREST OF THE PAX SAFETY; THIS WAS WHERE WE NEEDED TO GO. AFTER REFUELING; IT TOOK US A WHILE TO GET THE TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE NUMBERS. UPON RECEIVING THE NUMBERS; I WAS ADVISED BY MY VP OF OPS TO GIVE THE CREW THE NUMBERS AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER; WE DEPARTED. IN REGARDS TO WHETHER WE SHOULD DECLARE OR NOT DECLARE AN EMERGENCY; THE CAPTAIN FELT THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO LAND BELOW 4000 LBS OF FUEL (EMERGENCY FUEL AS STATED IN THE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL) AND I ALSO AGREE THAT THE FLIGHT WAS COMPLETED SAFELY IN AN URGENT; BUT NOT CRITICAL (EMERGENCY) STATE. OUR DECISIONS AS A DISPATCH/FLIGHT CREW WERE BASED ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT TO CONTINUE TO ANY OTHER AIRPORT BESIDES ZZZ; WE WOULD HAVE CREATED AN EMERGENCY SITUATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.