Narrative:

An aircraft with malfunctioning mode C was handed to dab from jax. The receiving controller initiated a manual track start by typing in aircraft identify and trackball slewing out to it. The aircraft was then electronically handed off to me. Approximately 7 mins later the aircraft overflew dab and the data tag dropped off. This left a small primary target only. I was busy with several IFR overflts; arrs; and departures. Approximately 9 mins later; the traffic rush subsided. Upon reviewing my flight progress strips; I realized that this C210 was missing. I started a wide scan and found him 15 mi outside my airspace and well into mco's. The aircraft did not conflict with any other; and appropriate IFR separation was never lost. I realize that I am responsible for the safety of all aircraft in my jurisdiction and have revised my control technique accordingly. However; there are a few disturbing contributions to this operational error. 1) the initial controller tagged the non mode C aircraft incorrectly. (I did not know.) the track should have been initiated from the tab list. He received no share of blame. Corrective action: teach controllers the correct method for tagging a primary target and the possible consequences of incorrect methods. 2) stars is not programmed for safety. Stars has the ability to categorize all tracks as departures; arrs or en route. The software is written in such a way that all manual track starts are arrs. All airports have a 'drop box' created over the airport proper. This prevents data tags from accumulating over the airport and cluttering the indicators. By itself -- a great function. The safety issue is that an en route aircraft with a manual tag is seen as an arrival. If it overflies the airport proper; the software drops the tag. Corrective action: a safe and easy fix is to reprogram stars on a national level to see all manual track starts as en route. The only drawback for controllers is a few extra keystrokes to manually drop the tag. Tags would never just drop off. I could only imagine this scenario playing out in atl or new york TRACON. I believe the FAA is willing to close this case and call it an operational error. The real problem is the software. There are so many quirks to stars that are not taught; but rather learned on the job or passed on from atcs to atcs. Let's not make this one of them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DAB CTLR DESCRIBED OPERROR WHEN DATA BLOCK DROPPED AND ACFT ENTERED MCCOY'S AIRSPACE WITHOUT COORD; CLAIMING STARS EQUIP AS CONTRIBUTORY.

Narrative: AN ACFT WITH MALFUNCTIONING MODE C WAS HANDED TO DAB FROM JAX. THE RECEIVING CTLR INITIATED A MANUAL TRACK START BY TYPING IN ACFT IDENT AND TRACKBALL SLEWING OUT TO IT. THE ACFT WAS THEN ELECTRONICALLY HANDED OFF TO ME. APPROX 7 MINS LATER THE ACFT OVERFLEW DAB AND THE DATA TAG DROPPED OFF. THIS LEFT A SMALL PRIMARY TARGET ONLY. I WAS BUSY WITH SEVERAL IFR OVERFLTS; ARRS; AND DEPS. APPROX 9 MINS LATER; THE TFC RUSH SUBSIDED. UPON REVIEWING MY FLT PROGRESS STRIPS; I REALIZED THAT THIS C210 WAS MISSING. I STARTED A WIDE SCAN AND FOUND HIM 15 MI OUTSIDE MY AIRSPACE AND WELL INTO MCO'S. THE ACFT DID NOT CONFLICT WITH ANY OTHER; AND APPROPRIATE IFR SEPARATION WAS NEVER LOST. I REALIZE THAT I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF ALL ACFT IN MY JURISDICTION AND HAVE REVISED MY CTL TECHNIQUE ACCORDINGLY. HOWEVER; THERE ARE A FEW DISTURBING CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS OPERROR. 1) THE INITIAL CTLR TAGGED THE NON MODE C ACFT INCORRECTLY. (I DID NOT KNOW.) THE TRACK SHOULD HAVE BEEN INITIATED FROM THE TAB LIST. HE RECEIVED NO SHARE OF BLAME. CORRECTIVE ACTION: TEACH CTLRS THE CORRECT METHOD FOR TAGGING A PRIMARY TARGET AND THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF INCORRECT METHODS. 2) STARS IS NOT PROGRAMMED FOR SAFETY. STARS HAS THE ABILITY TO CATEGORIZE ALL TRACKS AS DEPS; ARRS OR ENRTE. THE SOFTWARE IS WRITTEN IN SUCH A WAY THAT ALL MANUAL TRACK STARTS ARE ARRS. ALL ARPTS HAVE A 'DROP BOX' CREATED OVER THE ARPT PROPER. THIS PREVENTS DATA TAGS FROM ACCUMULATING OVER THE ARPT AND CLUTTERING THE INDICATORS. BY ITSELF -- A GREAT FUNCTION. THE SAFETY ISSUE IS THAT AN ENRTE ACFT WITH A MANUAL TAG IS SEEN AS AN ARR. IF IT OVERFLIES THE ARPT PROPER; THE SOFTWARE DROPS THE TAG. CORRECTIVE ACTION: A SAFE AND EASY FIX IS TO REPROGRAM STARS ON A NATIONAL LEVEL TO SEE ALL MANUAL TRACK STARTS AS ENRTE. THE ONLY DRAWBACK FOR CTLRS IS A FEW EXTRA KEYSTROKES TO MANUALLY DROP THE TAG. TAGS WOULD NEVER JUST DROP OFF. I COULD ONLY IMAGINE THIS SCENARIO PLAYING OUT IN ATL OR NEW YORK TRACON. I BELIEVE THE FAA IS WILLING TO CLOSE THIS CASE AND CALL IT AN OPERROR. THE REAL PROB IS THE SOFTWARE. THERE ARE SO MANY QUIRKS TO STARS THAT ARE NOT TAUGHT; BUT RATHER LEARNED ON THE JOB OR PASSED ON FROM ATCS TO ATCS. LET'S NOT MAKE THIS ONE OF THEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.