Narrative:

On takeoff; we experienced an electrical anomaly. It appeared that almost every caution and warning light in the cockpit came on; as if the light test switch was on. I made the decision to abort. As I retarded the throttle; the lights went out. However; we were committed to the abort. My decision was based on 2 things: one was poor WX conditions. The other was not knowing the exact condition of the aircraft. Did we have an indication problem (which I thought was probable) or did we indeed have multiple problems? In retrospect; I believe the decision was the correct one because of a couple of potential problems I did not think of at the time. Had the problem persisted in-flight; we would have been unable to select a VOR; ILS; or VHF frequency. The other being complete failure of the aircraft visual caution and warning system. This; combined with the WX; would constitute a more severe problem and not worth the risk. The abort was conducted as per the fom and was uneventful with 1 exception. The rejected takeoff feature was abrupt and a bit of a surprise. This system works very well. I would liken it to landing with the autobrakes in the maximum setting. I do not believe there is any reason to override this system during a rejected takeoff. The system works so quickly and efficiently; that pilot intervention could lessen the safety margin. I also believe we should look at arming the speed brake for takeoff to streamline and simplify the abort process. This would also standardize abort and landing procedures which are basically the same after touchdown.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLT CREW REPORTS ANOMALOUS WARNING LIGHT ACTIVATION DURING TKOF ROLL AND REJECTED TKOF.

Narrative: ON TKOF; WE EXPERIENCED AN ELECTRICAL ANOMALY. IT APPEARED THAT ALMOST EVERY CAUTION AND WARNING LIGHT IN THE COCKPIT CAME ON; AS IF THE LIGHT TEST SWITCH WAS ON. I MADE THE DECISION TO ABORT. AS I RETARDED THE THROTTLE; THE LIGHTS WENT OUT. HOWEVER; WE WERE COMMITTED TO THE ABORT. MY DECISION WAS BASED ON 2 THINGS: ONE WAS POOR WX CONDITIONS. THE OTHER WAS NOT KNOWING THE EXACT CONDITION OF THE ACFT. DID WE HAVE AN INDICATION PROB (WHICH I THOUGHT WAS PROBABLE) OR DID WE INDEED HAVE MULTIPLE PROBS? IN RETROSPECT; I BELIEVE THE DECISION WAS THE CORRECT ONE BECAUSE OF A COUPLE OF POTENTIAL PROBS I DID NOT THINK OF AT THE TIME. HAD THE PROB PERSISTED INFLT; WE WOULD HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO SELECT A VOR; ILS; OR VHF FREQ. THE OTHER BEING COMPLETE FAILURE OF THE ACFT VISUAL CAUTION AND WARNING SYS. THIS; COMBINED WITH THE WX; WOULD CONSTITUTE A MORE SEVERE PROB AND NOT WORTH THE RISK. THE ABORT WAS CONDUCTED AS PER THE FOM AND WAS UNEVENTFUL WITH 1 EXCEPTION. THE REJECTED TKOF FEATURE WAS ABRUPT AND A BIT OF A SURPRISE. THIS SYS WORKS VERY WELL. I WOULD LIKEN IT TO LNDG WITH THE AUTOBRAKES IN THE MAX SETTING. I DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS ANY REASON TO OVERRIDE THIS SYS DURING A REJECTED TKOF. THE SYS WORKS SO QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY; THAT PLT INTERVENTION COULD LESSEN THE SAFETY MARGIN. I ALSO BELIEVE WE SHOULD LOOK AT ARMING THE SPD BRAKE FOR TKOF TO STREAMLINE AND SIMPLIFY THE ABORT PROCESS. THIS WOULD ALSO STANDARDIZE ABORT AND LNDG PROCS WHICH ARE BASICALLY THE SAME AFTER TOUCHDOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.